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Chapter 1  
Studying Investor Behavior 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to enhance insights into the potential value of financial advisors in 
retail portfolio decisions. This thesis offers four main contributions, three of which are 
empirical in nature and based on data from a large group of retail investors. The last 
contribution stems from an extensive review of related literature.  
To introduce these four contributions, this first chapter describes a framework with two 
approaches to the study of retail investor behavior, and discusses both the roles and the 
environment surrounding financial advice. The economic approach in Section 1.2 deals 
with the neoclassical economic paradigm of how investors should behave; the behavioral 
approach in Section 1.3 describes how investors behave in reality. To study the added 
value of financial advisors, both approaches are equally important: The former provides 
advisors with a powerful benchmark for “smart” behavior, and the latter offers insights on 
why investors do not always act normatively. A financial advisor thus faces a daunting 
task in finding a “meeting of the ways” to help investors make decisions that best serve 
their interests. This meeting of the ways is nicely illustrated in one of the 
recommendations1 to financial advisors that Kahneman and Riepe (1998, p. 62) offer, 
namely, that advisors should “maximize the client’s overall well-being (which includes 
emotional as well as financial health).” Next, I discuss the role and institutional 
environment of financial advisors in Section 1.4, then in Sections 1.5 and 1.6, I address the 
research problem and provide an overview of the thesis, respectively.  
1.2 Economic Approach to Investor Behavior 
Finance is grounded in neoclassical economics, which also applies to investment decision 
behavior. Neoclassical economics assumes optimizing agents who make rational decisions, 
display preferences aligned with expected utility, and use portfolio theory to construct 
investment portfolios. I briefly define each of these concepts in the following sections. 
  
                                                     
1
 This eleventh recommendation in Kahneman and Riepe (1998) is reproduced in Appendix A to this chapter. 
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1.2.1 Rationality 
Rationality is an idealized, normative, economic decision-making design of individuals. 
Behavior is rational to the extent to which it is effective, efficient, and consistent; thus, it 
relates to the quality of the judgment and decision making. Rationality is also a relative 
concept that depends on the amount of knowledge and the objectives possessed by the 
decision maker. Economic rationality typically refers to unbounded rationality. This 
implies that the objectives are known and well-defined, all information is available and 
used in an unbiased fashion, and choices are consistent.  
1.2.2 Expected Utility Theory and Risk Aversion 
The concept of rationality in financial decision making is deeply rooted in expected utility 
theory.2 This theory, developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) is based on 
earlier work by Bernoulli (1738), and provides a normative model of rational choice under 
risk. Thus, people maximize their well-being (or utility), given their preferences and 
constraints, by aggregating the probability-weighted (wealth) outcomes, measured in terms 
of utility. Utilities are subjective and usually nonlinearly related to money amounts, as 
displayed in a utility function. People behave rationally if they make choices that 
maximize their expected utility, so in this framework, economic agents are optimizers (i.e., 
maximizers, given their constraints).  
 
Generally speaking, the expected utility framework presupposes risk aversion. Those who 
prefer a certain outcome more than a gamble that provides at least the same expected 
payoff are risk averse. To accept the gamble, these decision makers have to be 
compensated. Their risk attitude, induced by the curvature of the utility function, 
determines the degree of compensation they require. A concave function indicates risk 
aversion, and the more concave the function is, the more risk averse the person is. 
Empirical evidence indicates that a majority of people prefer to avoid risk and are prepared 
to take it on only if they receive compensation.  
 
Expected utility rests on a set of assumptions (or axioms), such as (1) comparability (or 
completeness), which means that agents have well-defined preferences and thus can rank 
all prospects; (2) transitivity, such that preferences are consistent (e.g., if a person prefers 
A over B and B over C, then A must be preferred over C); and (3) invariance, which 
means that preferences are independent of the context (or framed independently) 
(Copeland, Weston and Shastri, 2005). 
 
 
                                                     
2
 Another component of rationality is the updating of probabilities from new information according to the 
Bayesian theorem. See e.g. Ackert and Deaves, 2010, p. 92-93. 
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1.2.3. Portfolio Theory 
Modern portfolio theory, (Markowitz, 1952b), is an important theory in Finance. It 
assumes that the preferences of investors are solely defined in terms of means and 
variances of returns.3 The key insight of this theory is that though the expected return of a 
portfolio is the weighted average of the returns of its individual components, the portfolio 
variance is not. Because asset returns typically are not perfectly correlated, combining 
securities in portfolios leads to a portfolio variance that is lower than the weighted average 
of the variances of its components. This insight is the core of the diversification principle 
and guides the investment decisions of many investors. 
Combining all possible investments into portfolios using varying weights for each asset 
can be depicted by a mean and standard deviation diagram of portfolio returns that 
represents all feasible portfolios. The boundary of this diagram indicates the efficient 
frontier, which comprises all portfolios that offer the highest expected return for a given 
amount of risk or else the lowest possible risk given a certain level of expected return. 
Rationality and maximizing expected utility implies that investors should only choose 
portfolios that are on the efficient frontier.  
The foundations of neoclassical finance provide a useful framework for defining normative 
behavior. However, it lacks the power to explain the observed decision-making behavior 
of economic agents in reality. The following section describes how insights from 
psychology and sociology are better able to explain observed financial decision making.  
1.3 Behavioral Approach to Studying Investments 
Behavioral finance is an academic field that applies behavioral concepts to the study of 
portfolio investments, corporate finance, and capital markets. This interdisciplinary 
approach incorporates insights from economics, psychology, and sociology and departs 
from the rationality assumption of neoclassical finance discussed in Section 1.2. Whereas 
neoclassical finance is normative in nature, behavioral finance represents a positive (or 
descriptive) science studying actual, rather than idealized, behaviors of agents and markets. 
It starts from the notion that financial decision making typically takes place in complex, 
opaque, uncertain environments, in which people do not behave as described by rational 
choice models. 
Behavioral finance builds on research into bounded rationality, which relates to two of the 
building blocks of behavioral finance: framing and heuristics. A third building block 
involves emotions and self-attributes, a forth to social forces.  
 
                                                     
3
 MPT also is referred to the use of a mean-variance framework. 
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1.3.1 Bounded Rationality 
The concept of bounded rationality implies that humans are limited in their decision-
making capabilities  (Simon, 1957). Decision makers therefore should be modeled as 
satisfiers, seeking a satisfying rather than an optimal solution. March (1994) provides an 
effective framework for studying investment behavior that relates the role of heuristics and 
framing to the concept of bounded rationality. March (1994, p. 8) also opposes the 
rationality assumption because “Studies of decision making in the real world suggest that 
not all alternatives are known, that not all consequences are considered, and that not all 
preferences are evoked at the same time.” He further introduces bounded (or limited) 
rationality: “individuals are intendedly rational. Although decision makers try to be 
rational, they are constrained by limited cognitive capabilities and incomplete information, 
and thus their actions may be less than completely rational in spite of their best intentions 
and efforts” (March, 1994, p. 9). March identifies four human “fallacies”: (1) limited 
attention, (2) faulty memory, (3) limited comprehension capacities, and (4) limited 
communication capacities. As a consequence of these limits, “Decision makers use various 
information and decision strategies to cope with limitations in information and 
information-handling capabilities.” (March, 1994, p. 11). 
The fundamental simplification processes that March (1994) identifies are editing, 
decomposition, heuristics, and framing. Editing simplifies decisions by ignoring some 
dimension(s), treating dimensions sequentially rather than simultaneously, or weighing 
dimensions equally rather than by their importance. Decomposition refers to separating 
complex problems into manageable partial problems, which often ignores 
interrelationships. Heuristics are mental rules of thumb; framing, as discussed next, refers 
to the way people choose to perceive a phenomenon, problem, or outcome.  
1.3.1.1 Framing  
Framing deals with the way people code events. Framing separates form from substance 
and thus deals with perceptions. Experimental evidence indicates that the presentation of a 
decision problem may influence the ultimate decision. Ackert and Deaves (2010) define a 
decision frame as a decision maker’s view of the problem and possible outcomes. March 
(1994) suggests that decision makers typically do not make choices in a comprehensively 
inclusive context, which Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) label “narrow framing.” Key 
aspects of framing are reflected in the prospect theory of decision making under 
uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986), in mental 
accounting (Thaler, 1999) and in path dependence. 
a) Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory provides a framework for the way people make decisions when dealing 
with uncertainty. The theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), builds on work 
by Markowitz (1952a). The prospect theory value function is similar in character to that of 
STUDYING INVESTOR BEHAVIOR 
5 
 
the utility function. However, one of the major differences is that it evaluates changes in 
wealth relative to a reference point, not that they evaluate wealth states in absolute levels. 
Prospect theory further distinguishes two phases in the decision-making processes: 
framing and editing, and then evaluation. Outcomes are framed in terms of gains or losses, 
which in turn affect the decisions being made and the evaluations of the outcomes. In the 
evaluation phase, framed prospects then get evaluated, such that the most valued prospect 
is chosen. People are asymmetric in their attitudes toward gains and losses. An important 
element in this respect is loss aversion: People feel losses more intensely than gains and 
overweight losses (by an estimated factor of 2.25, according to Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991) compared with gains of the same magnitude. The value function is therefore steeper 
in the loss domain. To avoid a loss or make losses less painful, people apply “techniques” 
such as hedonic editing (Thaler, 1999).  
 
Another difference with the rational decision making theory is that prospect theory finds 
that risk tolerance depends on the (framing of the) situation. People tend to be risk averse 
for gains and risk seeking for losses. In choosing between a sure gain and a gamble with 
an equal or higher expected value, people tend to select the sure gain. In choosing between 
a sure loss or gamble with an equal monetary loss, people tend to prefer the gamble. This 
asymmetric risk attitude is displayed in value functions that are convex for gains but 
concave in the domain of losses. Risk attitudes also change for outcomes that involve 
small probabilities. In gain settings, people become risk seeking (e.g., buy a lottery ticket), 
whereas for losses, they become risk averse (e.g., buying insurance). They tend to pay 
more for an increase in probability from 90% to 100% than for a jump from 30% to 40%. 
This tendency is displayed in the probability weighing function, another key aspect of 
prospect theory. People tend to weight probabilities subjectively, such that low probability 
events are overweighed, whereas moderate and high probability events are underweighted.  
b) Mental Accounting  
Mental accounting is the cognitive process of assigning financial events into categories, 
making financial decisions, and evaluating outcomes (Thaler, 1999). Money in one 
account appears imperfectly substitutable for money in another, contradicting the 
economic notion of fungibility. Choices are altered by the introduction of imaginary 
boundaries. Mental accounting relates to framing and arises when people assign costs and 
benefits to one object instead of taking the whole into consideration. Typically a mental 
account contains all costs and benefits related to one decision.  
 
Thaler (1999) identifies three components of mental accounting: (1) how outcomes are 
perceived and experienced, (2) how activities are assigned to specific accounts, and (3) 
how often accounts are evaluated. Mental accounting assumes that outcomes are evaluated 
in terms of prospect theory. Money is typically framed (or labeled) as budget 
expenditures, wealth accounts, or income categories. This categorization results in 
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different attitudes and behaviors. Following a purchase, a new mental account opens, and 
people feel emotional pain if they must close the account, without having experienced the 
pleasure that should have resulted from the purchase. This mechanism also applies to 
investing. Investors open a new account when buying a new stock. This mental separation 
inhibits an overall picture of the investment portfolio. Closing a seperate account at a loss 
is painful. Mental accounting (combined with other behavioral theories) thus predicts that 
people will be reluctant to sell securities at a loss. In addition, as investments occur over a 
period of time, investors are free to select the evaluation period. Empirical evidence 
indicates that investors typically select a rather short period of around one year to evaluate 
portfolio results, which may lead to “myopic loss aversion,” a phenomenon that may 
drives the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler, 1993). 
 
After setting up a scheme of mental accounts, individual decision makers may alter the 
boundaries between accounts, in a process labeled “hedonic editing.” In this process, 
people strive to attain maximal happiness in evaluating (joint) outcomes by integrating or 
segregating outcomes. They might integrate a gain with a smaller loss, to “cover” the loss 
and offset the negative emotion due to loss aversion. In general, through hedonic editing, 
people (1) segregate gains, (2) integrate losses, (3) integrate smaller losses with larger 
gains, and (4) segregate small gains from larger losses. evidence on loss integration is 
contradictory (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). 
 
Arguably, the most important point derived from mental accounting is that “rules are not 
neutral” (Thaler, 1999, p. 243). The perceived attractiveness of choices and subsequent 
outcomes depend on how they are framed, how often they are evaluated, and whether or 
not they are combined with other choices.  
c) Path dependence 
Prior outcomes influence decisions, in contrast with a normative view that suggests only 
incremental factors should be taken into account. For example, people are more hesitant to 
buy a (new) ticket after losing it than they are had they lost the monetary equivalent of 
that ticket. The willingness to engage in risky activities also depends in part on what 
happened prior to the decision. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 287) illustrate: “a person 
who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be 
unacceptable to him otherwise.” In this respect, three effects emerge: the house money 
effect, the snake bite effect, and the break-even effect. 
 
Thaler and Johnson (1990) introduce the house money effect, which stipulates that a prior 
gain stimulates risk seeking within the same mental account. An essential feature is that 
possible losses are not coded as losses but rather as reductions in gains, which mitigates 
loss aversion. At first sight, this behavior might seem to contradict prospect theory, which 
predicts more risk aversion in the gain domain, but prospect theory also describes one-
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shot gambles only. Sequential gambles are sometimes integrated, and after a large gain, 
people apparently move away from loss aversion in the value function. 
Typically, people become more risk averse after experiencing a loss, a tendency labeled 
the snake bite effect (Ackert and Deaves, 2010). Experiments by Johnson and Thaler 
(1990) indicate that participants believed that losing money after an initial loss hurt more 
than losing money without the prior loss. People were not willing to risk additional losses. 
After a loss, people become averse to additional losses, such that risk aversion increases. 
There is one noteworthy exception though: When an opportunity exists to recover the 
whole loss, that is, to break even, people are willing to accept more risk after initial losses. 
The possibility to close a mental account without any loss is very attractive because of the 
effects of loss aversion. The preference for long shots at the end of a betting day in horse 
races may illustrate this effect. 
A study of behavior in a large game show provided additional evidence for these results, 
which previously had relied solely on hypothetical choices in the laboratory. Post et al. 
(2008) analyze the behavior of contestants on the game show Deal or No Deal, which 
requires participants to choose between a sure amount and a gamble repeatedly during the 
show. The decisions of game contestants appear greatly affected by what happened before, 
in support of both the house money effect and the break-even effect. 
1.3.1.2 Heuristics 
Economic agents may use heuristics because they lack the cognitive ability to process and 
compute the expected utility of all possible actions. Nofsinger (2011, p. 76) characterizes 
heuristics as “shortcuts the brain uses to reduce the complexity of information analysis.” 
Heuristics refer to the process by which people find out things for themselves, usually by 
trial and error, which leads to rules of thumb that can be useful in real life, because they 
allow for decision making without the need of fully digesting all the information. They 
also can lead to errors though, because they cause misjudgments of probabilities and 
relationships at the same time. Probability judgment is often essential in financial decision 
making, so understanding heuristics is critical to understanding financial behavior. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) describe three major heuristics: representativeness, availability, and 
anchoring and adjustment. The affect heuristic also has gained prominence, and other 
documented heuristics include the familiarity heuristic. 
a) Representativeness 
Representativeness refers to judgments based on stereotypes. People tend to estimate 
probabilities based on comparison with known situations instead of relying on a statistical 
probability. An illustrative and frequently cited example is the “Linda example” from 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1982) study. The participants received the following 
description:  
CHAPTER 1 
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Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and 
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
Then they considered a question: “Which is more probable?: A. Linda is a bank teller; B. 
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.” Option B was chosen by 
85% of the respondents, apparently because B fits better, or is more representative, of 
Linda, even though A is less restrictive and thus more probable. This tendency also has 
been referred to as the conjunction fallacy. 
Representativeness also entails the tendency to assign a memory to a random process. 
Seeing chance as a self-correcting process is the gamblers’ fallacy (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1994). On a roulette table for example, after a sequence of red outcomes, the 
perceived probability of black being the next outcome increases above the actual statistical 
probability of 50%. This fallacy relates to sample size neglect (or the law of small 
numbers), which occurs when people draw conclusions using too few data points. 
Representativeness relates to the tendency to perceive causal relationships behind random 
fluctuations too. Investors perceive trends where there are none. The so-called 
extrapolation bias is the tendency to make predictions by extrapolating past (perceived) 
patterns in a naïve fashion. Furthermore, in making predictions, people may forget that 
outcomes typically regress to the mean. In estimating the grades of college students for 
example, people put too much weight on high school grades, thereby overrating the 
successful students and underrating the less successful ones.  
b) Availability 
People use the availability heuristic when they assign probabilities to outcomes by the ease 
with which they come to mind. Retrieving information from the mind is easier when 
instances are more familiar, more salient (if it had more impact), or more recent. Thus 
people tend to drive more carefully after seeing an accident. The availability heuristic also 
arises when people use the ease of imagining an outcome in their judgments of 
probabilities. This bias may lead to ignoring (or underweighing) risks that cannot be 
imagined or overestimating risks that can be imagined very vividly. 
c) Anchoring and adjustment 
Through anchoring and adjustment, people make estimates from an initial number but 
adjust insufficiently (e.g., forecasting a stock index based on the current level, forming 
new earnings estimates after an earnings surprise) or incorrectly use a random number as 
the base for their estimation. In prospect theory terms, anchoring relates to the use of a 
reference point. Anchoring also relates to belief perseverance (or conservatism), such that 
people cling to their previously formed beliefs. People prefer to search for confirming 
information (so-called confirmation bias) and are reluctant to search for evidence that 
contradicts their beliefs. When exposed to contradictory evidence, people typically treat 
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the new information skeptically. This way of dealing with conflicting information has been 
introduced in a broader sense as cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).  
d) Affect 
Affect is the immediate emotional response to some stimulus (e.g., the name of a particular 
firm), which is typically either positive or negative. Relying on such feelings in judgments 
and decision making is characterized as the affect heuristic. According to Kahneman 
(2002, p. 470), “the idea of an affect heuristic is probably the most important development 
in the study of judgment heuristics in the last decades.” People’s reliance on the affect 
heuristic certainly offers them some advantages, in that it “is a quicker, easier and more 
efficient way to navigate in a complex, uncertain and sometimes dangerous world” (Slovic 
et al., 2002, p. 398). Affective feelings may guide decision making, especially when 
alternatives are difficult to evaluate (as is the case for many investment choices). Affect is 
related to mood, which may affect prices in stock markets. Hirshleifer and Shumway 
(2003) find that nice weather puts investors in a positive mood, makes them more risk 
tolerant, and thus drives up prices. 
e) Ambiguity Aversion and Familiarity 
Finally, aversion to ambiguity parallels the familiarity bias, because it implies that people 
prefer the familiar to the unfamiliar. They are less inclined to gamble if the odds are 
unknown, compared with a gamble in which the odds are known. People prefer risk to 
uncertainty, and they prefer gambles that they believe they understand better. Heath and 
Tversky (1991) relate this finding to the competence effect: When people feel more 
competent, they prefer to bet on their own judgment. 
1.3.2 Emotions and Self-Attributes 
Emotions, such as fear, hope, anger, regret, pride, worry, excitement, guilt and mood may 
also influence investment decision making. According to Nofsinger (2010), the influence 
of emotions on decision is larger for more complex and uncertain situations. Damasio 
(1994) even finds that without emotions, reasonable decisions are impossible.  
Fear and hope are the key emotions in the two-factor theory of risky choice offered by 
Lopez (1987). In making decisions in an uncertain environment, people balance their 
desire for security and potential. They prefer gambles that combine high levels of security 
(little fear) with some upside potential (a lot of hope). Fear is the dominant emotion for 
risk-averse people; hope the dominant one for risk seekers. In the behavioral portfolio 
theory of Shefrin and Statman (2000), these emotions translate into two distinct layers in 
portfolio composition, focused on the downside or the upside. Aspiration level in turn 
deals with the probability of falling below a certain level and reflects both opportunities 
and needs.  
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The affect heuristic has strong emotional ties. Affective impressions are positive or 
negative in nature, and thus contrast the visceral factors discussed in Loewenstein (2003). 
Visceral factors include immediate and typically negative emotions such as fear and anger, 
and also relate to drive states such as hunger, or feeling states such as pain. Immediate 
emotions are experienced at the time of the decision. According to Loewenstein (2003), 
visceral factors play an essential, probably dominant, role in human decision making. 
Visceral factors may make people behave in conflict with their own self-interest. 
Loewenstein (2003) argues that most self-control problems involve visceral factors; they 
also play an important role in decision making under risk and uncertainty, because the 
evaluation of risk on a cognitive level differs from emotional reactions to that same risk.  
Anticipated emotions, such as regret and disappointment, instead are expected to be 
experienced in the future and not at the time of decision making (Loewenstein, 2003). 
Although these emotions emerge after an outcome has occurred, they influence decision 
making, because people anticipate them. Although regret and disappointment are related, 
regret implies a sense of responsibility for the outcome. Both depend on the degree to 
which people can imagine another (more desirable) outcome and the salience of that 
alternative outcome. The pain that occurs from realizing that a previous decision turned out 
poorly makes people regret averse. Furthermore, regret associated with not acting (i.e., 
regret of omission) is felt less intensely than the regret resulting from action (i.e., regret of 
commission). It is easy to imagine that not acting was the better choice. 
Emotions typically drive self-attributes such as overconfidence and limited self-control. 
Psychologists define an overconfident person as one who believes he or she has more 
accurate information than he or she actually does. People tend to be overconfident in their 
own predictions and set narrow confidence intervals. Such overconfidence is labeled 
“miscalibration,” but overconfidence also can relate to a “better than average effect.” 
When asked about some ability, people generally rate themselves as better than average. 
The “excessive optimism” type of overconfidence occurs when people assign overly high 
probabilities to favorable outcomes and low probabilities to unfavorable ones. Two biases 
drive such overconfidence: self-attribution and hindsight. The former occurs when people 
relate successful outcomes to their own expertise and/or good judgment and unsuccessful 
outcomes to bad luck and/or others. The latter relates to the perception people have when 
they look back at a previously predicted probability. They may assert that they knew a 
certain outcome was about to happen, which often is not true. An illusion of control also 
can create overconfidence; people tend to place larger bets on a coin toss before rather than 
after the toss, even if the outcome has not yet been revealed. This trend indicates that 
people believe their involvement might change the outcome. Finally, overconfidence stems 
from the illusion of knowledge, which refers to an incorrect belief that more information 
leads to more knowledge. Overconfidence is rooted in emotions as it protects someone’s 
self-esteem, the feeling of one’s own worth, and thus aids in emotional self-preservation. 
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Limited self-control deals with the difficulty people have executing their will power and 
their preference for current as opposed to deferred gratification. Limited self-control may 
lead to procrastination when effort must be expended now to obtain a future benefit. Thus 
people recognize the need to save money but fail to do so, because other options provide 
more immediate satisfaction. Such preferences may lead to dynamic inconsistencies, given 
that preference reversals typically occur in the present, not when the same trade-off refers 
to sometime in the future. To model such behavior, researchers have introduced the 
concept of hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Laibson, 1997). Thaler and Shefrin (1981) define 
self-control as an internal conflict, parallel to that of an organization facing agency 
problems, though people often adopt similar techniques to cope with such agency 
problems. Humans appear to have two sets of preferences that are in conflict at some point 
in time, such that they function as “doers” who are myopically and emotionally short 
sighted and “planners” who think more rationally in the long term.  
1.3.3 Social Forces 
Experimental results from ultimatum, dictator, and trust games imply that most people are 
concerned with issues such as fairness, reciprocity, and trust, even when retaliation or 
reputation effects are ruled out, which rejects the idea that people are primarily driven by 
self-interest (Ackert and Deaves, 2010). Conformity also can drive behavior when people 
give in to real or imagined social pressure (Ackert and Deaves, 2010). Conformity may 
lead to herding; it implies disregarding one’s own information and following the behavior 
of others. Especially when information acquisition is costly, such behavior may be wise, 
which implies social learning. Herding also may result from people having similar 
information, a process in which the media may play an important role. 
1.3.4 Overview 
Sections 1.2 and 1.3 describe two approaches to the study of investor behavior. The 
economic approach deals with normative behavior and provides a powerful rational 
framework that may serve as a benchmark against which to compare actual behavior. 
Actual behavior appears within the behavioral approach and deals with the impact of 
framing, heuristics, emotions, and social forces. In categorizing behavior though, it is 
necessary to recognize that human behaviors are intertwined with cognitive, emotional and 
social forces. Labels of behaviors are helpful for grasping complex concepts such as 
human behavior, but readers must recognize the inherent simplification that results from an 
analytical distinction of categories. Illustrating the existence of interdependencies, Ackert 
and Deaves (2010) state that cognitively, a person’s perception includes affective 
reactions, and those affective reactions offer cognitive representations of distinct body 
states. The lack of linearity of the weighing function in prospect theory also may have an 
emotion basis, and loss aversion may be driven by fear. Although mental accounting is a 
cognitive operation, the self-control problem it may help solve may be rooted in the fear of 
outliving the available means.  
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1.4 The Role of Investment Advice 
The core of this thesis pertains to the potential value that investment advisors add to retail 
portfolio decision making. Assessments of such added value greatly benefit from a 
sensible benchmark. Portfolios that are independently managed by so-called execution-
only investors are a natural candidate for this investigation. Considering the prominence of 
investment advisors and execution-only investors in this thesis, I start with a brief 
explanation.  
 
Loonen (2006) positions investment advice between execution-only and discretionary 
asset management services. He defines execution-only as a transaction-oriented service, 
primarily aimed at executing trades at low cost, whereas discretionary asset management is 
a relationship-oriented activity aimed at making investment decisions on behalf of the 
investor. At their intersection, an investment advisor bridges the asymmetry in experience, 
knowledge, and means and provides the investor with profitable act–oriented advice. The 
final decision to act remains with the investor though. Loonen (2006) thus offers a detailed 
definition of an investment advisor:  
A person, who made it his profession, working for a financial institution or 
independently, to advise by means of business contact in a (pro)active or reactive 
way on the composition of an investment portfolio or just on the purchases and 
sales of securities. This advice is based on an analysis. The fee for this advice 
consists of a transaction dependent remuneration combined or not with a fixed fee.  
Another definition comes from the Dutch Act on Financial Supervision (“Wet op het 
financieel toezicht” or Wft) that attributes a product-oriented role to the advisor, who 
engages in the recommendation of products, pension agreements, insurance, or financial 
instruments (Wft1.1.1).  
 
From these definitions, it appears that the role of financial advisors is to advise on 
investment portfolios or recommend financial products, but this assertion is more 
tautological than helpful. I therefore review what others have said about the actual role of 
financial advisors. 
 
An economic perspective on financial advisors, who often are part of financial institutions, 
indicates that they act as intermediaries between individuals and capital markets to reduce 
frictions and transaction costs, as well as transform risks, terms, quantities, and 
information. Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) say that financial advisors’ core of existence 
lies in bridging information asymmetry. Using an advisor enables investors to economize 
on information costs, or the time and money spend to acquire and understand information. 
In this sense, advisors lower information costs by developing expertise. 
 
From a behavioral viewpoint, the mitigation of behavioral biases and errors (and thus 
improved investment decisions) offers another reason to hire a professional. This role is 
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the focus of Kahneman and Riepe (1998), who describe financial advice as a prescriptive4 
activity that guides investors to make decisions that best serve their interests. As they state:  
To advise effectively, advisors must be guided by an accurate picture of the 
cognitive and emotional weaknesses of investors that relate to making investments 
decisions: their occasional faulty assessment of their own interest and true wishes, 
the relevant facts that they tend to ignore, and the limits of their ability to accept 
advice and to live with the decisions they make (p. 52). 
Providing timely warnings about the pitfalls of intuition should be one of the 
responsibilities of financial advisors (p. 53). 
The anticipation, diagnosis, and management of investor discomfort and regret are 
central elements of responsible financial advising and therefore part of the 
financial advisor’s job description (p. 62). 
These statements can be operationalized as a comprehensive list of practical 
recommendations5 that guide financial advisors in their main tasks. Considering their 
relevance for this thesis, I regrouped these recommendations into six main categories that 
may serve as a useful framework for understanding financial advisors’ role. 
a) Education and communication 
Advisors should teach investors about financial markets and the instruments to 
participate in it, make investors aware of the role of uncertainty, communicate realistic 
expectations, and provide clear examples. 
b) Framing 
The presentation greatly affects the perception, choice, and satisfaction of investors. 
Advisors must make sure to frame as broadly as possible, but also to choose the frame 
that is relevant for the client. The proper design of the format to present information is 
part of this task.  
c) Investor characteristics and investment goals 
Before building a portfolio, the advisor’s main goal should be to get as clear a picture 
as possible of the investor, including the susceptibility to biases. 
d) Personalize 
Advice should be segmented according to client characteristics, such as sophistication, 
wealth, and degree of loss aversion. 
e) Sensible policies 
Advisors should agree on a set of procedures beforehand and make the client feel 
responsible for any decisions made. 
f) Know your own biases 
The advisors’ knowledge of his or her own susceptibility to biases may help build 
satisfactory client relationships.  
                                                     
4
 Prescriptive is not the same as normative, which implies behavior that follows the axioms of rational choice. 
Prescriptive is concerned with providing practical advice. 
5
 All 44 recommendations are listed in Appendix A at the end of the chapter. 
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The Dutch Finance Authority (AFM, 2011) implicitly stresses the importance of aspects A 
and C when it indicates: “the focus on skills in many banks and other financial institutions 
is primarily aimed at investment skill. In developing professionalism of advisors, the skills 
needed to get to know and inform the client well during the inventory process receive less 
attention.”  
 
Pompian (2012) also introduces four fundamental characteristics of a successful advisory 
relationship: 
a) The advisor understands the client’s financial goals. 
To define these goals, an advisor should also understand the psychology and emotions 
underlying the decisions behind the goal creation. 
b) The advisor maintains a systematic approach. 
The advisor should bring discipline into the investment process. 
c) The advisor delivers what the client expects. 
Crucial to this aspect is to fully understand what drives the investor, so that 
expectations can be addressed. 
d) The relationship benefits both client and advisor. 
Assuming the advisor benefits most when advisory relationships last, it is crucial to 
establish a strong bond.  
 
Based on these four aspects, the role of an advisor is to establish a long-lasting relationship 
aimed at a disciplinary investment approach that rests on a thorough understanding of the 
client.  
 
Advisors may serve some additional roles as well. As Shefrin (2002) narrates in a 
hypothetical example of an investor named John, “…the shifting of responsibility from 
John to his advisor is one of the main services for which John’s advisor gets paid. Hand 
holding may be every bit as important as traditional advice, if no more so” (p. 129), such 
that, “Having a financial advisor enables the investor to carry a psychological call option. 
If an investment decision turns out well, the investor can take the credit, attributing the 
favorable outcome to his/her own skill. If the decision turns out badly the investor can 
protect his/her ego by blaming the advisor” (p. 130). A survey (ICI, 2007) among U.S. 
mutual fund investors also provides some support for this view of advisors’ roles. Investors 
indicate that hiring a financial advisor gives them peace of mind about their investments.  
 
Loonen (2006) introduces four roles applicable to a financial advisor: (1) bargain hunter, 
(2) risk analyst, (3) personal advisor, and (4) fiduciary. The bargain hunter has a good feel 
for deals in financial markets and makes more profitable trades than the investor would do 
on her or his own. The risk analyst analyzes the investor’s portfolio thoroughly, whereas 
the personal advisor knows the investor well and incorporates this knowledge into his or 
her advice. Finally, the fiduciary represents the investors’ financial interests. The results of 
a survey of 1,001 investors and 209 investment advisors regarding their views of the four 
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roles appear in Table 1 (Loonen, 2006). For most investors, the risk analyst role is most 
important, followed by personal advisor and fiduciary. In contrast, advisors see themselves 
mainly as a personal advisor, while the role of bargain hunter only fits a few advisors.  
 
Table 1.I Roles of a Financial Advisor 
Source: Loonen (2006) 
 Investors Advisors6 
Bargain hunter 45.1% 7.1% 
Risk analyst 79.1% 68.2% 
Personal advisor 67.7% 82.9% 
Fiduciary 68.2% 67.2% 
 
The evidence presented in this section suggests that financial advisors serve many potential 
roles. I categorize and summarize them in a six-role framework.  
I. Financial economist 
The advisor offers investment knowledge, skill, and discipline; lowers information 
costs; analyzes risks; and is a sounding board. 
II. Financial psychologist 
The advisor knows how to access and deal with susceptibility to biased reasoning 
and decision making, including his or her own; she or he can act as a debiaser, 
stress reliever, comfort bringer and hand holder. Framing effects may help the 
advisor in this role. 
III. Personal advisor 
The advisor knows the characteristics, motives, and goals of the investor and 
incorporates this into her or his advice. 
IV. Relationship manager 
The advisor knows how to establish and keep long-lasting relationships with 
clients and acts as a fiduciary. 
V. Salesperson  
The advisor operates in a commercial environment. The advisor and/or financial 
institution should also benefit from the advisory relationship. 
VI. Teacher 
The advisor should help the investor understand, explaining concepts like risk and 
return, diversification, securities, mutual funds, fee structures, and so forth. 
In any advisory relationship, all of these roles are present to some extent. Of course, any 
advisory relationship is unique; advisors adapt their roles to the specifics of the investor 
and the context. 
 
                                                     
6
 Assuming an equal weight of the three size categories in Loonen (2006, p.144) 
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1.4.1 Moral Hazard Behavior 
Investors who engage in advisory relationships may encounter moral hazard risks from the 
point of their advisors. In as far as professionals operate in an organizational setting, they 
are subject to agency relationships. In general, such relationships induce incentive-based 
behaviors (Ross, 1973). These incentives relate to the different financial concerns of 
financial advisors: (1) generating commissions for the financial institution, (2) 
performance-based bonuses, and (3) the performance of investors’ portfolios (Loonen, 
2006). This aspect thus results from the salesperson role. Moral hazard behavior in 
advisor–investor relationships arises when the advisor engages in activities that are 
undesirable from the investor’s perspective or the advisor has an incentive to hide 
information. Such behavior is possible, because advisors typically have more information 
than the investor.  
1.4.2 The Environment of Financial Advice in the Netherlands  
The empirical research in this dissertation is based on data describing investor behavior in 
the Netherlands. Therefore, in this final part of Section 1.4, I explain relevant institutional 
arrangements in the Dutch investment environment. 
The number of households in the Netherlands was 7.4 million at the end of 2011. On 
average, their gross assets amounted €212,000, a large part of which was invested through 
collective pensions and life insurance arrangements (€152,000). The average household 
held €49,000 in deposits and €12,000 in individual investment portfolios, though relatively 
few households invested directly. In 2011, only 17.6% of the households (1.3 million) 
owned an investment portfolio (Millard Brown, 2011). Survey data from the Dutch Central 
Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank [DNB], 2008) indicate that the average portfolio (€70,000 
in 2007) of Dutch households that owned an investment portfolio contained 54% equity 
and 25% fixed income securities. 
The legal protection of individual investors in the Netherlands stems mainly from the 
Financial Supervision Act (Wet Financial Toezicht [Wft]), which took effect on 1 January 
2007. Starting on 1 November 2007, the European Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) also was implemented in the Wft. Supervision of the behavior of 
financial institutions toward retail investors is the responsibility of the Netherlands 
Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit Financiële Markten, [AFM]). The legal 
protection that the Wft provides builds on a “know your customer” principle and differs 
for asset management, investment advice, and other services, such as Internet or phone-
based brokerage (execution-only) services. A financial institution acting as an asset 
manager or investment advisor must conduct a so-called suitability test 
(geschiktheidstoets) to determine whether a financial product suits the personal 
characteristics of the investor. Therefore, the advisor must obtain information about a 
customers’ financial situation, investment knowledge, investment experience, investment 
STUDYING INVESTOR BEHAVIOR 
17 
 
objectives, and risk willingness, then ensure that all of his or her advice takes this 
information into consideration. For execution-only services, the requirements are less 
strict. Advisors only need to conduct a fitness test (passendheidstoets) to determine 
whether the investor has enough investment knowledge and experience to understand a 
financial product and its risk (Wft 4:23). Finally, the Wft provides a safety net by 
forbidding churning (BGfo 8.2.2, clause 84)7, that is, executing transactions with the sole 
purpose of benefitting the financial institution and/or advisor. 
In addition to the Wft, banks are required to follow the banking code (Nederlandse 
Vereniging van Banken [NVB], 2009), a code of conduct that took effect in 2010. 
Although this code provides rules on many aspects of bankers’ behavior, the customer due 
care principle (klant centraal) is arguably the most relevant for this thesis. Verhoef (2012) 
provides an overview of dilemmas that banks face in implementing this rule, as aptly 
illustrated in the conflict between bank profitability and client interests. According to 
Verhoef (2011), this dilemma is rooted in the focus on product profitability, whereas 
adopting a customer lifetime value focus could bridge seemingly conflicting aspirations. In 
a more general setting, this issue relates to conflicts of interest between clients and other 
stakeholders (e.g., employees, shareholders, bondholders, governments). A relevant 
additional aspect is the question of which client is relevant to the customer due care 
principle. If lower commissions or higher interest rates on the investment account for one 
investment client leads to higher mortgage rates for another, which interests should the 
bank serve?  
Furthermore, Dutch retail banks can signal the competence of their employees through the 
Dutch Securities Institute (DSI), which sets knowledge, integrity, and experience 
requirements for security specialists, including asset managers and investment advisors. 
The DSI also provides a register of professionals who meet its relevant criteria. Individual 
investors can take their complaints to the DSI complaints committee (Klachteninstituut 
Financiële Dienstverlening, [Kifid]) which makes binding decisions.8 The DSI aims to 
provide an incentive to act in the best interest of clients. 
In 2012, some new proposals offered suggestions on ways to improve the financial 
services provided to retail investors. The Dutch Minister of Finance proposed a new 
financial market directive (Wijzingsbesluit Financiële Markten 2013; Dutch Ministry of 
Finance, 2012) that includes a ban on commission sales and a bankers’ oath (de 
bankierseed). If the law is adopted, the Netherlands will follow the United Kingdom, 
where the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has also proposed a ban on commission 
sales starting in 2013. If this legislation gets adopted, financial advisors would charge their 
clients directly for their services and must be transparent in what they charge, leading to a 
separation of the trading in and selling of financial instruments and the related advice. So 
                                                     
7
 BGfo stands for Besluit Gedragstoezicht financiële ondernemingen; it is part of the Wft. 
8
 The complaint committee (geschillencommissie) handles only complaints about the financial institution; the 
financial ombudsman previously handled these complaints. 
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far, receiving financial advice is supposed to be “free,” and advisors are allowed to be paid 
indirectly, through the products they sell or trade, if some criteria9 are met 
(passendheidseis). The proposed MiFID II legislation explicitly bans commissions when 
firms describe their advice as independent. The bankers’ oath, applied to all employees of 
the financial institution, aims to make employees aware of their role in society and 
provides a moral–ethical obligation to behave appropriately. Taking such an oath is 
commonplace in other professions. Although the oath might not have much effect, it can 
provide support to someone faced with an ethical dilemma who must justify her or his 
behavior to an external party (De Bruin, 2012).  
1.5 Research Problem of the Thesis 
Given the abundant empirical evidence that individual investors make suboptimal portfolio 
decisions10, the question of how to improve the quality of retail investment decisions 
seems warranted. Various remedies have been proposed, one of which is the introduction 
of a professional financial advisor.11 To provide insight into the possible value added of 
financial advisors, this thesis addresses the following key question:  
What value, if any, do professional financial advisors provide in the investment 
portfolio decisions of retail investors?  
There are many ways to address such a question: I could rely on economic theory, evaluate 
existing empirical studies, ask investors or advisors about the role they believe advisors 
serve, study actual advisory meetings between advisors and their clients, consider portfolio 
decisions and outcomes in a laboratory setting, or do the same using field data. Ideally, all 
of these approaches should be pursued, but this thesis must choose among them. I review 
the scarce empirical studies available regarding the impact of financial advisors, but my 
main results rest on two data sets, one derived from portfolio and transaction records data 
from a retail bank and the other from a survey of a group of investors. 
Figure 1 displays both my key empirical strategy and the specific setting for financial 
advice.  
To summarize, the above mentioned key question of this thesis will be studies trough a 
comparison of self-directed investors and advised investors and their respective investment 
performances, their portfolio characteristics and some of their demographic and 
educational characteristics. Financial advisors are part of a financial institution (with its 
own policies, rules, and culture) that in turn is part of the Dutch institutional environment.  
                                                     
9
 BGfo 149a, clause 2 states that commissions must be reasonable, transparent and not inhibit the obligation to 
act in the best interest of the client. 
10
 This statement is mainly inferred from research discussed in Chapter 2. 
11
 Throughout this thesis, in accordance with prior literature, the terms “financial advisor” and “investment 
advisor” are used interchangeably. A financial advisor might serve a broader role, advising on many financial 
issues, whereas investment advisors often limit themselves to investment portfolio advice. Advisors in this 
thesis typically serve the more specialized role. 
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1.6 Overview of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into the following five chapters.  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of literature on retail investor behavior, which serves as a 
useful introduction for determining when a financial advisor may or may not help. The 
focus is on portfolio composition, trading behavior, and buying and selling securities. The 
last sections investigate the role of sophistication, which appears prominent for 
understanding the described behaviors.  
In Chapter 3, I provide the results from a comparison of advised and self-directed 
investment behavior. This research is based on a large data set that contains portfolio 
holdings and transaction records from a group of Dutch retail investors. The focus is on the 
differences in portfolio performance and portfolio composition between the two groups.  
Chapter 4 addresses a critical issue for evaluating the impact of advisory intervention. In 
comparing the behavior and outcomes of advised versus non-advised investors, self-
selection bias could cause some noise. This chapter therefore introduces the Hausman-
Taylor estimation as a potential remedy, considering the data available, such that Chapter 4 
offers primarily a methodological improvement over Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 5 determines the potential relationship among financial literacy, cognitive 
abilities, and the propensity to seek financial advice. It models the choice to hire an 
advisor, using financial literacy, cognitive abilities, and many other socio-economic 
variables as explanatory variables. 
In Chapter 6, I provide a summary of the main results and discuss their implications. 
A final note on the nature of chapters 3, 4 and 5: these chapters are directly derived from 
work that has been published or is in the process of going to be published. Therefore, each 
of these chapters is “self-contained”, and – as a consequence – will contain introductions 
and explanations that overlap with material from previous chapters. Also, each chapter 
may follow a different editorial format. 
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Appendix 1.A: Recommendations to financial advisors  
Taken from Kahneman and Riepe (1998); these recommendations have been regrouped by 
topic.  
A. Know your own biases 
1. Keep track of instances of your own confidence.  
2. Be mindful of your propensity for overconfidence when making statement to clients. 
3. Resist the natural urge to be overoptimistic and think, for example, of things that can 
go wrong. 
4. Because you are more likely to remember your successes, keep a list of past 
recommendations you made that were not successful. 
5. Ask yourself whether you have real reason to believe that you know more than the 
market. 
6. Before making an active decision, consider the possibility that the trade is based on 
random factors. List the reasons why it isn’t before making the trade. 
 
B. Education and communication 
 
7. Make clients aware of the uncertainty involved with investment decisions. 
8. Communicate realistic odds of success to your clients. 
9. Provide client with real-life examples of where it was better to “let the winners run” or 
“cut losses.” 
10. In the education process, be careful not to inadvertently reinforce the tendency toward 
overreaction to chance events. 
11. Drawing the investor’s attention to the role of statistical aggregation is perhaps the best 
remedy to unreasonable loss aversion (i.e. you win a few and lose a few, but in the 
long run, you come out ahead). 
12. Teach the investor the importance of taking a long-term view. 
13. If the investor drastically alters a portfolio based on short-term considerations, 
tactically point out the consequences of these actions the next time the urge arises. 
 
C. Framing 
 
14. When presenting historical data to clients, resist the tendency to focus on the upside. 
15. When presenting alternative courses of action to clients, do so using the broadest 
possible frame. 
16. Make sure the frame chosen has relevance for the client (e.g., wealth). 
17. For clients whose primary goal is retirement, consider converting the level of wealth 
into the amount of annuity that can be expected during retirement. 
18. Alert the client to the costs of narrow frames (e.g., simultaneous borrowing and 
saving). 
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19. Broad frames are preferable, but using mental accounts is probably the better option 
for those investors who use mental accounting as an instrument of self-control or who 
would suffer undue stress over losing money from a “safe” account.  
20. Design statements that give less prominence to the most recent quarter, and more to 
what has happened over the lifetime of the account. 
21. Redesign account statements to give greater prominence to the performance of the 
overall portfolio. Downplay what happened to each piece of the portfolio.  
22. When developing a client’s investment policy, follow a top-down process that 
accounts for all the investor’s objectives simultaneously. Avoid the common bottom-
up approach in which a separate policy is set up for each investor’s objective 
 
D. Investor characteristics and investment goals 
 
23. Optimists who are also regret prone have the worst combination of traits. Early 
identification of such tendencies is therefore useful. 
24. Some individuals may be more loss averse than others. Assess how loss averse each 
client is. 
25. Risk of loss is an important aspect of risk for most investors, but loss is a relative term. 
Determine the reference point from which a gain will be calculated. 
26. Identify the degree of aversion to different aspects of risk (e.g. shortfall risk, volatility, 
risk of loss). 
27. Pay more attention to what investors have done in the past than what they say they will 
do in the future. 
28. Recognize early which clients find it most difficult to stay the course and live with a 
long-term commitment. 
29. Maximize the client’s overall well-being (which includes emotional as well as 
financial health). 
30. Objective factors (e.g., investment horizon, liquidity needs) as opposed to emotional 
factors (e.g., aversion to risk, irrational fear of certain asset classes, propensity for 
regret) should receive the greater weight, but relative weights need not to be the same 
for all clients. 
31. When there is an extreme mismatch between the client’s goals and what actions the 
client’s emotional state will allow, consider ending the relationship. 
32. Encourage investors to confront their propensity for regret. 
33. Determine the type of regret to which your client is most susceptible 
(omission/commission). 
34. If clients are particularly prone to regrets of commission, a radical change in the 
investment policy or a decision that is out of character for them should prompt special 
caution. 
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E. Personalize 
 
35. Do not recommend very risky investments to loss-averse clients. They will accept 
such investments only if they optimistically underestimate risk. 
36. Sophisticated investors should consider using derivative overlays that limit the 
downside while retaining some upside participation. 
37. Higher net worth clients are also likely receptive to equity-linked structured notes. 
38. For lower end clients, equity-linked annuities can be an attractive option. 
 
F. Sensible policies 
 
39. Advisors should of course shop around to compare prices for these instruments. 
40. Before a purchase decision is made, discuss conditions in which a sale would be made. 
41. Encouraging clients to adopt and follow a sensible risk policy is one of the important 
tasks of financial advisors. 
42. Agree ahead of time on a set of procedures to follow in the event that the investor is 
tempted to make a portfolio alteration based on a hunch. 
43. Involve the client in the decision process so that decisions are “ours” and not the 
advisor’s alone. 
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Chapter 2 
A Review of Individual Investor Behavior 
Literature1 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of literature pertaining to individual investor behavior.2 
The study of individual (or retail) investors is important for two main reasons (de Bondt, 
1998). First, from a micro-level perspective, individual investment behavior affects the 
well-being of households. Households increasingly are responsible for their own financial 
future, so the question of how they fare is more relevant than ever. Second, from a macro-
level perspective, retail behavior appears systematic (Barber et al., 2009a) and therefore 
affects prices (Barber et al., 2009b).  
Given this importance, it is not surprising that the number of studies on retail investor 
behavior and performance is vast.3 Although these studies indicate substantial 
heterogeneity in both retail investor behavior and performance, some stylized facts 
emerge. This chapter details the research findings related to portfolio composition (Section 
2.2), trading behavior (Section 2.3), buying behavior (Section 2.4), and selling behavior 
(Section 2.5).  
Many of these behaviors have negative impacts on outcomes. Odean (1999) shows that the 
stocks U.S. investors buy underperform the stocks they sell, in line with Grinblatt and 
Keloharju’s (2001) report that stocks that Finnish investors buy exhibit weak future 
performance. Barber and Odean (2000) also find that the average U.S. individual investor 
earns meager risk-adjusted returns. Barber et al. (2009c), who analyze all stock market 
trades in Taiwan, indicate that whereas retail investors lose as much as 3.8% per year, 
professional parties gain from trading. Bauer et al. (2009) similarly provide evidence that 
Dutch online traders underperform, especially those who trade in options.  
                                                     
1
 A previous version of this chapter which was co-authored with Frans Tempelaar has been published in Risk 
Magazine (see volume 15, no 4, p. 30-35) 
2
 Other papers that review retail investor behavior are De Bondt (1998), Barberis and Thaler (2003), and Barber 
and Odean (2011).  
3
 A search on Scopus using “individual investor” or “retail investor” indicates almost 600 publications in peer-
reviewed journals since 1998. 
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But it also is important to note that though weak (long- term) performance may be a 
stylized fact, it ignores two additional findings. First, across four studies (Barber et al., 
2009a; Kaniel et al., 2008; Kaniel et al., 2010; Kelley and Tetlock, 2012), there is 
“intriguing evidence that individual investors’ trades positively predict returns at short 
horizons in the US”4 (Barber and Odean, 2011, p .10), which implies retail investors might 
perform well in the short run (up to one month). Second, significant heterogeneity has 
been documented in individual investor behavior. Many of the behaviors discussed have a 
negative impact on portfolio outcomes, though not for all investors.5 For example, 
mounting evidence suggests that sophistication drives good financial decision making, so 
mechanisms to increase investor sophistication might have the potential to benefit 
investors. Financial advice could introduce more sophistication to retail portfolios. 
Therefore, in Section 2.6, evidence about the impact of financial sophistication and 
professionalism on portfolio behaviors and outcomes will be discussed.  
2.2. Portfolio Composition  
Studies of portfolio composition mainly deal with how people diversify. Generally 
speaking, diversification in retail portfolios is limited, naïve, and significantly influenced 
by proximity considerations.  
2.2.1. Limited Diversification 
Choices about diversification arguably are among the most important portfolio decisions 
investors must make. Campbell (2006) calls diversification the “second major topic in 
household finance,”6 and using data from 100,000 Swedish households, he estimates that 
approximately half of the volatility in retail portfolios is non-systematic, due to a lack of 
sufficient diversification. Blume and Friend (1975) were perhaps the first to identify a lack 
of diversification in U.S. retail portfolios; more than half the investors in their sample held 
only one or two stocks, and only a small minority of investors held more than ten.7 More 
recent studies confirm widespread underdiversification. In their sample of U.S. online 
brokerage investors, Barber and Odean (2000) find the median (mean) number of stocks to 
be only 2.6 (4.3).  
Using this same data set Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) analyze the lack of diversification 
more thoroughly. Almost 30% of the investors held only one stock, and only 9% held 
                                                     
4
 Evidence from Taiwan indicates retail investors suffer losses in both the long and the short run though. 
5
 Barber and Odean (2000) find that approximately 43% of individual investors outperform the market after 
transaction costs. Approximately 25% do so with an excess return of 6% a year, whereas another 25% earn a 
negative excess return of 9% annually. Coval et al. (2005) document strong performance persistence among 
individual investors. 
6
 The first is financial market participation. 
7
 Campbell et al. (2001) note that a portfolio of 20-30 stocks attains a large fraction of the total benefits of 
diversification; Statman (1987) shows that an optimally diversified portfolio must include at least 30 stocks. 
Statman (2002) also has indicated that at least 120 stocks may be needed for an optimal level of diversification, 
using the rules of mean-variance portfolio theory. 
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more than ten. The level of diversification improves over time though: The average 
number of stocks held increased from four to seven during a six-year interval. Although 
holding more stocks generally improves diversification, the authors find no evidence of 
sophisticated diversification improvement (i.e., by holding less correlated stocks). In their 
study of 21,500 German online investors, Dorn and Huberman (2005) confirm a lack of 
diversification in German stock portfolios, in that the average portfolio in their sample 
contains four to five positions. Especially young and active traders tend to under-diversify. 
Anderson (2007) finds underdiversification in a sample of Swedish (online, small, very 
active) investors. The median (average) investor holds two (three) stocks, and the author 
suggests that the degree of diversification is related to skill.  
Various explanations for limited diversification have been advocated. For example, 
transaction and search costs or small portfolio sizes may be hurdles to diversified 
portfolios, or perhaps behavioral factors are needed to explain the empirical findings. 
Odean (1999) indicates that overconfidence leads to underdiversification when investors 
hold unrealistic views about specific stocks. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) confirm that 
the degree of underdiversification relates positively to overconfidence, as well as holding 
local stocks and trend chasing. Thus underdiversification appears at least partly driven by 
behavioral factors, a finding further supported by evidence that shows underdiversified 
investors typically underperform. In general, better diversified investors seems to have 
better stock picking abilities, and risk preferences also may play a role. Goetzmann and 
Kumar (2008) find that underdiversified investors prefer risky (higher volatility, higher 
beta) stocks and stocks with more skewed returns. 
Although this evidence on underdiversification is rather robust, some additional remarks 
are necessary to provide a complete story. Campbell (2006) notes that measuring an 
investor’s total portfolio is not easy, considering the lack of comprehensive data on each 
household or individual investor. In addition, evidence about limited diversification is 
limited itself, in that it tends to be based only on common stocks. Polkovnichenko (2005) 
finds that many investors simultaneously hold well-diversified mutual funds and 
underdiversified portfolios of common stock. Thus a singular focus on common stock 
understates the degree of diversification, because mutual funds generally provide investors 
with well-diversified portfolios. The huge size of the retail mutual fund market might 
imply that the limited diversification of individual investors is not as big a problem as 
many studies suggest. Calvet et al. (2007) confirm this view with another sample of 
Swedish households: 76% of Swedish households that own individual stocks also hold 
mutual funds. Thus, many Swedish households are well diversified, even though the 
authors still can identify a group that selects highly concentrated portfolios. 
Portfolio concentration is generally considered an investment error. Goetzmann and 
Kumar (2008) find that underdiversified investors typically underperform, though a small 
subset of active, underdiversified investors outperforms. Ivkovic et al. (2008) suggest that 
investors hold concentrated portfolios to exploit informational asymmetries and that 
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concentrated portfolios actually outperform diversified portfolios. In particular portfolios 
of wealthy investors or concentrating in non-S&P500, local stocks, and stocks with low 
analyst coverage outperform others, which suggests that informational asymmetries drive 
concentration.  
Insufficient diversification becomes manifest in more forms than just holding a limited 
number of individual stocks. The next sections offer more evidence of limited 
diversification among retail investors, as a result of naïve diversification and a 
concentration of portfolios in local, domestic, own-industry, or own-company stocks . 
2.2.2. Naïve Diversification 
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) find a remarkable framing effect when retirement contribution 
participants construct an investment portfolio. In various experimental survey designs, 
final asset allocations depend greatly on the funds being offered. Participants apparently 
use a naive diversification heuristic—or in its most extreme form, a 1/n heuristic—in 
which they evenly divide their money over the choice alternatives. When more stock funds 
are presented, participants increase their equity allocation; when more bond funds are 
presented, the same happens for their fixed income allocation. In one experimental 
condition, four out of five funds were fixed income funds and the other was a stock fund, 
equity exposure was 43%. When the choice option included four stock funds and one fixed 
income fund, the equity exposure rose to 68%. 
These experimental results were confirmed using data from 162 real retirement savings 
plans. In the low equity group (on average, 37% of the investment options were equity 
funds), the allocation to equity was 49%. For two other groups (medium equity, with 65%, 
and high equity, with 81%, of the alternatives in equity funds) equity allocation rose to 
60% and 65%. These authors also tested whether own-company stocks were mentally 
separated from other equity investments. In plans in which the sponsor’s stock was not 
offered as an option, contributions were evenly split between stocks and bonds. When 
company stock was an option, employees allocated 42% of their contributions to company 
stock; the rest of the contribution was evenly split between stock and bond funds. That is, 
employees appear to place own-company stock in a different mental account than equity 
investments in general; see also Section 2.2.3. 
In a longitudinal study of a single firm, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) further show that 
adding and removing funds greatly influences investor’s decisions. When offered a 
balanced and a bond fund, participants allocated 18% of their contributions to equity. 
When the company added three stock funds, equity allocation increased to 41% right after 
the introduction, then rose to 62% in the following two years. When the bond fund was 
removed, the average equity allocation was 71%. These changes appeared within a period 
of less than four years, so changing preferences were unlikely to drive the results. 
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Huberman and Jiang (2006) test the robustness of these findings using data from more than 
half a million 401(k) participants in the United States and find further evidence of a so-
called conditional 1/n diversification heuristic. Most investors only select about three to 
four funds, irrespective of the number of funds offered. Then having chosen the funds, 
investors use the 1/n heuristic and evenly spread their allocations across funds. The 
relation between equity exposure and the number of equity funds offered is more complex 
than Benartzi and Thaler (2001) suggested though; it also depends on the amount of funds 
offered. Only when the menu of available funds is relatively small (<10) does equity 
exposure depend significantly on the number of equity funds offered, and the effect is not 
as strong as suggested by Benartzi and Thaler (2001). For plans with more choice options 
(>10), they find no effect on equity allocation.  
Baltussen and Post (2011) conduct a laboratory experiment that confirms the conditional 
1/n heuristic. The participants limit their choice set by selecting assets that appear 
attractive in isolation and then divide their wealth evenly over the remaining assets. Only a 
few participants evenly distribute their wealth over all options, though when they were told 
about the benefits of diversification, they considerably improved the quality of their 
decisions. Financial education or advice thus might be enable people to avoid an overly 
simple diversification strategy. 
Vast literature has indicated that applying naïve diversification strategies does not 
automatically imply that portfolios are inefficient. DeMiguel et al. (2007) formally test the 
quality of a 1/n strategy and show that it outperforms many more advanced allocation 
mechanisms for selecting a portfolio of individual stocks. Although naïve diversification 
may not result in inefficient portfolios, the inherent framing effect may create a portfolio 
that does not match the risk preferences of the investor. 
2.2.3. Impact of Proximity 
Investors exhibit a clear preference for stocks to which they feel close. Evidence reveals an 
overweighing of own-company, own-industry, domestic, and local stocks. This preference 
may be driven by behavioral phenomena, such as the familiarity heuristic, the affect 
heuristic, myopia, or (perceived or real) informational asymmetries. 
2.2.3.1. Own-Company and Own-Industry Stock 
Traditional finance theory has a clear implication for employees investing in own-
company stock: It’s unwise. Evidence from the 2001 defaults of firms such as Enron and 
Global Crossing exemplified the risk of this strategy: When a firm fails, employees lose 
both their retirement savings and their job (Poterba, 2003). Yet investing in own-company 
stock remains widespread in U.S. defined contribution8 retirement saving plans. These 
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 For defined benefit (DB) plans, U.S. legislation caps holdings of own-company stock at 10%, but for defined 
contribution (DC) plans, this is not the case. Therefore, most literature deals with DC plans. 
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plans, many of them 401(k) plans, are of central importance, because in 2012, they had 
$2.8 trillion invested by more than 50 million active workers. 
Choi et al. (2002) report that participants invest more than 35% of their portfolio in own-
company stock. Similarly, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) find that on average 42% of the 
wealth in 162 retirement plans is invested in company stock; Benartzi (2001) reports that 
around one-third of employees’ retirement savings is invested in company stock in a 
sample of 135 S&P 500 firms. As an extreme case, Coca-Cola employees allocate 76% of 
their discretionary contributions to company shares. Mitchell and Utkus (2002) estimate 
that 5.3 million employees (out of 23 million) in the United States hold more than 60% in 
own-company stock in their 401(k) plan, while 8 million have zero exposure to company 
stock. 
Benartzi et al. (2007) explain own-company stock in retirement portfolios as a result of 
bounded rationality by both employees and employers. Huberman (2001) instead relates 
investing in own-company stock to the familiarity heuristic. In a good review of company 
stock in retirement plans, Mitchell and Utkus (2002) evaluate the rationale for the high 
fraction of company stock, for both employers and employees. Employers believe it boosts 
efficiency, worker productivity, employee morale, and eventually firm value by aligning 
interests more closely, though empirical evidence of these effects offers only mixed 
results. The appeal of having stock in “friendly hands” also may motivate employers to 
encourage employee stock ownership. Employees hold high fractions of company stock 
partly because of myopia; they perceive their own company stock as less risky than a well-
diversified equity fund. Survey data indicate that only a small fraction of investors (16%) 
realize that company stock actually is riskier than the overall stock market. Greater own-
company stock holdings also relate to past stock performance, because employees 
extrapolate past performance. Benartzi (2001) finds that the allocation of discretionary 
contributions to company stock relates strongly and positively to past returns; employees 
thus apply the representativeness heuristic9 (in particular, excessive extrapolation) to 
company stock.  
Huberman and Sengmueller (2004) analyze active changes to own-company stock 
investments in 401(k) plans. Although few employees make active changes to their 
retirement portfolios, when they do, inflows to employer stock relate to salient information 
such as past returns and business performance; thus the availability heuristic may play a 
role. This reaction to past performance is asymmetric. The strongest and most robust 
reactions occur with positive absolute and market-adjusted returns. Past positive return 
sensitivity extends as far back as three years, whereas bad past performance does not have 
any effect. In addition, employees allocate more to own-company stock when firms match 
employee contributions with additional own-company stock. 
                                                     
9
 Please also see Section 2.4.2, “Buying Based on Representativeness.” 
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There is no evidence suggesting investments in own-company stock are driven by 
informational advantages. Mitchell and Utkus (2002) show that portfolios that overweigh 
own-company stocks exhibit deteriorating performance, and Benartzi (2001) finds that 
allocations to company stock do not predict future performance. 
Finally, overweighing own-company stock may be related to the so-called endorsement 
effect, which posits that employees interpret matching plans by the employer as an implicit 
advice. This effect is substantial: Plans in which employers match employee investments 
in company stock lead to company holdings that are more than twice as large as plans in 
which employees make all allocation decisions themselves. This finding may have 
relevance for this thesis, because when an employer’s allocation decision is perceived as 
implicit investment advice, it is widely followed.  
Related to the trend of excess holdings of own-company stock is overweighting of stocks 
based on professional proximity. Investors appear to prefer investments in the same 
industry in which they work. Doskeland and Hvide (2011), using all trades of individual 
investors in Norway over a 10-year period, find that they overweigh professionally close 
stocks with an average allocation to professionally close stocks of 11%, an excess of 7%. 
This overweighting is not driven by informational benefits, because professionally close 
portfolios and trades do not provide superior returns. Doskeland and Hvide (2011) thus 
confirm previous results about local investments10 that do not seem information driven. 
Their results are consistent both with overconfidence and familiarity. Familiarity has also 
been proposed as a potential driver of home country bias. 
2.2.3.2. Home-Country Bias 
Home- Country bias refers to the tendency of investors to overweigh domestic securities in 
their portfolios. This behavior is inconsistent with standard models that highlight the 
benefits of international diversification, due to the relatively low correlation among stock 
returns of various countries.  
French and Poterba (1991) were among of the first to report a strong home-country bias in 
security selection:11 U.S. investors hold 92% domestic equity; Japanese investors hold 
96%, U.K. investors hold 92%, German investors 79%, and French 89%. This 
overweighting of domestic stocks has been declining though. Dorn and Huberman (2005) 
find a domestic equity allocation of 46% for German online investors in a 2000 sample, 
and French (2008) shows that the degree of U.S. aggregate home bias has gradually 
declined over time, such that investors allocated only 2% to foreign stocks in 1980, 8.5% 
in 1990, 14% in 2000, and 28% to 2007. 
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 Section 2.2.3.3. offers more discussion of the so-called local bias. 
11
 Home country bias is traditionally calculated as the deviation between the actual weights and the weights 
based on a country’s market capitalization within the world equity market. 
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Solnik and Zuo (2012) provide an overview of the degree of home bias in many countries. 
Especially in emerging markets, the home bias is large, with an average of approximately 
95%, compared with 70% for developed countries, averaged over 2001–2008. Across 
developed countries, the differences also are large: In the Netherlands, the home bias 
(37%) is the lowest of the 21 developed counties listed, but Greek investors overweigh 
domestic securities by 92%. 
Home bias has been explained using both rational and behavioral arguments. Karlsson and 
Nordén (2007) relate home bias to the mutual fund allocations of 4.4 million Swedish 
individuals in a new defined contribution plan. The degree of home bias can be explained 
by inflation hedging, a lack of sophistication, and overconfidence. In an overview of 
literature on the home bias, Lewis (1999) concludes that hedging against domestic-specific 
risks and transaction costs are not enough to explain the empirical findings. Cooper and 
Kaplanis (1994) concur that home bias cannot be explained by investors hedging against 
inflation risk. 
Behavioral explanations focus on familiarity, optimism (about future returns on the 
domestic market), pessimism (about future returns on foreign equity), and perceived risks 
of foreign equity. French and Poterba (1991) assert that risk perceptions largely drive 
home bias, because investors perceive foreign securities as more risky than domestic 
securities due to their limited knowledge of foreign markets. Aversion to ambiguity drives 
the relative unpopularity of foreign securities. Statman (1999) also posits that foreign 
stocks are unpopular because of a lack of familiarity. According to behavioral portfolio 
theory (BPT), foreign stocks will be unattractive if their past returns are low, given that 
they are placed in the upside potential layer.12  
Bailey et al. (2008) find that investors who diversify more domestically also invest 
internationally more often, which may suggest that behavioral factors play a role. The 
overconfident investors invest more abroad, but investors who display the local bias or the 
disposition effect invest less in foreign assets, resulting in a detrimental performance 
effect. 
2.2.3.3. Local Bias 
Local bias is another example of how geographical proximity drives asset allocations. It 
implies a “home bias at home” (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999) that might induce unjust 
feeling of competence or make valuable information acquisition easier. Specifically, local 
bias refers to the tendency of investors to tilt their portfolios toward locally headquartered 
stocks. One of the first investigations of a preference for geographical proximity, by Coval 
and Moskowitz (1999), shows that U.S. investment managers prefer firms with 
headquarters near where they live. In a subsequent study, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) 
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 Within the BPT, correlations between layers are ignored, and thus the diversification benefits of foreign 
holdings get overlooked. 
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note that preference for geographic proximity may be driven by informational advantages, 
because local holdings really do outperform various benchmarks. Although this study 
examines the portfolios of professional money managers, it prompted similar studies 
among retail investors, which ask whether overweighing local stocks is a bias that arises 
from feeling more comfortable with local stocks and opposing diversification theory, or if 
it is rooted in a rational explanation, such as exploiting informational asymmetries or 
hedging again price increases in local services or goods. 
Huberman (2001) finds that shareholders of regional telephone companies tend to live in 
the same area in which the companies operate. Each of the regional telephone companies is 
equally accessible, so transaction costs (as have been proposed to explain home bias) are 
not valid. Overweighing local telephone companies may provide a hedge against price 
increases, though Huberman (2001) finds a stronger argument from the opposite direction. 
Because households’ financial welfare is closely linked to the success of local companies, 
nonregional asset allocation would be more rational. These results are in line with a 
preference for the familiar. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) provide further evidence about 
how familiarity drives individual investment decisions. Using data from Finland, they 
report that retail investors exhibit a preference for holding and trading nearby firms that 
share the same language and culture. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) confirm this strong 
preference for holding local stocks among U.S. individual investors, who overweight local 
firms by a factor of three on average. Local holdings outperform non-local holdings 
considerably, suggesting retail investors may be able to exploit information asymmetries. 
The excess returns on local holdings are 3.2% per year and mainly driven by non-S&P500 
stocks, for which information asymmetry is more likely. 
Massa and Simonov (2006) also provide evidence of the impact of proximity. Their data 
set is unique, in that it covers all wealth components (cash, real estate, equity holdings, 
bonds) of almost all Swedish households during 1995–2000. Proximity is operationalized 
by professional and geographical proximity, as well as the holding period. Because 
investors tilt their portfolios toward stocks that correlate positively with their nonfinancial 
(e.g., labor) income, hedging motives can be ruled out as an explanation. In line with 
Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005), they reject the view that familiarity is a bias: Investors 
benefit from overweighting close stocks. Proximity apparently provides a cheap 
information acquisition route and thus allows investors to improve their returns. 
Seasholes and Zhu (2010) question the information-based hypothesis though and assert 
that previous findings are econometrically flawed. Using the same data as Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2005) but correcting for cross-sectional dependence (using calendar-time 
portfolios), these authors find that the performance differences between local and non-local 
portfolios, though positive, are no longer significant. They even find a negative 
performance of –1.7% per year for trades rather than portfolios, formed on the basis of 
geographical proximity. This negative effect increases for trades of stocks with more 
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information asymmetries (non-S&P stocks). The authors thus conclude that retail investors 
do not exploit information asymmetry through geographic proximity. 
2.2.4. Volatility Specialization 
Dorn and Huberman (2010) test the so-called preferred risk habitat hypothesis, with a 
prediction that investors engage in narrow framing and select stocks one-by-one based on 
individual stock volatility. Using a data set of 20,000 German discount broker clients, they 
find that stocks in individual portfolios have remarkably similar volatilities. Apparently 
investors match the average volatility of stocks to their risk aversion, rather than to 
portfolio volatility, and thus they ignore the return correlations proposed by portfolio 
theory. More volatility-specializing investors expose themselves to more idiosyncratic risk 
with lower Sharpe ratios. The volatilities of less experienced investors and those with more 
concentrated portfolios exhibit the most pronounced volatility specialization, suggesting a 
behavioral explanation (in particular, narrow framing). 
2.2.5. Behavioral Portfolio Theory 
Many of these behaviors temped Shefrin and Statman (2000) to develop a descriptive 
approach to portfolio composition, opposing the normative mean-variance approach 
proposed by Markowitz (1952). Their behavioral portfolio theory (BPT) explicates actual 
portfolio compositions of individuals by incorporating elements from mental accounting 
(Thaler, 1985) and Lopes’s (1987) SP/A theory to address the impact of emotions (i.e., 
hope and fear). In BPT, investors build portfolios as pyramids of layers, with layers 
associated with particular goals, time horizons, and attitudes toward risk. Typically, 
investors built a bottom layer to avoid the risk of poverty and a top layer to achieve wealth 
aspirations. These layers represent distinct mental accounts, and covariances between them 
are overlooked. Investors first label securities as “bonds” or “stocks” or “domestic” or 
“foreign,” which may inhibit a clear overall (frame-independent) picture of the portfolio. 
Also, “foreign” may be perceived as more risky, leading to more funds allocated to 
domestic stocks. Behavioral investors also may prefer securities framed in a way to 
guarantee a minimum payoff, which would explain the popularity of some structured 
products.  
The finding that people take more factors into consideration than just risk and return 
motivated Fisher and Statman (1997a) to focus on the differences in the mean variance 
between optimal and actual portfolio decision making. They compare investments and 
food portfolios: Just as people assess the attractiveness of meals by considering various 
factors, beyond nutrition value and cost, investors care about more than risk and expected 
return. Food has other goals than to be fed at low cost and is therefore judged on 
palatability, variety, prestige, and cultural aspects. Similarly, investments are judged on 
criteria that make them intuitively appealing, which leads to a preference, for example, for 
socially responsible companies. These authors conclude that optimization techniques 
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dictate how investors should behave, but prescriptions should fit investor preferences, as in 
BPT. 
In another study, Fisher and Statman (1997b) evaluate investment advice from mutual 
fund companies using the insights of BPT. Mutual fund companies address such mental 
accounting in the labels of their funds, which designate specific goals (a bond fund is sold 
as an “income” or “high yield” fund; a stock fund as “growth” fund). They frame their 
portfolios as layered pyramids of mutual funds, just as described by BPT. They advise 
investors to assign particular funds to particular goals, essentially advising them to ignore 
correlations between funds or asset classes. Although the portfolio recommendations of 
mutual fund companies may deviate from MPT-efficient portfolios, the authors conclude 
that the costs of ignoring the prescriptions of the mean-variance framework are small.  
In summary, diversification by retail investors appears suboptimal: The average investor 
owns only a few stocks, divides money evenly over investment options, and bases 
allocation decisions on proximity. In many cases, it seems likely that behavioral 
phenomena are at the root of observed allocation decisions. Behavioral portfolio theory 
addresses these issues and offers a descriptive approach to explain how portfolios are 
constructed. 
2.3. Trading Behavior 
A long-standing anomaly in financial research has been the excessively large volume of 
trading in securities markets. In 2009 annualized turnover of the New York Stock 
Exchanges was 129%, though it declined to 86% over 2011 (NYSE, 2011). Black (1986) 
introduced the concept of noise trading in this context. He defines noise as anything that is 
not information, so noise traders cannot expect to profit from their trades. Although trading 
on noise may be irrational, there are many rational motives to trade: liquidity, lifecycle 
considerations, rebalancing, private information signals, or taxes, for example.13 Barber et 
al. (2009) estimate a 3.8% market-adjusted loss as a consequence of trading by individual 
investors, using all transaction of the entire Taiwanese market for a five-year period. 
Linnainmaa (2011) also posits that investor trade to learn, so return reductions as a result 
of excessive trading is the price that investors pay to learn, in which case it would be 
rational. But many other scholars believe that behavioral explanations are needed for 
observed trading volumes. Overconfidence (one source of noise) is widely cited as a 
possible driver of excessive trading. In this case, overconfidence refers to an irrational, 
excessive belief in one’s own abilities (the “better than average effect” or “hubris”) or an 
overestimation of the precision of information (“miscalibration”).  
Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) test an overconfidence-based trading 
hypothesis using data from a U.S. discount brokerage firm and find a large penalty for 
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 In many tax systems, realized gains and losses have tax consequences. Realizing losses is beneficial in these 
systems, because it lowers the taxes to be paid.  
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active trading, mainly due to transaction costs. Although the least active traders perform 
reasonably in line with the market, net performance is monotonically decreasing with 
trading activity. The quintile of most active traders thus generates a negative three-factor 
alpha of –0.86% per month, whereas the least active investors generate an alpha of around 
0. Although alternative explanations, including liquidity trading, rebalancing, tax-
motivated selling, or the joy of gambling, may explain some trading activity, the authors 
believe trading is mainly explained by overconfidence. 
Barber and Odean (2001) test the robustness of the overconfidence hypothesis using 
gender as a proxy for the degree of overconfidence. The underlying assumption that men 
tend to be more overconfident than women has been supported by many psychological 
studies, especially in domains considered “masculine,” such as finance. Barber and Odean 
(2001) confirm that men trade significantly more actively than women (annualized 
turnover = 77% vs. 53%), which also means they underperform women (annualized net 
return difference = 0.94%). The differences between single men and single women are 
even more pronounced, suggesting that overconfidence is a cause of excessive trading.  
To further explore the overconfidence-based trading hypothesis, Barber and Odean (2002) 
investigate the change in trading behavior after investors move from telephone-based to 
online trading. Before going online, these investors outperformed both the market and a 
size-matched control group. Once online though, they traded more frequently (average 
annual turnover before switching = 70%, after switching = 120%) and perform worse than 
they previously did, as well as compared with a control group. These findings support the 
overconfidence hypothesis, because the switchers likely are more overconfident than non-
switchers due to their self-attribution bias (i.e., their previous investment success was due 
to their own skill), the illusion of control (due to their active involvement in the trade), the 
illusion of knowledge (due to vast amount of data available to them), and cognitive 
dissonance (time and effort spent on information leads to the perceived necessity to trade).  
Further support for the overconfidence hypothesis comes from Statman et al. (2006), who 
explore the relationship between overconfidence and trading volumes at the macro level. 
Trading volume relates positively to lagged stock returns, consistent with increased 
overconfidence as a result of past success and biased self-attribution. Their finding 
especially holds for subsamples in which individual investors have more impact. Also, 
Barber et al. (2009) propose that the 300% turnover in the Taiwanese stock market is 
caused by overconfidence and the desire to gamble. 
Although Odean (1999), Barber and Odean (2000, 2001, 2002) and Statman et al. (2006) 
find evidence in support of overconfidence-based trading, a major limitation of these 
studies is that they infer overconfidence from observed behavior. Many authors therefore 
question whether other reasons, apart from (or instead of) overconfidence, may be relevant 
for explaining trading behavior. These authors thus try to measure psychological attributes 
that proxy for or are related to overconfidence.  
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Glaser and Weber (2007) combine trading records and survey responses from German 
online investors and find that investors who (incorrectly) perceive themselves as above 
average exhibit greater trading activity, whereas the degree of miscalibration has no effect. 
Although this finding supports the impact of the better-than-average form of 
overconfidence, it still seems surprising, given the vast literature that explains 
overconfidence as a manifestation of overestimations of the precision of information.  
Although Dorn and Huberman (2005) confirm substantial trading using data from German 
online investors, their two proxies for overconfidence (self-attribution bias and the illusion 
of control) are not related to trading activity. They instead claim that self-reported risk 
aversion is the main determinant of trading: More risk-tolerant investors trade more 
aggressively. The reported differences are large, such that the monthly portfolio turnover 
of the most risk-averse investors is less than 10% compared with more than 30% for the 
least risk-averse.  
The finding that men trade more because of their higher degree of overconfidence is also 
disputed by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009), who claim that instrumenting overconfidence 
by gender fails to recognize that gender is associated with many other investor attributes 
(e.g., sensation seeking) that also affects trading. Sensation seeking is a psychological 
attribute linked to gambling behavior. Kumar (2008) relates trading to gambling motives. 
Sensation seekers are driven by intensity, novelty, and the variety of experiences. To proxy 
for sensation seeking, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) use the number of speeding tickets 
received by an investor and find that it is strongly related to trading, in addition to 
overconfidence. In line with Glaser and Weber (2007), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) find 
overconfidence related to the better-than-average effect, not to miscalibration. 
Related to sensation seeking is entertainment seeking. Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) show 
a strong effect of entertainment and gambling motives on trading behavior. Their research 
is motivated by responses to a survey that called investing “a nice pastime” (Hoffman, 
2007). In this view, the direct utility derived from trading may compensate for the 
performance deterioration that results from trading excessively. The most enjoyment- or 
gambling-prone investors turn their portfolio over twice as often. Dorn and Sengmueller 
(2009) estimate that more than half of the turnover in their sample is driven by irrational 
explanations, and their findings do not change even when they include proxies for 
overconfidence, which actually appear unrelated to turnover. Bauer et al. (2009) report 
results consistent with these findings. Option traders, in their sample of Dutch online 
investors, are affected most by entertainment and sensation-seeking motives, and these 
investors incur the largest portfolio losses, resulting from a combination of poor market 
timing and high trading costs. Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) conclude with a relevant 
observation: Financial economists often evaluate behavior in terms of effects on wealth, 
but they may ignore the impact of that behavior on welfare. 
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Graham et al. (2009) estimate the impact of the competence effect, which posits that 
people are more willing to rely on their own judgment when they feel more competent 
(Heath and Tversky, 1991). They find that perceived competence positively affects trading 
behavior. Specifically, when their competence measure increases by one standard 
deviation, the propensity to trade more than once a week almost doubles. Their measure of 
overconfidence is not related to trading though. 
Although excessive trading may be a stylized fact for a specific group within the retail 
investor population, many studies document completely different behavior, namely, strong 
inertia by many households. Inert behavior may relate to the status quo bias (Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser, 1988), that is, a person’s preference to leave matters unchanged. People 
generally have a deep aversion to regret, and making active (portfolio) changes that turn 
out to be inferior, relative to having kept the status quo, are painful. Choi et al. (2002) find 
that a majority of investors (55% in one plan, 59% in another) in 401(k) plans never trade 
during a three-year period. Similarly, Linnainmaa (2011) reports that in her sample of 1.1 
million Finnish households, 48% of the people that own stocks never trade during an eight-
year sample period, and 60% of the trades during that same period originate from the 5% 
most active traders. Dahlquist et al. (2011) document strong inertia in their sample of 
Swedish investors in retirement accounts. Again a large majority of them make virtually 
no changes: 68% of investors made no changes in their portfolios during 2000–2010, and 
an additional 16% made only one change. Inertia cannot be explained by transaction costs, 
which are absent in these samples. Contrary to Barber and Odean (2000, 2001, 2002), 
trading activity was actually beneficial in this case, in that Dahlquist et al. (2011) show 
that performance increases monotonically with activity as a result of successful mutual 
fund picking. 
This overview of trading activity by retail investors exhibits two stylized facts: Some 
investors trade excessively, and others do not trade at all. Excessive trading has mainly 
been observed in online accounts and relates to the behavior of only a fraction of the 
investor population.14 Because inertia typically has been found in retirement accounts, it is 
necessary to distinguish inert behavior from rational buy-and-hold considerations, which is 
not easy.  
2.4. Selecting Securities to Buy 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) investigate the behavior of different investor classes in 
Finland over a two-year interval using the buy ratio.15 They find that Finish retail investors 
follow a contrarian strategy.16 Using the buy–sell ratio may obscure the possibility of 
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 Campbell (2006, p. 1571) states for example, “discount brokerage customers tend to be households with a 
particular interest in equity trading. 
15
 The buy ratio is calculated as the number of buys divided by the number of buys plus sells. 
16
 In a contrarian strategy, the investor buys stocks that have performed badly and sells stocks that have done 
well, or the opposite of a momentum strategy. 
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different drivers of buying and selling decisions though. Barber and Odean (2011) find that 
investors both buy and sell stocks that have performed well, which they relate to different 
thought processes involved when buying or selling. According to them, retail investors 
exhibit contrarian behavior only when they sell and momentum behavior when they buy. 
Although retail investors may pursue some sort of deliberate strategy in their buying 
decisions, many studies find that buying is influenced by the attention, representativeness, 
and affect heuristics. 
2.4.1. Buying Based on Attention and Availability 
Merton (1987) notes that certain stocks grab investors’ attention and are thus considered 
for purchase. For a typical individual investor, the buying decision is far more complex 
than the selling decision. Most people do not sell short and therefore only need to focus on 
the (few) stocks that they already own when they sell. In buying though, they can select 
from thousands of stocks. Barber and Odean (2008) therefore hypothesize that attention 
influences the buying decision of individual investors to a greater extent than does the 
selling decision. The availability heuristic relates to attention in that it deals with the 
degree to which information is readily available. 
Lee (1992) finds a relation between buying behavior and earnings announcements that 
likely attracts investor attention. Lee assigns trades to individual and professional investors 
according to trade size (trades below $10,000 proxy for individual investor trades) and 
finds a remarkable difference in their reactions to earnings news. Trades by professionals 
react to the type of news: Good news creates net buying, bad news generates net selling. 
For trades by individuals though, the direction of the news does not matter. Around 
earning releases in general, good or bad, buying dominates, in support of the proposition 
that attention drives the trading behavior of individual investors.  
Hirshleifer et al. (2008) also find an earnings attention effect. They identify individual 
traders and focus on extreme earnings surprises as proxy for attention-grabbing news. The 
extreme earnings surprises trigger bigger trading activity and greater net buying for three 
weeks after the extreme earnings announcement. Abnormal trading is higher after extreme 
negative earnings surprises than for positive earnings surprises. Apparently, bad news is 
more salient. People are net buyers after both negative and positive earnings surprises.  
Barber and Odean (2008) investigate the existence of attention-based buying among both 
individual and institutional investors. Their proxy for attention-grabbing information is 
abnormally high trading volume, extreme previous day returns, and companies being in the 
news. On high volume days, individual investors are large net buyers, but on low volume 
days, this group consists of net sellers. Institutional investors engage mainly in buying on 
low volume days. On days following high negative or high positive returns, people mainly 
buy. For institutional investors, the behavior depends on style: Momentum investors sell 
after negative returns and buy after positive returns, but value investors do the opposite. 
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When firms are in the news, individual investors also buy more of this stock than they sell. 
To test if the imbalance is caused by a constraint on short-selling, the stocks already in the 
portfolio are taken into consideration. In that case, selling dominates, but the same relative 
buy–sell imbalance is visible. Attention-based buying harms individual investors, because 
stocks bought underperform stocks sold.  
Seasholes and Wu (2007) support the attention hypothesis in their study of the trading 
behavior of arbitrageurs and individual investors. On the Shanghai Stock Exchange, stocks 
cannot rise above or below a daily price limit (for most stocks, ±10%). Stocks that hit their 
price limit are reported in the news and therefore more likely to be noticed by individual 
investors. The authors find active individual investors buying the day after an upper price 
limit has been hit. The effect is even stronger for first-time buyers in the particular stock, 
supporting the attention-based buying hypothesis. 
Da et al. (2011) proxy for retail attention using Google search frequency for particular 
stocks. Although these Google searches correlate weakly with the proxies for attention 
used by Barber and Odean (2008), their results strongly support the retail attention 
hypothesis. Greater investor attention measured by Google search frequency leads to 
positive price pressures for the following two weeks, followed by a reversal during the rest 
of the year, especially for stocks traded mainly by retail investors. Higher search volume 
also leads to large first-day IPO returns. 
Bae and Wang (2012) also support the investor attention hypothesis by investigating 
Chinese firms listed in the United States, which may include “China” in their name or not. 
China-named stocks significantly outperform non–China-named stocks during a boom 
period in the Chinese stock market, but they exhibit greater price reversal during 
downturns. In Hong Kong, they find no China-named effect, which suggests that attention 
drives the U.S. findings. Although the authors do not mention it, the representativeness 
heuristic also may play a role. The “China” label may easily be linked to positive news 
about the growing Chinese economy. 
2.4.2. Buying Based on Representativeness 
In buying decisions, the representativeness heuristic may play a role. Representativeness 
enables people to perceive systematic patterns in recent stock price movements or 
earnings, even when these patterns are random. Using perceived patterns, investors might 
extrapolate in a naïve fashion and buy stocks that recently increased in value. When 
investors naively extrapolate past returns and exhibit the so-called extrapolation bias, they 
are positive feedback traders. 
In a survey of individual investors, De Bondt (1993) finds that the typical non-expert 
expects trends to continue. The average percentage gap between the fraction of investors 
A REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR BEHAVIOR 
41 
 
that is bullish and the fraction that is bearish increases by 1.3% for every percentage point 
that the Dow Jones rises during the week prior to the survey.  
A previous section detailed how employees increase company stock allocations in their 
retirement portfolio, especially when it performs well (Benartzi, 2001; Huberman and 
Sengmueller, 2004). Bange (2000) provides additional evidence of positive feedback 
trading among small equity investors through survey data. Investors increase their 
exposure to equity after positive market returns and decrease equity allocations after 
market downturns. Bange (2000) finds no evidence that these allocation changes reflect 
superior market timing ability. The findings are consistent with evidence from Barber et al. 
(2009b), who document the positive relation of aggregate buying by retail investors with 
past returns.17 In analyzing trades of online investors, Odean (1999) also shows that 
individual buys follow positive market-adjusted returns. Retail investors buy securities that 
have outperformed the market in the previous two years. Although Chen et al. (2007) 
confirm evidence of representativeness-based buying in China, they also find, contrary to 
Odean, that individual investors typically focus on recent (past four months) returns. 
Whether incorporating past returns in investment decisions is really a bias likely depends 
on the investors’ estimated holding period. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) provide evidence 
of short-term momentum (stocks that have done well recently yield abnormal returns in the 
near [3–12 months] future), but de Bondt and Thaler (1985) find long-term reversals 
(winners underperform losers over a three- to five-year horizon). This so-called winner–
loser effect appears driven by investors becoming too optimistic about stocks that have 
increased in price and overly pessimistic about stocks that have decreased.  
Beyond the naïve extrapolation, stereotyping, based on the same representativeness 
heuristic, may influence investors’ buying decisions. Stereotyping may lead investors to 
confuse stock attributes with company characteristics. Solt and Statman (1989) show that 
investors can confuse a growth company (high growth opportunities in sales or earnings) 
with a growth stock (high expected return). Using Tobin’s q as a measure of growth 
opportunities and data from 1960 to 1977, they find that growth companies earn much 
lower returns. Companies in the highest Tobin’s q quintile (i.e., highest growth 
opportunities) exhibit an annual return that is 5.9% less that the firms in the lowest 
quintile. In a similar vein, Chan and Lakonishok (2004) look into return differences 
between so-called growth (or glamour) stocks (high past growth rates in sales) and value 
stocks. The average five-year return difference was more that 60% in favor of the value 
stocks. This finding implies that many investors erroneously believe past performance is 
representative of future performance. 
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 Because the disposition effect (Section 2.5.1.) posits that investors preferably sell winners, both buying and 
selling should follow rising stock prices. 
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2.4.3. Buying Based on Affect 
The impact of the affect heuristic on investment decision making has not been studied as 
extensively as attention or representativeness. Affect may be defined as the immediate 
emotional response to some stimulus (e.g., stock of a particular firm). As Kahneman 
(2002) stated in his Nobel Prize lecture, “the idea of an affect heuristic is probably the 
most important development in the study of judgment heuristics in the last decades.”  
Affective feelings may guide decision making, especially when alternatives are difficult to 
evaluate (as is the case in many investment choices). Affect relates mood, which can affect 
prices in stock markets. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) find that nice weather puts 
investors in a positive mood, makes them more risk tolerance, and drives up prices.  
Cooper et al. (2001) find that during the late 1990s (when positive sentiment about Internet 
businesses likely triggered positive affect), firms that added “dotcom” to their names 
experienced tremendous increases in market value (average abnormal returns of 74% 
within 10 days of an announcement), but in the early 2000s (when Internet businesses 
likely triggered negative affect), similar market reactions were observed for firms that 
removed “dotcom” from their names (Cooper et al., 2005).  
Statman et al. (2008) report that firms with positive affect are associated with both high 
returns and low risk. They relate affective responses for firms to subsequent returns and 
find that a portfolio of admired firms’ stock underperforms a portfolio of stocks of less 
admired (or spurned) firms. Aspare and Tikkanen (2011) also provide survey evidence that 
people’s affect toward a company provides an extra motivation to invest in its stock. The 
impact of affect does not relate to many of the investor characteristics studied, except for 
education; for investors holding a university degree, affect plays a lesser role. 
Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) built on neurological evidence that relates affective responses 
to financial judgment and decision making. In an experimental setting, these authors 
provide evidence that excitement and anxiety—which relate to different regions of the 
brain—modify risk preferences. Risk aversion is diminished by excitement but increased 
by anxiety. Affect can be introduced exogenously or result from past outcomes, and it 
relates positively to confidence in one’s ability to evaluate risky investments, which in turn 
provides further evidence in support of the overconfidence hypothesis.  
2.5. Selecting Securities to Sell 
Selling decisions by individual investors typically relate only to stock they already own. 
Combined with a typical individual investor holding only a few stocks, it makes the selling 
decision relatively easy compared with the buying decision. The disposition effect is the 
most prominent description of how individuals decide to sell.  
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2.5.1. Disposition Effect 
The disposition effect is a preference to sell winning security positions rather than losing 
positions; it is remarkably robust. Shefrin and Statman (1985) predict the disposition effect 
from elements of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and mental accounting 
(Thaler, 1999). In making investment decisions, it implies that (1) investors evaluate 
outcomes of individual securities rather than portfolio returns, (2) investors label the 
outcomes of their investments in terms of gains and losses related to a reference point (e.g., 
buying price), and (3) due to loss and regret aversion, most investors prefer not to realize 
losses and close the mental account they opened by buying the security, such that they can 
leave open the possibility that the purchase was a wise decision after all.  
Odean (1998) tests the disposition effect hypothesis using a large data set of 10,000 online 
investor accounts during 1987–1993 and finds strong support. Odean (1998) compares the 
proportion of gains realized (PGR) with the proportion of losses realized (PLR) and finds 
that a larger part (by a factor of 1.5) of the wining positions gets sold compared with losing 
positions. This disposition behavior is not justified ex post. By having sold the loser and 
holding on to the winner, investors could have earned a much larger return (3.4% for a 
one-year horizon). Selling losers and holding winners would also be more rational, 
considering the tax effects of these transactions in some systems. Alternative explanations 
for the disposition effect include a belief in mean reversion, portfolio rebalancing, liquidity 
demands, or a reluctance to sell at low prices due to higher transaction costs. But when 
investors believe in mean reversion, they seemingly should tend to buy past losers, which 
they do not do. If investors rebalanced their portfolio due to changed risk characteristics, 
we should expect that only part of the positions would be liquidated, which again is not the 
case. Liquidity motives do not drive the effect; the disposition effect is not dampened for a 
subsample of stocks sold for which the proceeds are reinvested within three weeks of the 
sale.  
Weber and Camerer (1998) find evidence of the disposition effect through an experimental 
approach. People are 50% more likely to realize gains than losses. In line with Odean’s 
(1998) findings, investors’ possible belief in mean reversion can be ruled out, because the 
disposition effect was greatly reduced when stocks were automatically sold after each 
round. 
In a large-scale study of investor behavior in Finland, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) also 
find evidence of the disposition effect for five investor groups (non-financial corporations, 
financial and insurance institutions, governmental organizations, nonprofit institutions, and 
households). Especially for large losses, there is a strong reluctance to take a loss, yet in 
December, investors accept losses to realize tax benefits. 
Kaustia (2004) finds support for the disposition effects by analyzing a data set of initial 
public offerings (IPOs). An advantage of IPOs is the availability of a relatively 
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unambiguous reference price, the offering price, which is shared among many investors. 
That study showed that stocks trading below the offering price since their IPO exhibit 
significantly more trading volume when the offering price is exceeded, especially when it 
happens for the first time.  
Whereas Feng and Seasholes (2005) document a disposition effect among Chinese 
investors, Barber et al. (2007) study the disposition effect in aggregate using a database of 
all trades in Taiwan. These authors report strong evidence in favor of the disposition effect. 
Investors in Taiwan are twice as likely to sell a stock for a gain as for a loss. A large 
majority of investors in Taiwan (84%) exhibit a disposition effect.  
2.6. Relevance of Investor Sophistication and Financial Advice 
The preceding sections documented many typical individual investor behaviors. For some 
of these behaviors, rational-economic explanations cannot be excluded, but they mostly 
appear rooted in human psychology: driven by heuristics and emotions, and frame 
dependent. The role of intuitive decision making by retail investors should come as no 
surprise though. Financial decision making is complex, made in opaque and uncertain 
environments, and the feedback is slow and often hard to interpret. Although “quick and 
dirty” judgment and decision rules may not always lead to optimal outcomes, they are 
often an efficient and good enough way to make decisions. 
An interesting question thus is whether greater guidance of retail investors would improve 
their financial decision making. Such guidance can take many forms: financial education, 
the use of sensible default choice options, or the use of a financial advisor. Guidance 
generally implies greater (financial) sophistication added to the decision-making process. 
The impact of sophistication has been widely studied, so it may serve as a useful 
introduction to the main question of this thesis: whether and how retail financial advisors 
add or detract value. 
To review prior literature on financial sophistication and guidance, this section offers (1) a 
comparison of portfolio performance and the behavior of various classes of markets 
participants that may be assumed to differ in level of sophistication (e.g., financial 
institutions, retail investors); (2) a discussion of the impact of various proxies for 
sophistication (e.g., experience, wealth, occupation, education, financial literacy, cognitive 
abilities) among retail investors; and (3) a review of the (scarce) literature available related 
to the impact of financial advisors. 
2.6.1. Performance and Behavior of Various Investor Classes 
A comparison of the performance of various investor classes typically aims to address the 
question of the extent to which wealth transfers take place across various participants. 
Estimating these wealth transfers preferably requires data that cover a whole market, 
considering the adding-up constraint on trading. In empirical literature on investor 
A REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR BEHAVIOR 
45 
 
behavior, two data sets cover a whole market and can identify participants. Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2000) use all stock market transactions in Finland over a two-year time span. 
They find that stocks that individuals buy exhibit weak future performance, whereas 
sophisticated investors (e.g., foreign, professionally managed funds, investment banking 
houses) take the other side of the trade and exhibit strong performance. Barber et al. (2009) 
analyze all stock market trades in Taiwan. A similar and clear pattern emerges: Retail 
investors lose while professional parties gain. Comparing the buys and sells of individuals, 
they reveal that stocks sold outperform stocks bought by 75 basis points per month. The 
net market adjusted returns of Taiwanese individual investors in aggregate are –3.8%, 
which reflect the combination of bad stock picking, commissions, taxes, and bad market 
timing. Hvidkjaer (2008) analyzes all trades in the United States and finds that small trades 
offer a good proxy for retail behavior. His findings are in line with the two other studies: 
Small trades underperform the market by 89 basis points per month. He also finds that 
stocks with strong retail buying are growth stocks with high past returns and high 
advertising expenses. 
Other studies compare the behavior (rather than the performance) of individuals against 
that of professionals. Generally speaking, many of the behaviors discussed in Sections 2.1–
2.5 exist among both retail and professional investor classes, but the most biased behavior 
occurs among individuals. Barber et al. (2007) find that most investors in Taiwan (84%) 
exhibit a disposition effect, but mutual funds and foreign investors do not. Although many 
investor classes are driven by preferences for familiar firms, this effect is less prominent 
for institutions (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). Barber and Odean (2008) note that 
attention-based buying is only observable among retail investors and not (or much less so) 
among institutional investors. 
2.6.2. Impacts of Sophistication and Learning on Retail Behavior 
An interesting question remains, namely, whether behavioral biases and errors are mainly 
a beginner’s phenomenon, such that experience reduces or even eliminates deviations from 
micro-economic predictions. List (2003) finds that the degree of market experience tends 
to correlate with the degree of rationality of in people’s decision making. De Bondt (1998, 
p. 832) is less positive though: “What is surprising is the failure of many people to infer 
basic investment principles from years of experience.”  
In addition to experience, investor sophistication might result from education, financial 
literacy, cognitive ability, occupation, or wealth. Most studies show that higher levels of 
sophistication are associated with better decision making and better outcomes. Bailey et al. 
(2008) find that wealthier, more experienced investors are more likely to hold foreign 
equity. In addition, behavioral factors play a role. Whereas overconfident investors invest 
more abroad, investors who display a local bias or the disposition effect invest less in 
foreign assets, resulting in detrimental effects on performance. Bailey et al. (2011) further 
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note that investors with higher income or education and more experience make better 
mutual fund investment decisions. 
Feng and Seasholes (2005) study the disposition effect as a function of experience and 
investor sophistication for a group of 1,511 investors in the People’s Republic of China. 
On average these investors exhibit a disposition effect, but sophisticated and experienced 
investors have fewer problems with selling losing stocks. Dhar and Zhu (2006) also 
document a negative relationship among financial literacy, trading experience, and the 
disposition effect. 
According to Loewenstein (2003), emotions have a strong impact on decision making, and 
experience relates to the level of these emotions. Lo and Repin (2002) observe significant 
differences in emotional responses between experienced and less experienced foreign 
exchange and derivatives dealers. More experience leads to lower emotional responses. 
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) look into investor characteristics and diversification and 
find that the least diversified portfolios are held by young, low income, less educated, less 
sophisticated, and non-professional groups. Graham et al. (2009) find that (perceived) 
competence mitigates home bias. In their whole sample, 38% of the investors hold foreign 
assets, but among those who feel more competent, 52% invest internationally. For 
investors with the highest degree of competence, the probability of holding foreign assets 
increases to more than 73%. In support of these findings, Abreu et al. (2011) show that 
after gaining experience in the home market, investors start investing abroad and improve 
their portfolio performance. Kimball and Shumway (2010) use survey data and find that 
sophisticated investors invest more internationally, suggesting that home bias is an issue, 
especially for the less financially literate. 
Another branch of literature looks into the effects of financial literacy and cognitive 
abilities. Generally, a lack of financial literacy or low cognitive abilities adversely affect 
the quality of financial decision making: Less literate people are less likely to participate in 
the stock market (Van Rooij et al., 2011) and tend to diversify their portfolios 
insufficiently (Christellis et al., 2010). Grinblatt et al. (2011a) first find a positive relation 
between IQ and stock market participation, and then they report that high-IQ investors 
show significantly better portfolio performance (Grinblatt et al., 2012). Korniotis and 
Kumar (2012) also reveal that portfolio distortions such as concentration, excessive trading 
and holding local stocks must be conditioned on cognitive abilities.  
2.6.3. Impacts of Financial Advice 
Although the performance and behavior of professional market participants and the role of 
sophistication in the retail investor class provides some useful insights regarding the role of 
professionalism, related research has ignored the specific setting in which financial advice 
usually gets organized. Insofar as professionals operate in an organizational setting, they 
are subject to agency relationships, which tend to induce particular, incentive-based 
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behaviors (Ross, 1973). The incentives for financial advisors pertain to various financial 
concerns, such as producing commissions for their financial institution, generating a 
performance-based bonus, or enhancing the performance of investors’ portfolios (Loonen, 
2006). Therefore, in professional investment decision making, behaviorally based effects 
might be less prominent, because the professional decision environment and sophistication 
are augmented by agency-based effects from the organizational setting in which 
investment counseling and decision making takes place.  
Some interesting studies adopt an explicit focus on the role and impact of financial advice. 
For example, studying role of professionalism in retail portfolios, Shapira and Venezia 
(2001) report that compared with investors who made independent investment decisions, 
professionally managed portfolios are better diversified and exhibit a lesser disposition 
effect, better market timing, and better round-trip performance. The managed group also 
exhibits more trading activity, which may be due to a status quo bias for the independent 
group, agency-related problems (churning), or more overconfidence in the managed group.  
Laboratory evidence supports the claim that financial advisors are not free of bias. Glaser 
et al. (2010) document that even when all participants are overconfident to some extent, 
financial professionals tend to be more overconfident than laypeople. Kaustia and Perttula 
(2011) confirm overconfidence among financial advisors, as well as the positive effects of 
debiasing measures, such as training or written warnings. Kaustia et al. (2009) indicate 
strong framing effects among a group of financial advisors, such that the advisors relate 
higher risk to higher required returns but lower expected returns. Thus, retail investors 
suffer from misconceptions related to risk and return (De Bondt, 1998), but advisors may 
not do much better. Kaustia et al. (2008) also find that financial experts exhibit significant 
anchoring effects in forming stocks market return expectations, though to a lesser extent 
than laypeople.  
Bergstresser et al. (2009) compare the aggregate performance of various mutual fund 
classes sold through intermediary and direct distribution channels in the United States. 
They find that broker-sold funds underperform direct-sold funds,18 on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Therefore, brokers must deliver clients unobserved intangible benefits, or else conflicts of 
interest inhibit brokers from providing value for their clients 
Hackethal et al. (2012) similarly paint a rather negative picture of the value of financial 
advisors, based on a comparison of advised and self-directed portfolios in Germany from 
2003–2005. Advised portfolios achieved a net return 5% per year lower than the 
independent group, but its risk also was lower. Monthly risk and investor characteristic 
                                                     
18
 Broker-sold funds are sold through intermediaries; direct-sold funds are marketed directly to the retail 
investor. Vanguard is a typical example of a supplier of direct-sold funds, and American Funds offers funds 
through financial advisors. However, direct-sold funds are sometimes also used by fee-based financial advisors. 
The same fund also might be offered to direct customers and broker customers simultaneously. 
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adjusted returns were 0.4% per month lower for the advised group; turnover and mutual 
fund allocations were higher.  
In an interesting audit study, Mullainathan et al. (2010) analyze whether advisors tend to 
debias their clients. They find that though advisors match portfolios with client 
characteristics, they fail to debias customers and, in some cases, even exacerbate client 
biases. Advisors promote return chasing behavior, encourage holding of actively managed 
funds, and fail to discourage holdings of own company stock. In general, advisors tend to 
support strategies that result in more transactions and higher fees. 
In a laboratory choice experiment, Hung and Yoong (2010) expose participants randomly 
to three conditions: (1) advice, (2) no advice, or (3) the choice to receive advice. The 
random assignment to different treatments has the clear advantage that self-selection bias 
plays a much lesser role.19 Some interesting results emerge. First, less financially literate 
people seek advice more often. Second, though unsolicited advice is generally ignored, 
participants who choose to receive advice improve their investment performance 
significantly, which implies a positive causal effect of advisory intervention. Bhattacharya 
et al. (2012) similarly offered 8,200 execution-only investors in Germany the option to 
receive free and unbiased advice in a financial advice choice experiment. A large majority 
of investors chose not to accept the offer; of those who accepted it offer, many chose not to 
follow the advice. However, investors who accepted the advice and followed it 
significantly improved their portfolio efficiency. In contrast with Hung and Yoong (2010), 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) find that less financially literate participants are less likely to 
take advice; that is, those who most need advice opt not to receive it. 
Karabulut (2011) indicates that though advisors mitigate home bias and 
underdiversification and reduce trading activity, they do not improve risk-adjusted returns. 
Bluethgen et al. (2008) confirm that advisors are associated with better diversified 
portfolios, more in line with predefined model portfolios but also higher fee expenses. 
2.7. Conclusion 
Retail investor behavior is a widely studied phenomenon. Empirical evidence typically 
indicates deviations from normative recommendations among individual investors. For 
example, diversification is typically limited, trading is excessive for some but other 
investors never trade, and buying decisions are heuristically based while selling decisions 
are narrowly framed and influenced by loss and regret aversion. Retail investors as a group 
exhibit portfolio performance that is inferior to that of more sophisticated investor classes. 
Within the group of retail investors, increased sophistication positively affects the quality 
of portfolio decision making.  
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 In the advice-choice treatment, investors still self-select to receive advice or not. 
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A related question is whether guidance, in the form of financial advice, can improve the 
investment decision-making quality exhibited by retail investors. Existing evidence on the 
effect of advisory intervention in retail portfolio decision making is mixed, to say the least. 
Laboratory experiments indicate that financial advisors are not free from biased judgments. 
Sometimes advisors are less (anchoring) and sometimes more (overconfidence) biased 
than laypeople. In combination with possible moral hazard behavior, this influence implies 
that debiasing efforts by advisors should not be taken at face value; in some cases, advisors 
even may exacerbate investment mistakes. Other experimental studies indicate that 
financial advisors positively affect portfolio outcomes, but only when investors accept and 
follow their advice, which is not obvious. Finally, studies that use transaction and portfolio 
data outside experimental settings find positive, negative, and zero effects on risk-adjusted 
returns, though diversification generally improves as a result of advisory intervention.  
Whether advisory interventions have any effect on the portfolio decisions of retail 
investors thus remains an open question. This thesis aims to contribute to the discussion on 
the possible added value offered by financial advice.  
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Chapter 3 
Financial Advice and Individual Investor Portfolio 
Performance1 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This paper attempts to address the question whether financial advisors add value to 
individual investor portfolio performance by comparing the portfolio performance of 
advised and self-directed investors, using a large data set of Dutch investors.2 Although 
many individual investors rely on financial advisors to make portfolio investment 
decisions, until recently, existing literature has largely ignored the added value of financial 
advice.3 Recent theoretical and empirical literature suggests an ambiguous contribution of 
advisors on retail portfolios. In line with predictions of Stoughton, Wu, and Zechner’s 
(2011) model, Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) suggest a negative relationship 
between advisor involvement and investor performance in U.S. mutual funds. In addition, 
Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012) find that risk-adjusted returns are lower for 
advised portfolios, partly as a result of higher trading costs. Other studies indicate that 
advisors fail to debias their customers or even exacerbate client biases that are known to 
hurt returns (Mullainathan, Nöth, and Schoar, 2010). In contrast, Bluethgen, Gintschel, 
Hackenthal, and Muller (2008) find that advisors are associated with better diversified 
portfolios that are more in line with predefined model portfolios, but with higher fee 
expenses. Bhattacharya, et al. (2012) find that advice taking is associated with an 
improvement in portfolio performance, though only a fraction of investors are willing to 
accept and follow advice. Finally, Shapira and Venezia (2001) report that compared with 
                                                     
1
 In a slightly modified form, this chapter has been accepted for publication in Financial Management (see 
volume 41 (2012), issue 2, p. 395-428). 
2
 Advised investors have an advisory relationship with the bank that provided the data; self-directed (or 
execution-only) investors do not have such a relationship. This division is overly simple in that advised 
investors likely make some investment decisions independent of their advisors, and self-directed investors 
might hire advisors through different channels. However, on average, the decisions of advised investors in this 
data set should be influenced more by an advisor than the decisions by the group of self-directed investors. 
3
 In the U.S., for example, 81% of the households investing in mutual funds, outside a retirement plan, rely on a 
financial advisor (Investment Company Institute, 2007). Similarly, Bluethgen et al. (2008) indicate that roughly 
80% of individual investors in Germany rely on financial advice for their investment decisions, and Hung, 
Clancy, Dominitz, Talley, Berrebi, and Suvankulov (2008) find that 75% of U.S. investors consult a financial 
advisor before conducting stock market or mutual fund transactions. In the Netherlands, the domain of the 
current research, 51% of households with an investment portfolio rely on financial advice (Millward Brown, 
2010). 
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investors who made independent investment decisions, professionally managed portfolios 
were better diversified and showed better round trip performance due to better market 
timing. Thus, whether financial advisors improve or worsen portfolio decision making 
remains an open question to which this paper tries to make a contribution. 
Research regarding advised portfolio behavior may be positioned at the intersection of 
individual and professional portfolio behavior, two research streams that are well 
established. In early research on the portfolio performance of retail investors, Schlarbaum, 
Lewellen, and Lease (1978a, 1978b) report risk-adjusted returns of approximately 0% and 
reasonable levels of skill, though recent empirical studies indicate that average individual 
investors perform poorly.4 Within these findings, however, a large heterogeniety in 
performance can be observed.5 In addition, the added value of professional money 
managers has been debated ever since Jensen (1967) first demonstrated that mutual funds 
do not outperform a buy-and-hold strategy on average (Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers, 
2010; Busse, Goyal, and Wahal, 2010; Fama and French, 2010). Yet Binay (2005) argues 
that institutional investors, including investment advisors, generate excess returns based on 
their style and stock picking. Other studies that explicitly compare the portfolio 
performance of individual households with that of professionals find that professionals 
significantly outperform less sophisiticated investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; 
Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean, 2009). 
This paper differs from the extant literature in several ways. First, in addition to providing 
a rich set of descriptives that distinguish advised from self-directed investors, I combine 
analysis of the role of advisors on risk, return, portfolio composition, and timing skills. 
Additionally, my results likely rely on a more representative data set than previous 
studies.6 Moreover, by comparing pre- and post-advice seeking behavior, I am able to 
identify effects from advisory intervention and, at least partly, circumvent endogeneity 
problems that may hinder previously reported results. 
Despite differences in investor and portfolio characteristics between advised and self-
directed investors, I cannot reject the hypothesis of no return differentials between the two 
groups. Less ideosyncratic risk exists in advised portfolios because of their greater 
diversification resulting from more investments in mutual funds, the use of more asset 
classes, and a lesser focus on domestic equity. The potential for selection effects leaves me 
to question whether these findings reflect the advisor’s influence alone. Less sophisticated 
                                                     
4 Their method is based on realized returns, however, causing a positive bias in performance measurement due 
to the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Kaustia, 2010). 
5
 For other papers on retail investor performance, see Barber et al., 2009; Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz, 
2009; Ivkovic, Sialm, and Weisbenner, 2008; Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway, 2005; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 
2005; Barber and Odean, 2000, 2001; and Odean, 1998, 1999. 
6
 Bergstresser et al. (2009) use aggregated holdings of mutual funds. Hackethal et al (2012) use data from 
10,000 accounts over a 34-month period with an average account value of less than €13,000, which is unlikely 
to represent the whole portfolio of the investors in their sample. Bluethgen et al. (2008) use data from less than 
4,500 accounts. 
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investors, for example, may be more inclined to seek advice (Hung and Yoong, 2010). If 
sophistication and portfolio performance are positively correlated, selection effects may 
understate the reported results. Evidence from an additional analysis of investors who 
switch from being self-directed to advised, however, indicates that the results (at least in 
part) reflect the effect of advisory intervention. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the potential costs 
and benefits of financial advice. After describing the data and summary statistics in 
Section 3.3, I present the methods and empirical results in Section 3.4 and 3.5. I provide 
my conclusions in Section 3.6. 
3.2 Investment Advice and Individual Investor Performance 
3.2.1 Potential Costs of Investment Advice 
When professionals operate in an organizational setting, they are subject to agency 
relationships that induce incentive-based behaviors (Ross, 1973). The incentives for 
financial advisors often pertain to different financial concerns, such as producing 
commissions for their financial institution, generating a performance-based bonus, or 
enhancing the performance of investors’ portfolios (Loonen, 2006). Several theoretical 
studies model behavioral responses to these incentives and predict that exploitation of 
unsophisticated clients may occur (Ottaviani, 2000; Krausz and Paroush, 2002; Inderst and 
Ottaviani, 2009; Stoughton et al., 2011). Bergstresser et al. (2009) provide empirical 
evidence regarding conflicts of interest between brokers and their clients in the mutual 
funds market. Broker-sold funds underperform direct-sold funds (before costs). Zhao 
(2003) reports similar findings. Funds with higher loads tend to receive higher inflows. 
Although research indicates that financial professionals tend to be less biased in some 
ways than laypeople (discussed in the next section), they may be more biased in some 
other fashion or, given the agency relationship discussed previously, may have an 
incentive to exacerbate their clients’ biases. For example, overconfidence hurts returns 
(Odean, 1999), but correcting it may be difficult. Overconfidence likely reduces an 
investor’s propensity to seek advice (Guiso and Japelli, 2006). Even when he or she hires 
an advisor, it is questionable whether that will help. Shapira and Venezia (2001) find more 
trading activity in professionally managed accounts, which they relate, among other issues, 
to a possible higher degree of overconfidence for the managed group. Glaser, Weber, and 
Langer (2010) document that although all participants are overconfident to some extent, 
financial professionals tend to be more overconfident than laypeople. Kaustia and Perttula 
(2011) also find overconfidence among a group of financial advisors and some positive 
effects from debiasing measures. In addition, Kaustia, Laukkanen, and Puttonen (2009) 
find strong framing effects among a group of financial advisors. Advisors relate higher risk 
to higher required returns, but to lower expected returns. Thus, while retail investors may 
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suffer from misconceptions related to risk and return (De Bondt, 1998), advisors may not 
do much better. 
Mullainathan et al. (2010) analyze whether advisors tend to debias their clients. They find 
that although advisors tend to match portfolios to client characteristics, they fail to debias 
their customers and, in some cases, even exacerbate client biases. That is, the authors find 
that advisors promote return chasing behavior, encourage holding of actively managed 
funds, and fail to discourage the holding of their own company stock. In general, advisors 
tend to support strategies that result in more transactions and higher fees. In addition, 
Karabulut (2011) indicates that advisors have no influence on stock market participation, 
but are associated with lower degrees of home bias and less turnover. 
3.2.2. Potential Benefits of Investment Advice 
Hackethal et al. (2012) indicate that economies of scale in portfolio management and 
information acquisition, as well as advisors’ potentially better investment decision making 
abilities, may help investors improve portfolio performance. Stoughton et al. (2011) 
rationalize the use of financial advisors by noting that they facilitate small investor market 
participation by economizing on information costs. It seems likely that, on average, 
financial advisors are more financially sophisticated than individual investors in terms of 
investment experience, financial education, and financial knowledge, characteristics linked 
to improved decision making. Kaustia, Alho, and Puttonen (2008) report that financial 
market professionals are still biased in their return expectations, but less so than laypeople, 
while List (2003) finds that the degree of market experience is correlated with the degree 
of rationality in decision making. Feng and Seasholes (2005) support this finding by 
reporting that increased sophistication and trading experience are strongly related to the 
elimination of biased decision making. In addition, Dhar and Zhu (2006) document a 
negative correlation among financial literacy, trading experience, and the disposition 
effect. Shapira and Venezia (2001) report that professionally managed accounts exhibit 
less biased decision making (in terms of the disposition effect) than independent individual 
investors. These findings all indicate that education and experience reduce behavioral 
biases that hurt performance, though they may not entirely eliminate them. Finally, 
Loewenstein (2003) confirms that emotions may have a key impact on decision making, 
and experience is related to the level of these emotions, such that Lo and Repin (2002) 
observe significant differences in emotional responses between experienced and less 
experienced foreign exchange and derivatives dealers. 
Beyond these potential benefits resulting from advisor experience, the legal setting 
provides advised investors some guarantee that financial transactions will fit their 
characteristics and financial situations. Dutch and EU regulations (in particular the MiFID) 
require advisors to make recommendations that fit well within an elaborate client profile, 
whereas for execution-only services, this client profile is much more limited and 
transactions do not need to be checked against the client profile. 
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3.2.3. Self-Selection of Investors into Advice Taking 
In the sample for this study, investors decide whether to hire an advisor. Therefore, 
differences in behavior and performance between the groups cannot solely reflect the input 
of the advisor as any difference that emerges is a combined result of investor heterogeniety 
and advisor influence. Resolving this issue would require running an experiment that 
assigns participants randomly to an advised or self-directed investor group.7 Hung and 
Yoong (2010) similarly implement a hypothetical choice experiment and find that 
investors with lower financial literacy are more likely to take advice and enjoy better 
investment performance suggesting a positive effect of advice. Furthermore, they find that 
older, more wealthy people are more likely to use advisors, but are also significantly less 
financially literate. The notion that less sophicated investors are more likely to take advice 
is consistent with the outcomes of theoretical models, such as those proposed by Stoughton 
et al. (2011), who predict that underperforming active funds sell only through financial 
advisors to unsophisticated investors and Inderst and Ottaviani (2009), who assume that 
naive clients do not rationally anticipate advisors’ conflicts of interest. Both models imply 
that advisors mainly service less sophisticated investors. 
Therefore, if advised investors are less sophisticated than self-directed investors, assuming 
that portfolio performance is a function of sophistication in the absence of an advisor, a 
direct comparison of the two groups would underestimate the added value of financial 
advice. In addition, Bergstresser et al. (2009) report that clients of brokers are slightly 
more risk averse. Bluethgen et al. (2008) also find that customers of a German retail bank 
are older, wealthier, and more risk averse. In this case, risk aversion likely leads to less 
risky portfolios for investors who take advice and, thus, to lower returns. 
3.2.4. Account Size 
This study compares the results of relatively large portfolios (values exceeding €25,000 or 
€100,000) with the results of the whole sample since the impact of advisors on portfolios 
may depend on the portfolios’ size. Large portfolios provide a larger profit potential for the 
bank giving advisors incentive to pay more attention to them. Large portfolios may also 
contain more complex securities that require more advisory efforts. For example, a large 
number of (especially large) advised portfolios hold structured products. Alternatively, 
since portfolio size is often used as a proxy for sophistication (Anderson, 2008), small 
                                                     
7 Other, more advanced econometric methods also provide ways to deal with self-selection bias. For example, 
the panel structure of the data set supports fixed- or random-effects regressions. However, the fixed-effects 
estimator needs time-varying data, which are largely absent from the study data set as few investors switch 
between groups. The random-effects model requires the stringent assumption of no correlation between 
unobserved individual effects and explanatory variables, which seems highly unlikely. For example, investment 
skill would need to be uncorrelated with gender or wealth. Instrumental variable regressions demand variables 
that correlate well with the choice of hiring an advisor and not with returns. As is the case for many empirical 
studies, these variables are unavailable. Thus, I am not confident that these methodologies solve the potential 
self-selection bias in this case, so I use this more qualitative approach. Note, however, that the analysis of 
switchers in Section 3.5 aims to identify causal effects of advisory intervention. 
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portfolios may deviate more from normative recommendations, which may lead to a 
greater advisory impact even when less attention is paid to it. In Section 3.5, I formally test 
the advisory impact on small and large portfolios. 
3.3. Data 
3.3.1. The Sample 
The primary database comes from a medium-sized, full service retail and business bank 
that offers an array of financial products. The bank, which advertises itself as a relationship 
bank, offers services throughout the Netherlands through a network of bank branches, 
though it has a stronger presence in some regions of the country than others. Customers 
typically have an account manager who communicates all the financial services the bank 
offers. For investment advice, clients visit the investment department, although non-clients 
may also visit this department by making an appointment themselves. Some clients receive 
advice after they switch from execution-only services. Execution-only and advised 
investors of the bank receive service from different departments within the bank. Investors 
with an advisory relationship cannot trade through the execution-only department, nor can 
investors who use execution-only services trade with the help of an advisor. 
During our sample period, all customers were eligible for advice; that is, smaller investors 
could access advisory services as well.8 Although most banks require that a minimum 
amount of money be invested before a client is eligible for advisory services, this was not 
the case for the bank in this research during the sample period. Note that assignment to a 
specific advisor is random. Both new and existing investment clients are directed to an 
advisor depending on availability at the time. Advisors in the sample are paid fixed wages 
only, so they have no direct personal financial incentive to generate commissions, but 
career and prestige considerations are likely to play a role. 
For all investment clients in the sample, I obtained both position and transaction files for a 
52-month period from April 2003-August 2007. I use only the accounts of private 
investors with unrestricted accounts excluding any portfolios owned by a business, linked 
to mortgage loans, or part of a company savings plan9. Therefore, the final sample consists 
of 16,053 investors. To compare the results with those from other empirical studies, I also 
report results based on common equity holdings, which involves a sample of more than 
6,100 investors. Accounts opened or closed during the sample period are included for the 
months in which they were active. This procedure partly solves possible survivorship bias. 
The overall trade file contains the following data fields: 1) account identifier, 2) transaction 
date, 3) security identification code, 4) transaction type, 5) quantity traded, 6) trade price, 
7) currency, and 8) commission paid. The file consists of 535,543 transactions, with a 
                                                     
8
 The fifth percentile of the portfolio value distribution of advised customers was approximately €600. 
9
 I make this selection because business may contain professional investors. Portfolios that are linked to a 
mortgage or part of a company savings plan are not freely accessible. 
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combined market value of €1.6 billion. Thirty percent of all trades are option trades.10 The 
position file consists of 2,434,326 investor-security-month positions, which I aggregated 
into 654,036 monthly individual portfolio statements. The position file also includes 
information about the type of the client (execution-only or advised), gender, zip code, and 
date of birth. The six-digit zip code data (representing, on average, 15 households) from 
Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2006) provide information 
about residential property values and incomes. Specifically we use the average official 
property value for tax purposes (the so called “WOZ waarde”) and the gross household 
income within each six-digit zip code data area.  
To obtain an impression about the representativeness of my sample, I compare my sample 
with the investment portfolios of 1.5 million Dutch households with security investments 
using data from the Dutch Central Bank (DNB, 2006) in Table 3.I. According to average 
portfolio size and composition, it seems likely that my sample reasonably represents the 
average investor in the Netherlands. A 2007 survey (DNB, 2008) suggests that the 
investment portfolios in my sample represent a significant proportion of financial wealth 
for most households and cannot be considered a “play account” (Goetzmann and Kumar, 
2008).11 In addition, I compare the portfolios in my sample with samples from other 
empirical studies of individual investor behavior in the U.S., Germany, and the 
Netherlands (Dorn and Huberman, 2005; Barber and Odean, 2008; Bauer, Cosemans, and 
Eichholtz, 2009). This comparison reports many similarities in terms of trading style, 
portfolio composition, and sociodemographics. 
Table 3.I: Comparison Investment Portfolio of Average Dutch with Current Sample 
This table compares the asset allocations and values of the aggregate portfolio of Dutch 
households with current sample as of 2006. 
  
DNB Data   Own Research Sample 
Equity allocation 54%   52% 
Common Equity 37%   30% 
    o.w. Dutch 75%   81% 
Equity Mutual Funds 17%   22% 
Fixed Income allocation 25%   36% 
Common bonds 18%   18% 
    o.w. Dutch 56%   87% 
Bond Mutual Funds 7%   18% 
Other allocation 21%   12% 
Balanced funds 4%   0% 
Structured Products 6%   6% 
Other 11%   6% 
Average Portfolio Size € 70.000   € 65.376 
                                                     
10
 Bauer et al. (2009) report that almost 50% of the trades in their sample are option trades. Their data come 
from a Dutch online broker. 
11
 Respondents reported gross assets of €233,000 on average, 20% (€ 47,000) of which was invested in financial 
assets. 
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3.3.2. Measuring Investor Portfolio Returns 
In contrast with most empirical studies regarding investor performance, I take a broader 
perspective to consider all portfolio holdings12 including mutual funds, bonds, and 
derivatives, and explicitly account for both the size and the timing of deposits and 
withdrawals including intramonth trades. For comparison, I provide a separate analysis of 
returns on common equity positions for the sample. 
To calculate portfolio and common equity returns, I use the modified version of the Dietz 
measure (Dietz, 1968): 
                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                (3 .1) 
                                                                       
                                                                (3.2)
 
where grossitR  ( netitR ) is the gross (net) monthly return of investor i in month t, itMV  is the 
end-of-month market value of the investment (or common equity only) portfolio that 
investors have at our sample bank excluding the cash balance, grossitNC is the net 
contribution (deposits minus withdrawals) in month t before transaction costs, and itw  is 
the weight attributed to this net contribution. This weight is determined by the timing of 
the contributions. The earlier in the month a contribution takes place, the greater is the 
weight. Specifically, each contribution is weighted by the fraction of remaining days in the 
month of the contribution. 
itCOSTS  refer to both transaction costs and custodial fees (including 19% VAT). Since I 
use market values in the calculations, I underestimate the actual costs as some market 
values are observed on an after-cost basis, such as mutual fund market values that are 
observed after the deduction of various fees (e.g., management fees). For withdrawals that 
result from a dividend payment, dividend withholding taxes are added back.13 Bond 
transactions are net of accrued coupon interest. For every month that a portfolio holds a 
fixed income security, the coupon (recalculated on a monthly basis) is included in the 
transaction file. Monthly turnover is calculated by dividing all purchases and sales by the 
beginning of the month portfolio value. These calculations provide a sample of 604,831 
investor-month portfolio return observations and 217,129 common equity return 
                                                     
12
 I do note however, that the cash balance on the investment account is not known. 
13
 In the Netherlands, private investors can neutralize these withholdings in their income tax filings. 
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observations. Any missing values indicate investors who invest for less than the whole 
sample period of 52 months or the elimination of extreme outliers.14 
The gross and net monthly returns of the average advised and self-directed investors in 
every month, for use in the time-series regressions, are calculated as follows: 
 
                                          (3.3a) (3.3b) 
 
                                               (3.4a) (3.4b)
 
 
where 
tN  is the total number of investors at time t and the subscripts ADV and SD denote 
advised and self-directed investors, respectively. Thus, I have four time-series of equally 
weighted returns that serve as the basis for the time-series analysis in Section 3.4.2. Fama 
(1998) strongly advocates the use of aggregate calendar time portfolios especially so when 
cross sectional dependence is likely. Given that many empirical researchers in the field of 
individual investor behavior follow this advice, we also employ a calendar time approach 
to ensure comparability. 
3.3.3. Control Variables 
Several variables may influence returns. Thus, this research includes the following 
controls: 1) gender, 2) age, 3) turnover, and 4) wealth (three wealth proxies: portfolio size, 
residential value, and income, the latter two observed at the six-digit zip code level). 
Barber and Odean (2001) find that men trade 45% more than women causing them to 
underperform by almost 1% per year. Korniotis and Kumar (2011) confirm that older, 
more experienced investors exhibit greater investment knowledge, but they seem to have 
poorer investment skills, perhaps due to cognitive aging. Portfolio turnover also may hurt 
net returns (Barber and Odean, 2000) such that the most active traders outperform in gross 
terms, but underperform in net terms (Bauer et al., 2009). Finally, with regard to wealth, 
portfolio size is a widely used proxy for investor sophistication. Anderson (2008) reports a 
positive association between portfolio value and trading performance, and Bauer et al. 
(2009) indicate that large portfolios outperform small portfolios. However, Barber and 
Odean (2000) find no significant differentials between the largest and smallest portfolios. 
Moreover, Dhar and Zhu (2006) report that income, age, trading experience, and portfolio 
size are all negatively correlated with the disposition effect, a bias that lowers returns 
(Odean, 1998). 
                                                     
14
 I winsorize the return distribution at 1% and 99%. 
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3.4. Analysis and Results 
3.4.1. Univariate Results 
Table 3.II presents a comparison of investor and portfolio characteristics of advised and 
self-directed investors. According to Panel A, of the more than 16,000 investors in the 
sample, approximately 70% are registered with the advisory department for at least one 
month during the sample period.15 For portfolios with a value exceeding €100,000, the 
percentage increases to more than 90%. The advised group contains more women (27% vs. 
24% for self-directed investors) and joint accounts (40% vs. 36%). The average advised 
investor is somewhat older (56 vs. 52 years) and the portfolio size is considerably larger 
than for the self-directed group (€70,000 vs. € 15,000). 
Panel B of Table 3.II further indicates that advised investors perform much worse in terms 
of gross and net raw portfolio returns. The results also indicate (see Panel D) that advised 
investors invest a considerably smaller fraction of their wealth in equity, which may 
explain their lower portfolio returns given the favorable market conditions for equity 
during the sample period. For equity-only portfolios, the net return differences are much 
smaller and better for advised investors in the largest portfolios. Return volatilities for both 
the whole and the equity portfolios are considerably smaller for advised portfolios. 
The average portfolio turnover is 4.7% per month (Panel C, Table 3.II), less than the 6% 
reported by Barber and Odean (2000) and much less than the 9% and 24% reported for 
option and equity traders, respectively, by Bauer et al. (2009). This result likely occurs 
because the other samples are from Internet brokerage firms, whereas my sample includes 
investors who use full service or telephone-based, execution-only brokerage services. 
Although advised investors execute almost twice as many trades (0.27 vs. 0.14 per month), 
they are less active in terms of turnover (4.4% vs. 5.5% per month). Since advised 
portfolios are generally better diversified, changes require more trades. Furthermore, there 
is great heterogeneity in trading activity: 45% of the investors never trade and the 1% of 
the most active investors turn their portfolio over approximately 1.5 times annually.16 
Panel D of Table 3.II contains the asset allocations indicating large differences in the asset 
mixes of average advised and self-directed investors. For both groups, equity and bonds 
represent the main assets (approximately 85% of portfolio value), while advised investors 
have less risky portfolios. Their asset mix consists of less than 50% equity, whereas self-
directed portfolios allocate almost 70% to this asset class.17  
                                                     
15
 This 70% represents the investors who were advised during the whole sample period as well as the investors 
that switched from or to receiving advice. 
16
 These details do not appear in Table 3.II, but were derived from additional analyses of the underlying data. 
17
 The whole portfolio of self-directed investors may not be observable given the average portfolio size of 
approximately €15,000, whereas the average portfolio size in the Netherlands is approximately €70,000 (see 
Table 3.I). Thus, these figures may be biased. 
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For larger portfolios (exceeding €100,000), the average equity allocation drops to almost 
50% and the difference between advised and self-directed portfolios becomes smaller. The 
average number of common equity positions is 4.4, but it is higher for advised portfolios 
(5.3 vs. 3.3), although this difference is mainly due to the higher average portfolio size of 
advised investors.18 Larger portfolios hold more common equity positions (almost nine for 
portfolios over €100,000). Well diversified portfolios may also be obtained by means of 
mutual funds. In advised portfolios, 66% of wealth is allocated to mutual funds, whereas 
self-directed investors allocate 48%. Similarly, fund allocation in equity exposure is 63% 
for advised investors, considerably more than that for self-directed investors (40%). 
Additionally, less advised investors own options (4.5% vs. 6%). Of the portfolios with 
average values greater than €100,000, almost 13% contain options. Although structured 
products are much less important than equity and fixed income in terms of value, the 
number of portfolios holding structured products is considerable (23%) and much more 
prevalent for advised portfolios (28%) than for self-directed portfolios (12%), especially 
for larger portfolios. This difference may be an indication that banks are pushing these 
products to exploit uninformed investors (Benet, Giannetti, and Pissaris, 2006; Henderson 
and Pearson, 2011). 
3.4.2 Time-Series Analysis of Returns 
To analyze risk-adjusted return differences, I calculate the alphas of a long-short portfolio, 
long on the aggregate equally weighted portfolio of advised investors and short on the 
aggregate equally weighted portfolio of self-directed investors. As Seasholes and Zhu 
(2010) note, forming portfolios creates a single time series that is free from cross-sectional 
correlation. In addition, since advisors may have an incentive to devote most of their 
attention to larger clients, it might be that the effect of advice is more pronounced for large 
clients. Therefore, I also create portfolios based on various account sizes. 
The regression of the monthly common equity return differences uses a three-factor model 
developed by Fama and French (1993) to correct for different style tilts in the portfolios. I 
also regress monthly portfolio return differences using a six-factor model that, beyond the 
three Fama-French factors, features variations in portfolio characteristics (Bauer et al., 
2009). I use the following model to calculate differences in alphas for the overall investor 
portfolio: 
( ) ,654321 ttttttftmtgrossSDgrossADV PUTCALLBONDHMLSMBRRRR tt εββββββα ++++++−+=−
          (3.5) 
And I estimate the alpha differences in the equity portfolio as follows: 
( ) ,321 tttftmtgrossSDgrossADV HMLSMBRRRR tt εβββα +++−+=−
                                    
(3.6) 
                                                     
18
 For further analysis on this issue, see Table 3.VI. 
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In these models, grossADVtR and 
gross
SDtR  are the average equally weighted gross returns for the 
advised and self-directed portfolio in month t, respectively, as calculated in Equations 
(3.3a), and (3.3b). We perform identical regressions using net returns as calculated in 
(3.4a), and (3.4b) (see Section 3.3.2). Rmt – Rft is the return on the MSCI Netherlands index 
in month t in excess of the three-month Euribor. SMBt is the return on a zero investment 
factor mimicking the portfolio for size. HMLt is the return on a zero investment factor 
mimicking the portfolio for value and BONDt is the excess return on the Iboxx 10-year 
Dutch Government Index. These return series have been obtained from Datastream. As in 
Agarwal and Naik (2004), CALLt (PUTt) is a return series, based on data obtained from 
NYSE-Euronext, generated by a buying two month at the money index call (put) option at 
the end of each month and selling it again at the end of the following month. The 
procedure repeats every month, generating a time-series of 52 monthly returns. To avoid 
multicollinearity problems, both CALLt and PUTt factors are orthogonalized on the Rmt 
factor. The computation of standard errors follows the Newey-West (1987) correction and 
takes into account autocorrelation up to three lags. 
The results in Panel A of Table 3.III indicate that, as expected from the average asset mix 
and the favorable stock market in the sample period, the average aggregated portfolio of 
advised investors underperforms the average self-directed portfolio by a significant margin 
in terms of raw returns. For the whole sample, the difference in gross returns is 0.25% per 
month (3% per year), similar to the findings in Table 3.II. For larger portfolios, this return 
difference is smaller, but still considerable. Moreover, the risk-adjusted return (alpha) 
differences indicate that although a negative sign dominates the various alphas, the 
hypothesis of no return differentials between advised and self-directed portfolios cannot be 
rejected. Panel B of Table 3.III reports that many of the risk exposures across the various 
specifications are quite similar, while advised investors expose themselves to less market 
risk over the entire portfolio, consistent with the lower equity exposure of this group. For 
both groups, the market betas are quite low19, with values of approximately 0.8 for the 
equity portfolios. Investors in this sample apparently prefer low beta stocks. Indicative of 
this finding is that the two most widely held stocks, in terms of both value and number of 
portfolios, have market betas of 0.5 and 0.4, respectively, during the sample period. 
  
                                                     
19
 This finding cannot be derived from this table, but is based on additional analysis of the underlying data. 
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3.4.3 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Returns 
The analysis of risk- and style-adjusted performance indicates no differences between the 
advised and self-directed investor groups. The previous section treated advised and self-
directed investors as a homogeneous group, but as Table 3.II reports, large cross-sectional 
differences between advised and self-directed investors exist in terms of investor 
characteristics and portfolio compositions, which are known determinants of investor 
performance (Section 3.3.3). Therefore, to be able to estimate the coefficient for advice 
taking, I need to control for these return determinants to avoid a potential omitted variables 
bias. Specifically, I applied the cross-sectional methodology developed by Fama and 
MacBeth (1973)20, which Petersen (2009) indicates provides unbiased statistical inferences 
when cross-sectional correlation is present.21 Specifically, the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
procedure assumes ( ) 0,cov 1 =−itit εε  and ( ) 0,cov ≠jtit εε .  
For each month, I ran the following cross-sectional regression for returns generated by the 
whole portfolio: 
 
, (3.7) 
 
and the following regression on common equity returns: 
      
,    (3.8) 
The Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimators reported in table 3.IV are calculated as time-series 
averages of the monthly cross-sectional parameter estimates, as follows:  
∑
=
=
T
t
t
FM T1
ββ
                                                                                                                        (3.9) 
while the estimated variance of the Fama-MacBeth estimate is calculated as 
( ) ( )∑
=
−
−
=
T
t
FMt
FM TT
S
1
2
2
1
1 βββ
 ,                                                                                              (3.10) 
                                                     
20
 Specifically, I employ the Stata routine “XTFMB” developed by D. Hoechle (version:  2.0.0, 2011). 
21
 To test whether this technique is appropriate, I follow Petersen’s (2009) advice and compare White standard 
errors with time-clustered or investor-clustered standard errors. Standard errors are indeed affected when I 
cluster by time, implying that cross-sectional dependence is present. For standard errors clustered by investor, 
they rise only fractionally and are well within the margins of Factors 3 and 4, which Petersen (2009) indicates as 
problematic. This implies that the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure is justified here. 
itittittittittitt
ittit8tit7tit6t
it5tit4tit3tit2tit1t0tit
εDerivativeβMixβStructuredβRealEstateβeFixedIncomβ
EquityβIncomelnβValuelResidentialnβTurnoverlnβ
ValuelnβAgeβJointβWomanβAdviceβαR
+++++
++++
++++++=
1413121110
9)()()(
)(
itit8tit7tit6t
it5tit4tit3tit2tit1t0tit
εIncomelnβValuelResidentialnβTurnoverlnβ
ValuelnβAgeβJointβWomanβAdviceβαR
+++
++++++=
)()()(
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As noted before, Petersen (2009) indicates that this procedure is only valid when an 
individual effect is absent in the data. As indicated in footnote 21, this assumption seems 
warranted. 
In equations 3.6 and 3.7, Rit denotes the gross or net portfolio or equity return in excess of 
the three-month Euribor for investor i in month t. Adviceit (the main variable of interest) is 
a dummy variable equal to one for investors with an advisor in the relevant month and zero 
otherwise. Womanit is a dummy variable equal to one if the portfolio is held by a woman 
and zero otherwise. Jointit is a dummy variable equal to one if the portfolio is held by two 
people (usually a married couple) and zero otherwise. Ageit is the age of the primary 
account holder in month t, while Valueit is the beginning of the month portfolio market 
value in month t [or equity value of the portfolio for Equation (3.7)]. Turnoverit is the sum 
of all purchases and sells in month t divided by the beginning of the month portfolio value 
(or, for Equation (3.7), the sum of all equity buys and sells divided by the beginning of the 
month equity portfolio value). Residential Valueit and Incomeit are the average house value 
and average gross monthly household income, respectively, based on averages of the six-
digit zip code of the area in which the investor lives. 
Since the portfolios differ remarkably in terms of asset allocation, it is necessary to control 
for these differences. Therefore, I use the fractions of the total account value allocated to a 
specific asset class as a percentage of the total monthly portfolio as an additional control 
when estimating the cross-sectional regressions on the whole investor portfolio. Equityit 
refers to both individual stock holdings and equity mutual funds, Fixed Incomeit indicates 
individual bonds and bond funds, Real Estateit refers to real estate funds, Stucturedit is 
structured products, Mixit involves balanced funds, and Derivativeit is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the account holds derivatives (mainly options) in that month. 
To assess the robustness of the results, I performed similar analyses for the first and second 
subperiods in the sample. Specifically, I ran regressions based on the first and second 26 
months of the sample. Since the overall sample period can be characterized as a bull 
market, I also performed separate analyses for the months when equity markets showed 
negative returns22, providing an indication as to whether the results hold in more adverse 
market periods. This approach seems appropriate considering the large fraction of inert 
investors who probably did not change their portfolio behavior dramatically, even during 
the recent economic crisis. 
The most important finding from the regression results in Table 3.IV is that the coefficient 
for the Advice dummy, that is sometimes positive, but mostly negative, almost never 
differs statistically from zero at conventional confidence levels.  
  
                                                     
22
 I used the MSCI Netherlands index to determine when equity markets were in decline. 
CHAPTER 3 
68 
 
  
G
ro
ss
G
ro
ss
Fu
ll
Fu
ll
D
o
w
n
w
ar
d 
m
ar
ke
t
Su
b 
1
Su
b 
2
>
 
€
25
,
00
0
Fu
ll
Fu
ll
D
o
w
n
w
ar
d 
m
ar
ke
t
Su
b 
1
Su
b 
2
>
 
€
25
,
00
0
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10
)
(11
)
(12
)
A
dv
ice
-
0.
07
-
0.
07
0.
01
-
0.
03
-
0.
10
0.
18
0.
04
0.
01
-
0.
00
0.
13
-
0.
12
-
0.
03
(-1
.
63
)
(-1
.
58
)
(0.
11
)
(-0
.
58
)
(-1
.
51
)
(1.
19
)
(0.
63
)
(0.
13
)
(-0
.
04
)
(1.
53
)
(-1
.
42
)
(-0
.
37
)
W
o
m
an
-
0.
02
-
0.
01
0.
02
-
0.
01
-
0.
01
0.
01
-
0.
00
-
0.
01
0.
06
0.
05
-
0.
07
-
0.
07
(-0
.
79
)
(-0
.
65
)
(0.
71
)
(-0
.
38
)
(-0
.
57
)
(0.
25
)
(-0
.
03
)
(-0
.
16
)
(0.
57
)
(0.
32
)
(-0
.
80
)
(-0
.
77
)
Jo
in
t 
A
cc
o
u
n
t
-
0.
00
0.
00
0.
01
-
0.
00
0.
01
-
0.
07
0.
04
0.
04
-
0.
12
*
*
0.
06
0.
01
0.
00
(-0
.
21
)
(0.
06
)
(0.
53
)
(-0
.
21
)
(0.
37
)
(-1
.
22
)
(1.
20
)
(0.
98
)
(-2
.
36
)
(0.
94
)
(0.
35
)
(0.
10
)
A
ge
0.
00
*
*
0.
00
*
-
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
*
0.
00
0.
00
*
*
0.
00
*
*
0.
01
*
*
0.
00
0.
00
*
*
0.
00
(2.
26
)
(1.
90
)
(-0
.
57
)
(1.
14
)
(1.
76
)
(0.
10
)
(2.
22
)
(2.
15
)
(2.
59
)
(1.
05
)
(2.
22
)
(0.
70
)
Va
lu
e 
(ln
)
0.
09
*
0.
12
*
*
-
0.
01
0.
16
*
*
0.
08
0.
22
-
0.
09
0.
02
-
0.
20
0.
11
-
0.
06
-
0.
02
(1.
75
)
(2.
34
)
(-0
.
12
)
(2.
52
)
(0.
98
)
(1.
22
)
(-0
.
85
)
(0.
24
)
(-1
.
22
)
(0.
63
)
(-0
.
52
)
(-0
.
30
)
T
u
rn
o
v
er
 
(ln
)
0.
26
*
*
*
-
0.
13
*
*
-
0.
20
*
-
0.
19
*
-
0.
07
-
0.
15
*
*
0.
38
*
*
*
-
0.
31
*
*
-
0.
42
*
-
0.
38
-
0.
24
*
*
-
0.
29
*
*
(3.
98
)
(-2
.
11
)
(-1
.
88
)
(-1
.
78
)
(-1
.
14
)
(-2
.
37
)
(3.
06
)
(-2
.
47
)
(-1
.
95
)
(-1
.
65
)
(-2
.
24
)
(-2
.
38
)
R
es
id
en
ta
l v
alu
e 
(ln
)
0.
09
0.
09
0.
02
0.
17
0.
02
-
0.
27
0.
03
0.
06
0.
05
0.
05
0.
06
0.
13
(1.
46
)
(1.
44
)
(0.
48
)
(1.
39
)
(0.
40
)
(-0
.
84
)
(0.
35
)
(0.
64
)
(0.
49
)
(0.
34
)
(0.
71
)
(1.
12
)
In
co
m
e 
(ln
)
-
0.
01
0.
00
0.
02
0.
03
-
0.
03
-
0.
06
0.
17
0.
16
0.
13
0.
49
-
0.
17
-
0.
26
(-0
.
28
)
(0.
00
)
(0.
35
)
(0.
37
)
(-0
.
50
)
(-0
.
93
)
(0.
73
)
(0.
71
)
(0.
74
)
(1.
14
)
(-1
.
38
)
(-1
.
47
)
Ta
bl
e
 
3.
IV
.
 
C
ro
ss
-
Se
ct
io
n
a
l D
iff
e
re
n
ce
s 
Po
rt
fo
lio
 
Pe
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
N
et
N
et
W
ho
le 
Po
rt
fo
lio
Eq
u
ity
 
o
n
ly
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
co
ef
fic
ien
te
st
im
at
es
o
n
v
ar
io
u
s
Fa
m
a-
M
ac
B
et
h
(19
73
)r
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
o
n
in
v
es
to
r
an
d
po
rt
fo
lio
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s.
T
he
lef
t-
ha
n
d
sid
e
o
ft
he
ta
bl
e
u
se
s
po
rt
fo
lio
re
tu
rn
s
(in
%
)a
s
de
pe
n
de
n
t
v
ar
iab
les
,
an
d
th
e
rig
ht
-
ha
n
d
sid
e
re
fe
rs
to
co
m
m
o
n
eq
u
ity
re
tu
rn
s
(in
%
).
B
ot
h
gr
o
ss
(co
lu
m
n
1
an
d
7)
an
d
n
et
re
tu
rn
s
(al
lo
th
er
co
lu
m
n
s)
ar
e
u
se
d.
T
he
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e
co
v
er
s
all
52
m
o
n
th
s
fro
m
A
pr
il
20
03
-
A
u
gu
st
20
07
,
an
d
Su
b
1
(2)
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
fir
st
(se
co
n
d)
26
m
o
n
th
s
o
ft
hi
s
pe
rio
d.
D
o
w
n
w
ar
d
m
ar
ke
tr
ef
er
s
to
all
m
o
n
th
s
in
w
hi
ch
th
e
M
CS
I-
N
et
he
rla
n
ds
ha
d
a
n
eg
at
iv
e
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
an
d
>
€
25
,
00
0
to
po
rt
fo
lio
s
w
ith
be
gin
n
in
g
o
ft
he
m
o
n
th
ac
co
u
n
t
v
alu
es
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
€
25
,
00
0.
T
he
de
pe
n
de
n
tv
ar
iab
les
ar
e
v
ar
io
u
s
in
v
es
to
r
an
d
po
rt
fo
lio
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s.
Ad
v
ic
e
is
a
du
m
m
y
v
ar
iab
le
eq
u
al
to
o
n
e
if
an
ad
v
iso
r
is
u
se
d.
W
o
m
a
n
is
a
du
m
m
y
eq
u
al
to
o
n
e
if
th
e
ac
co
u
n
t
w
as
he
ld
by
a
w
o
m
an
.
Jo
in
t 
Ac
co
u
n
t
is
a
du
m
m
y
v
ar
iab
le
eq
u
al
to
o
n
e
if
th
e
ac
co
u
n
t
w
as
he
ld
by
tw
o
pe
o
pl
e.
Ag
e
is
th
e
ag
e
o
ft
he
pr
im
ar
y
ac
co
u
n
th
o
ld
er
.
Va
lu
e
(ln
)i
s
th
e
lo
ga
rit
hm
o
ft
he
be
gin
n
in
g
o
ft
he
m
o
n
th
ac
co
u
n
t
v
alu
e.
Tu
rn
o
v
er
(ln
)i
s
th
e
co
m
m
o
n
lo
ga
rit
hm
o
ft
he
su
m
o
fb
u
ys
an
d
se
lls
di
v
id
ed
by
th
e
be
gin
n
in
go
ft
he
m
o
n
th
ac
co
u
n
t
v
alu
e.
Re
si
de
n
tia
lV
a
lu
e
(ln
)i
s
th
e
ho
m
e
v
alu
e
an
d
In
co
m
e
(ln
)i
s
th
e
gr
o
ss
m
o
n
th
ly
ho
u
se
ho
ld
in
co
m
e,
bo
th
o
fw
hi
ch
ar
e
m
ea
su
re
d
at
th
e
six
-
di
git
z
ip
co
de
lev
el.
Eq
u
ity
,
Fi
xe
d
In
co
m
e,
Re
a
lE
st
a
te
,
St
ru
ct
u
re
d,
a
n
d
M
ix
 
re
fe
r 
to
fra
ct
io
n
s
o
fs
pe
cif
ic
as
se
t
cla
ss
es
o
ft
he
to
ta
la
cc
o
u
n
tv
alu
e
at
th
e
be
gin
n
in
g
o
fe
ac
h
m
o
n
th
.
Eq
u
ity
re
fe
rs
to
bo
th
in
di
v
id
u
al
st
o
ck
ho
ld
in
gs
an
d
eq
u
ity
m
u
tu
al
fu
n
ds
,
Fi
xe
d 
In
co
m
e 
to
in
di
v
id
u
al
bo
n
ds
an
d
bo
n
d
fu
n
ds
,
Re
a
lE
st
a
te
to
re
al
es
ta
te
fu
n
ds
,
St
ru
ct
u
re
d
to
st
ru
ct
u
re
d
pr
o
du
ct
s,
an
d
M
ix
to
ba
lan
ce
d
fu
n
ds
.
D
er
iv
a
tiv
e
is
a
du
m
m
y
v
ar
iab
le
eq
u
al
to
o
n
e
if
th
e 
ac
co
u
n
t h
eld
 
o
pt
io
n
s 
o
r 
tu
rb
o
s.
 
t-
st
at
ist
ics
 
ar
e 
in
 
pa
re
n
th
es
es
.
 
*
*
*
,
 
*
*
,
 
*
 
de
n
o
te
 
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
 
at
 
th
e 
1 
pe
rc
en
t, 
5 
pe
rc
en
t, 
an
d 
10
 
pe
rc
en
t 
lev
els
,
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
.
FINANCIAL ADVICE AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE  
69 
 
  
G
ro
ss
G
ro
ss
Fu
ll
Fu
ll
D
o
w
n
w
ar
d 
m
ar
ke
t
Su
b 
1
Su
b 
2
>
 
€
25
,
00
0
Fu
ll
Fu
ll
D
o
w
n
w
ar
d 
m
ar
ke
t
Su
b 
1
Su
b 
2
>
 
€
25
,
00
0
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10
)
(11
)
(12
)
Eq
u
ity
0.
75
0.
95
*
*
-
1.
49
*
1.
13
*
0.
77
0.
95
*
*
*
(1.
67
)
(2.
08
)
(-1
.
90
)
(1.
86
)
(1.
11
)
(2.
87
)
Fi
xe
d 
In
co
m
e
-
0.
47
-
0.
24
0.
29
0.
19
-
0.
68
-
0.
35
(-1
.
08
)
(-0
.
57
)
(0.
36
)
(0.
38
)
(-1
.
00
)
(-1
.
06
)
R
ea
l E
st
at
e
-
0.
01
0.
23
0.
12
0.
90
-
0.
44
0.
11
(-0
.
03
)
(0.
48
)
(0.
15
)
(1.
26
)
(-0
.
67
)
(0.
27
)
St
ru
ct
u
re
d
0.
01
0.
22
-
0.
83
0.
21
0.
23
0.
10
(0.
03
)
(0.
55
)
(-1
.
15
)
(0.
42
)
(0.
36
)
(0.
38
)
M
ix
-
0.
18
0.
01
-
0.
57
0.
36
-
0.
35
-
0.
19
(-0
.
44
)
(0.
02
)
(-0
.
80
)
(0.
73
)
(-0
.
52
)
(-0
.
41
)
D
er
iv
at
iv
e
0.
19
*
0.
15
-
0.
32
*
*
0.
01
0.
29
*
*
0.
17
(1.
90
)
(1.
55
)
(-2
.
24
)
(0.
07
)
(2.
13
)
(1.
47
)
In
te
rc
ep
t
-
0.
06
-
0.
44
-
0.
22
-
1.
09
*
0.
21
-
0.
01
1.
13
0.
61
-
1.
80
-
0.
80
2.
02
*
*
2.
11
*
*
(-0
.
12
)
(-0
.
88
)
(-0
.
26
)
(-1
.
84
)
(0.
26
)
(-0
.
02
)
(1.
09
)
(0.
60
)
(-1
.
54
)
(-0
.
44
)
(2.
20
)
(2.
33
)
R
2
24
.
8%
24
.
6%
23
.
3%
22
.
7%
26
.
6%
29
.
9%
3.
2%
3.
2%
2.
7%
4.
0%
2.
3%
5.
3%
N
xT
57
3,
59
2
57
3,
59
2
18
0,
58
6
27
7,
97
5
29
5,
61
7
20
8,
70
5
20
0,
58
1
20
0,
58
1
62
,
67
4
10
0,
73
2
99
,
84
9
66
,
90
5
W
ho
le 
Po
rt
fo
lio
Eq
u
ity
 
o
n
ly
N
et
N
et
Ta
bl
e
 
3.
IV
.
 
C
ro
ss
-
Se
ct
io
n
a
l D
iff
e
re
n
ce
s 
Po
rt
fo
lio
 
Pe
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
 
(C
o
n
tin
u
e
d)
CHAPTER 3 
70 
 
Some coefficients do approach significance though, such as the whole portfolio returns 
during the entire sample period (Columns 1 and 2, negative by 7 basis points) and the 
equity returns in the first half of the sample period (Column 10, positive by 13 basis 
points). Overall, however, this analysis does not reveal any clear or robust pattern of out or 
underperformance. As such, the advised investors do not seem to be performing any better 
or worse than self-directed individual investors. 
Furthermore, in contrast with Barber and Odean’s (2001) finding, women do not 
outperform men and trading activity has a positive impact on gross portfolio and equity 
returns (Bauer et al., 2009). Apparently, trades are motivated by some informational 
advantage. However, taking trading costs into consideration makes this advantage 
disappear. Turnover significantly influences net returns adversely, in line with Barber and 
Odean (2000). 
Of the asset allocation variables, two coefficients are particularly noteworthy. First, equity 
exposure almost always contributes significantly to returns [e.g., positive for the whole 
sample period (Columns 1 and 2) and negative in adverse market conditions (Column 3)]. 
Additionally, derivatives add to the returns for the entire sample period (Column 1), but 
hurt returns when equity markets fall (Column 3). This finding is intuitive. Most of the 
derivative traders in the sample buy call options, but this is contradictory to Bauer et al. 
(2009), who indicate that options traders lose the most in bull markets. 
3.4.4 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Risk 
Retail portfolios tend to be under diversified opposing the insights from portfolio theory. 
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) indicate that most individual investors hold few stocks in 
their portfolios. And, they often select stocks with similar volatilities, thereby exposing 
themselves to more avoidable risk (Dorn and Huberman, 2010). Table 3.I already reported 
that risk in advised portfolios is lower than that in self-directed portfolios. In this section, a 
more rigorous analysis of this finding provides insight into the association between 
advisors and both total and idiosyncratic risk.  
Total risk refers to the standard deviation of net monthly portfolio returns for investors 
with at least 24 monthly returns observations and has been calculated as follows: 
( )
,24
1
2
≥
−
−
= i
i
net
i
net
it
i nif
n
RR
σ
                         (3.11) 
The calculation of idiosyncratic risk relies on the regressions on the returns in a three-
factor (equity portfolio) and six-factor (whole portfolio) model. I do not apply these 
models on the average portfolio, as previously, but instead use the time-series of returns 
for each individual portfolio, as follows:  
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( ) ,654321 ittititititiftmtiinetit PUTCALLBONDHMLSMBRRR εββββββα ++++++−+=
                          (3.12) 
( ) ,321 ittitiftmtiinetit HMLSMBRRR εβββα +++−+=
                                              (3.13) 
Please refer to section 3.4.2 for an explanation of the factors used in these models. The 
idiosyncratic risk measures for each individual portfolio is calculated as the standard 
deviation of the return residuals ( itε ) from regressions 3.12 and 3.13. 
Table 3.V presents the results. Panel A provides the comparison of the averages between 
the two groups. Advised portfolios are associated with lower total and diversifiable risk for 
both the total and equity-only portfolios. For the total risk measure, this finding should not 
be surprising. Advised portfolios have less equity in their total portfolio and more equity 
positions in their equity portfolio, both of which reduce volatility. The lower idiosyncratic 
risk for advised portfolios means better diversification, but it is necessary to take 
differences in investor characteristics into consideration as well. I apply a single cross-
sectional regression of the various risk measures to the time-series averages of the same 
investor characteristics discussed in Section IIIC. Panel B of Table 3.V indicates that for 
the whole portfolio, Advice is associated with lower total and lower idiosyncratic risk when 
controlling for observed investor heterogeneity. Residual volatility is 0.53 percentage 
points lower for advised portfolios, which is considerable, noting the average standard 
deviation of monthly return residuals of approximately 2%.23 The equity-only portfolio 
reveals no significant differences between the two groups for the sample of all households, 
but those with values exceeding €25,000 are associated with less risk.24 These findings 
imply that although advisors are not associated with higher returns, they may guide 
investors in their asset allocation decisions to lower avoidable risk. 
3.4.5 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Asset Allocation 
The findings in the previous section indicate that advice is associated with less risk. Since 
nonsystematic risk is a function of diversification, which in turn is a function of the 
number of securities and their return correlations, it is worthwhile to examine the 
diversification and asset allocation decisions of the investors in the sample more closely. 
Many studies indicate widespread under diversification in retail portfolios, but they are 
limited as they consider only common equity, even though many households use mutual 
funds as an effective and easy way to diversify. Polkovnichenko (2005) reports that many 
households simultaneously invest in well diversified portfolios of mutual funds and 
undiversified portfolios of individual stock. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) report that this 
under diversification is a function of investor sophistication and related to behavioral 
biases.  
                                                     
23
 Obtained from additional analysis of the underlying data set. 
24
 Given that return observations are cross-sectionally dependent (see n. 21) t-statistics in Table 3.V may be 
somewhat inflated. Therefore, especially when t-statistics are small, inference is less certain. 
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If advice introduces more sophistication into a portfolio, better diversification should 
emerge in advised portfolios. Specifically, I use specification 3.14, based on pooled OLS 
using investor clustered standard errors and time dummies. 
Total risk
Ideo-
syncratic 
risk
Total risk
Ideo-
syncratic 
risk
Total risk
Ideo-
syncratic 
risk
Total risk
Ideo-
syncratic 
risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Advised 2.27% 1.59% 4.84% 3.55% 2.10% 1.37% 4.24% 2.87%
Self-Directed 3.21% 2.31% 5.29% 4.08% 2.81% 1.94% 4.66% 3.33%
Difference -0.94%*** -0.72%*** -0.45%*** -0.53*** -0.72*** -0.57*** -0.43*** -0.46***
Advice -0.73*** -0.53*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.74*** -0.53*** -0.26*** -0.29***
(-21.18) (-19.71) (0.14) (-0.42) (-10.06) (-10.21) (-3.26) (-3.32)
Woman -0.19*** -0.12*** -0.06 -0.05 -0.19*** -0.08** -0.06 0.08
(-5.57) (-4.81) (-0.98) (-0.88) (-3.68) (-2.38) (-0.79) (0.88)
Joint Account 0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.02 -0.07
(0.95) (0.16) (-1.64) (-3.53) (-2.80) (-2.89) (-0.28) (-0.90)
Age -0.00*** 0.00** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.01***
(-2.73) (2.24) (4.41) (5.10) (-2.06) (1.09) (0.68) (2.66)
Value (ln) -0.61*** -0.55*** -1.09*** -1.19*** -0.36*** -0.42*** -0.86*** -0.94***
(-25.41) (-29.67) (-26.82) (-32.57) (-6.51) (-10.92) (-11.73) (-11.60)
Turnover (ln) 3.11*** 2.08*** 1.98*** 1.84*** 2.43*** 1.62*** 1.29*** 1.49***
(24.31) (21.23) (12.44) (11.61) (15.79) (13.70) (6.63) (7.23)
Residental value (ln) 0.52*** 0.29*** 0.27* 0.27* 0.38*** 0.12 0.02 0.05
(5.51) (3.95) (1.81) (1.82) (2.90) (1.41) (0.12) (0.25)
Income (ln) 0.09 -0.02 -0.24 -0.13 0.03 0.04 -0.31 -0.16
(0.64) (-0.16) (-1.08) (-0.59) (0.16) (0.29) (-1.09) (-0.49)
Intercept 4.12*** 3.71*** 9.10*** 7.91*** 3.65*** 3.37*** 9.43*** 7.54***
(10.82) (12.60) (15.69) (13.68) (6.58) (9.22) (11.75) (8.51)
R2 21.5% 21.9% 25.7% 31.1% 16.6% 18.0% 17.0% 17.0%
N 9,728 9,728 3,293 3,293 3,372 3,372 1,055 1,055
Panel A: Averages
Panel B: Regressions
Table 3.V. Cross-Sectional Differences in Risk
Equity Only
All Households Household Portfolio at least € 25,000
This table presents averages (Panel A) and coefficient estimates (Panel B) of risk on various cross-sectional differences
between investors. Risk is measured as the standard deviation of the net portfolio and equity returns ("Total risk") and
the standard deviation of residuals obtained from regressing each individual net portfolio and equity return time series
on the three- and six-factor models 3.12 and 3.13 ("Idiosyncratic Risk"). The left-hand side of the table uses all
portfolios, while the right-hand side refers to portfolios with values greater than €25,000. In Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, the
dependent variable is the risk of the whole portfolio. The other columns refer to common equity risk. Risk is only
calculated when portfolios have at least 24 return observations. The dependent variables are various investor
characteristics. Advice is a dummy variable equal to one if an investor is used. Woman is a dummy equal to one if the
account was held by a woman. Joint Account is a dummy variable equal to one if the account was held by two people.
Age is the age of the primary account holder. Value (ln) is the logarithm of the beginning of the month account value.
Turnover (ln) is the common logarithm of the sum of buys and sells divided by the beginning of the month account
value. Residential Value (ln) is the home value and Income (ln) is the gross monthly household income, both of which
are measured at the six-digit zip code level. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Whole Portfolio Equity Only Whole Portfolio
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,           (3.14) 
 
In this specification Wit is the fraction of the portfolio that investor i allocated to a 
specific asset class at the beginning of month t. Specifically, this analysis uses the 
fraction of equity, the fraction of mutual funds (in both the whole and the equity-only 
portfolios), the allocation to index funds, and the allocation to domestic equity. Wit  may 
also refer to the number of different asset classes, and the number of common stocks. In 
addition, I investigate whether advisors tend to push customers into mutual funds 
managed by their own banks, by using the relative allocation to own bank funds. 
Although banks sell their own products, advisors may recommend other mutual funds 
as well. Therefore, the fraction of own bank funds may be an indication of the use of 
mutual funds for the benefit of the bank rather than the investor. Table 3.VI contains the 
results.25 
The advised portfolios are associated with better diversification for almost all proxies 
(Panel A): more mutual funds, more index funds, less domestic equity, more asset classes, 
and more common equity positions. In Panel B, controlling for investor characteristics, the 
results largely remain the same in sign and magnitude. Advised portfolios are associated 
with a 21% higher allocation to mutual funds and a 26% increase in the mutual fund 
portion within the equity allocation. Mutual funds provide investors with an easy way to 
diversify, but advisors may also be tempted to push mutual funds that provide maximal 
benefits to themselves, perhaps through kickback fees (Stoughton et al., 2011). The data 
cannot confirm the latter interpretation, but in advised portfolios, a large fraction of the 
mutual fund holdings is allocated to funds managed by the bank that provided the data. 
However, this trend is even more evident among self-directed portfolios (Columns 4 and 5, 
Table 3.VI). Therefore, these mutual funds seem to provide both the advisor and its client 
with benefits, even though better alternatives may be available to the client (e.g., index 
funds, which are almost absent in the allocation, Column 6). Home bias is much less 
pronounced in advised portfolios, largely driven by the higher allocation to mutual funds 
with typical a greater international exposure. Advised portfolios are also associated with a 
higher number of asset classes. The number of common equity positions is marginally 
lower for advised portfolios, but not significantly so. For portfolios higher than €25,000 
and €100,000, the results are generally quite similar in sign and magnitude. Overall, it 
seems safe to conclude that advised portfolios achieve better diversification which largely 
drive the lower idiosyncratic risk in Table 3.V. 
  
                                                     
25
 A similar analysis, as described in n. 21, indicates that both serial correlation and cross-correlation are present 
and that serial correlation has the greatest impact on standard errors. Therefore, I follow Petersen’s (2009) 
advice and report results based on pooled ordinary least squares estimates with standard errors clustered by 
investor and the inclusion of time dummies in all specifications. 
itit8tit7tit6t
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3.4.6 Timing Returns 
No evidence thus far suggests better characteristics or risk-adjusted returns for advised 
portfolios. However, the added value of advisors might appear in the form of changes to 
asset allocations that enable investors to benefit from future market movements, rather 
than stock selection. 
To assess whether advised portfolios exhibit better timing ability in their asset 
allocation decisions, I calculate the returns of various portfolios using passive index 
returns (Rt), similar to Bergstresser et al. (2009), as follows:  
 
         (3.15) (3.16) 
 
in which Rjt is the return of a return index of asset class j (defined below) at month t, 
Wjit is the relative allocation to asset class j of investor i, Valueit is the beginning of the 
month portfolio value of investor i.  
I create these portfolio returns using both changing allocation weights based on actual 
asset allocation weights at the beginning of each month (“Monthly Rebalancing”), and 
also based on actual allocations in the first month an investor becomes active (“Fixed 
Allocation Weights”; Wjit contains then only cross sectional variation). These asset 
allocation weights are calculated on both a value-weighted (as in specification 3.15) and 
an equal-weighted (as in specification 3.16) basis. Asset class j refers to the following 
five asset classes, where I specify the specific total return index that has been used 
between brackets: 1) domestic equity [MSCI Netherlands], 2) foreign equity [MSCI 
World], 3) domestic bonds [IBOXX 10 year Dutch Government Index], 4) foreign bonds 
[City Group World Government Non Euro Bond Index 10 year], and 5) real estate [AEX 
Real Estate Index]. These asset classes represent 87% and 89% of advised and self-
directed portfolios, respectively. Other asset classes, such as structured products and 
balanced funds, cannot be tied unambiguously to an index and, therefore, are not 
included.  
Consistent with the previous results, the findings in Table 3.VII indicate that excess returns 
of advised investors are considerably lower due to lower equity exposure in favorable 
equity market conditions. The risk-adjusted returns, based on Sharpe ratios, again reveal 
few differences between the two groups. In addition, when I compare the returns of the 
fixed asset allocation with the monthly rebalancing strategy, timing seems to add 
marginally to the value-weighted return of both groups. However, because volatilities also 
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tend to rise, Sharpe ratios are practically unaffected. Overall, this evidence suggests that 
tactical asset allocation does not add to the risk-adjusted return for both groups.26 
 
 
3.5. Self-Directed Investors Who Switched to Advice 
Thus far, the analysis has compared two groups of investors, those who received 
investment advice and those who did not. In Section 3.2.3., I emphasized that any 
differences between these two groups are the combined result of both investor 
heterogeneity and advisory intervention. In this section, I formally test whether advisors 
influence portfolio decision making. To this end, I use the group of 228 investors in the 
data set who switched from being self-directed to being advised (hereinafter, I refer to 
these investors as switchers). The first investors switched in June 2003 and the last in July 
2007. Thus, the sample period is 48 months. 
To influence portfolio outcomes, an advisor must propose changes to a portfolio. 
Therefore, I first analyze portfolio turnover around the date of switch. Figure 3.I depicts 
the average portfolio turnover of switchers during the 12-month event window 
surrounding the switch month. As this graph illustrates, significant changes occur in the 
month of and just after the switch. Cumulative mean portfolio turnover in Month 0-3 is 
                                                     
26
 I confirm this conclusion by performing another analysis on the basis of flows (the results are available upon 
request). This analysis reveals that the aggregate monthly equity buy-sell imbalance (calculated as in Barber and 
Odean, 2008) is not correlated with leading equity markets returns, implying no forecasting skills. However, 
aggregate monthly equity buy-sell imbalance is positively, though moderately, correlated with lagged stock 
market returns for both groups of investors (but more so for self-directed investors), implying some return 
chasing. 
ADV SD ADV SD ADV SD ADV SD
Mean excess return 
per month 0.84% 0.98% 0.90% 1.11% 0.88% 1.04% 0.88% 1.12%
Standard deviation of 
monthly excess return 1.47% 1.73% 1.56% 1.96% 1.55% 1.88% 1.55% 2.00%
Sharpe ratio 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.57 0.56
Table 3.VII. Comparison of Timing Returns
Value weighted Equally weighted
Fixed Allocation Weights Monthly Rebalancing
This table compares timing skills of advised and self-directed investors. Average actual allocation weights
in April 2003 ("Fixed Allocation Weights") and average actual allocation weights at the beginning of each
month ("Monthly Rebalancing") are applied to passive index returns. Both value and equally weighted
allocation weights are used. ADV refers to advised portfolios, while SD refers to self-directed portfolios.
The following asset classes are taken into consideration: 1) domestic equity, 2) foreign equity, 3) domestic
bonds, 4) foreign bonds, and 5) real estate. Excess return refers to the return above the three-month
Euribor.
Value weighted Equally weighted
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more than 50%. The majority of this turnover is caused by reallocation within the existing 
portfolio.27 Investors also bring in more capital: One month after switching, the average 
portfolio size of switchers increased by approximately €7,000 more than the matched 
control group. 
 
 
I then analyze the changes that occur in the portfolio after the switch to an advisor. I 
compare the same portfolio allocations of switchers analyzed in Table 3.VI just prior to 
and after the switch. Following Barber and Odean (2002), who analyze individual portfolio 
behavior before and after going online, I employ a matched-pair research design. That is, I 
match each of the 228 switchers to a self-directed investor who does not switch. This 
matching occurs in the month preceding the switch by means of a propensity score. The 
propensity score is the probability of switching and is calculated by regressing a switch 
dummy (one for switchers and zero otherwise) on several key investor (gender, age, 
residential value, and income) and portfolio (portfolio value and equity allocation) 
variables. I use the propensity score of the non-switching self-directed investor who is 
closest to the propensity score of the switcher in the month preceding the switch as the 
                                                     
27
 Approximately 40 percentage points of the 50% turnover is based on reallocation. Since I calculate turnover 
as the sum of buys and sells in a particular month divided by the beginning of the month portfolio value, on 
average, 20% of the value of a portfolio is reallocated within three months after the switch. 
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Figure 3.I: Portfolio Turnover around Switch Month
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matched control.28 Table 3.VIII, comparing switchers with their matched controls, 
indicates the effectiveness of this matching. 
 
The main analysis is on the changes in differences in asset allocation between switchers 
and their matched controls from the pre-switch month (t = –1) to the post-switch month (t 
= 1 and t = 3). Table 3.IX presents the results. For insight into the question whether 
advisors have more influence on large investors because they put more effort into large 
portfolios than on small investors who make more investment mistakes, I also split the 
sample into groups of larger and smaller investors according to the median portfolio value 
in the pre-switch month. 
As Table 3.IX illustrates, large asset allocation changes occur for switchers. In line with 
the results in Table 3.VII, advisors tend to recommend lower equity exposure, more 
mutual funds, less own bank equity funds, less domestic equity, and more asset classes. As 
an example of the changes that occur because of advisory intervention, Table 3.IX 
(Column 3 of Panel A) reports that in the pre-switch month, switchers allocate 5.2% less to 
mutual funds within their equity exposure than their matched peers. Two months later (at t 
= 1), the difference changes by 5.7%, implying that switchers now have 0.5% higher 
exposure to equity mutual funds. Another two months later (at t = 3), the difference  
                                                     
28
 I use the nearest-neighbor algorithm by employing the Stata module psmatch2 from Leuven and Sianesi 
(2003). 
Switchers Matched Controls
Investors (#) 228 228
Woman (%) 25.0% 21.5%
Joint Account (%) 46.1% 36.4%
Age (years) 57.2 57.3
Account Value (€) 64,433 55,217
Residential Value  (* €1.000) 132.9 135.7
Income (€) 2,077.9 2,021.3
Equity allocation (%) 51.8% 50.2%
Table 3.VIII. Descriptives of Investors Who Switched to Advice
This table presents descriptive statistics for 228 investors who switched from being self-directed to
being advised ("switchers") and a control group of 228 self-directed investors who did not switch
("matched controls"). This control group was selected according to the nearest-neighbor propensity
score in the month preceding the switch. Woman is the percentage of accounts held by a woman
only. Joint Account is the percentage of portfolios held by two people. Age is the age of the
primary account holder. Account value is the beginning of the month account value. Residential 
Value is the home value and Income is the gross monthly household income, both of which are
measured at the six-digit zip code level. Equity Allocation refers to the percentage of total account
value invested in equity.
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changes by 8.9%, implying a 3.7% higher equity fund allocation. In general, switchers’ 
asset allocations change in the direction of the allocations of all advised investors reported 
in Table 3.VI. These results demonstrate that in line with Bluethgen et al.’s (2008) 
findings, advisors have a significant influence on investors’ asset allocations and direct 
their clients to better diversified portfolios. Panels B and C of Table 3.IX report the results 
for smaller and larger investors. For small portfolios, advisors recommend less risky 
portfolios because of their negative impact on equity exposure (Panel B, Column 1). 
Larger portfolios already contain considerably less equity. Thus, advisors have no need to 
make further changes. For the other asset allocation decisions, the largest changes occur in 
the large portfolios (see Panel C, Columns 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 9). Although advisors tend to 
reduce small portfolios’ exposure to own bank equity funds (Panel B, Column 4), they 
increase large portfolios’ exposure to the own bank bond funds (Panel C, Column 5). In 
general, the allocation to own bank funds remains large. 
In the final step, I analyze whether the observed changes in portfolio composition due to 
advisory intervention have any measurable impact on risk and return. I employ the same 
methodology as that of Barber and Odean (2002) and compare the returns earned by 
investors who already switched with those who had not yet switched during the same 
months. Since the first investors switched in June 2003 and the last in July 2007, I 
calculate a return series for 48 months. I regress the monthly return differences on the 
same factors as those in Models 4 and 5.29 Table 3.X presents the results of this analysis. 
Gross and net monthly portfolio returns are 27 and 25 basis points lower for the investors 
who already switched. Differences in alphas are also negative, but much smaller and not 
significant reinforcing the conclusion that advisors do not enhance or reduce risk-adjusted 
returns. The factor loadings of Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.X indicate a significant 
decrease in the exposure to the market factor of 0.15 after investors switched to advice. 
This finding is consistent with the notion that advisors lower the equity exposure in a 
portfolio and increase the fixed income allocation. Within the equity-only portfolio, no 
significant changes in factor loading are observed from pre- to post-advice seeking 
behavior (see Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.X). 
3.6. Conclusion 
This paper provides detailed insights into the differences between advised and self-directed 
investors and their portfolios and provides evidence of the added value of financial advice. 
Although I find significant differences in the characteristics of advised and self-directed 
investors, these differences are quite small in general. Differences in portfolio composition 
are more noteworthy. Advised portfolios contain significantly less equity and more fixed 
income securities in line with previous findings that retail investors who seek advice are 
typically more risk averse. 
                                                     
29
 This is a return series from a long portfolio in which switchers already switched and a short portfolio in which 
switchers did not yet switch. 
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Analyses of aggregate style-adjusted returns, cross-sectional assessments of returns, and 
returns based on timing skills indicate that the two groups perform similarly. Also, 
comparing portfolio returns before and after advice seeking indicates no return effects of 
advisory intervention. Although, generally, professionals are associated with better 
portfolio performance than retail investors, it is possible that conflicts of interest eliminate 
Investors 
Not Yet 
Advised 
(NYA)
Investors 
Already 
Advised 
(AA)
Difference 
(AA-NYA)
Investors 
Not Yet 
Advised 
(NYA)
Investors 
Already 
Advised 
(AA)
Difference 
(AA-NYA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Raw return 0.72 0.47 -0.25 1.20 1.09 -0,12
(-0.83) (-0.18)
Alpha 0.08 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.18 -0.14
(0.51) (0.81) (-0.37) (-0.21) (-0.68) (-0.62)
Market 0.38*** 0.23*** -0.15*** 0.79*** 0.80*** 0.01
(13.21) (5.97) (-6.00) (7.01) (7.17) (0.24)
SMB 0.11*** 0.08* -0.02 0.29*** 0.28*** -0.01
(5.60) (1.98) (-0.62) (5.32) (5.53) (-0.22)
HML 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.02
(0.15) (-0.45) (-0.88) (0.56) (0.39) (-0.29)
Bond 0.14*** 0.27*** 0.13
(2.74) (2.81) (1.42)
Call 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00
(4.18) (2.98) (0.46)
Put -0.00** -0.01** -0.00
(-2.57) (-2.58) (-1.55)
Table 3.X: Performance of Investors Who Switched to Advice vs. Investors Who Did Not Yet Switch 
to Advice (But Do So Before August 2007)
This table presents raw and risk-adjusted net returns (Panel A) and factor loadings (Panel B) of the
aggregate equally weighted portfolios of (previously) self-directed investors who already switched to
advice and the aggregate equally weighted portfolios of self-directed investors who did not yet switch to
advice, but did so before August 2007. The first investors (of 228) switched in June 2003 and the last
investors switched in July 2007, providing a time series of 48 months. Risk-adjusted monthly portfolio
(equity) returns (in %) are calculated from a six-factor (three-factor) model accounting for both the three
Fama-French (1993) factors (Market, SMB, and HML ) and the three additional factors for portfolio
returns. Bond is the excess return on the Iboxx 10-year Dutch Government Index. Call (Put) is a return
series generated by buying at two months at the money index call (put) option (see the section on
methodology). Standard errors are computed in line with the Newey-West (1987) correction taking into
account autocorrelation up to three lags. The results are expressed in percentages. t-statistics are in
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Whole Portfolio return Equity only return
Panel A: Returns
Panel B: Factor Loadings
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that benefit. The large fraction of advised investors holding structured products may be an 
indication that this is indeed the case. 
In terms of diversification, advised portfolios perform much better than self-directed 
portfolios, thus reducing avoidable risk. Advised portfolios are associated with more 
mutual funds, less domestic equity, and more asset classes. Additional analyses on 
investors who switch to advice taking confirm that advisors positively affect 
diversification. Therefore, the reduction of idiosyncratic risk observed in advised portfolios 
can (at least in part) be attributed to advisory intervention. 
It is widely known that retail investors make suboptimal portfolio decisions. Although 
advisors are sometimes subject to similarly biased decision making or have incentives to 
exacerbate their clients’ biases, this paper confirms that advisors do add positive value. 
They improve portfolio diversification. 
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Chapter 4 
Performance of Advised vs. Self-Directed Investors 
Controlling for Self-Selection1 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Most retail investors rely on financial advisors to improve their portfolio investment 
decisions,2 such that financial planning and advice represent big business, worth $44 
billion in U.S. revenues alone and employing more than 240,000 people (Ibisworld, 
20113). Understanding the role and impact of financial advisors thus is of utmost 
importance, yet little empirical research addresses this topic. Moreover, existing research 
offers rather negative assessments of the relevance of financial advisors. Some authors find 
potential positive effects (e.g., List, 2003; Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Bhattacharya et al., 
2012; Kramer, 2012), but a long list of research indicates that financial advisors do more 
harm than good (e.g., Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2012; Bergstresser, Chalmers, 
and Tufano, 2009; Zhao, 2003). In theoretical work, Stoughton, Wu, and Zechner (2010) 
and Inderst and Ottavianni (2009) show that opaque commission structures, in 
combination with naïve customers, produce biased, bad advice. The negative impacts of 
advisors may thus arise due to biased advice, caused by fee structures that lead to moral 
hazard.  
In addition, we argue that the overly negative picture of advisors reflects the failure of 
most existing studies to control for the endogeneity of the decision to use financial 
advisors. In this case, self-selection bias is likely, because investors choose to take advice 
or not. These selection concerns can seriously bias estimates of the impact of an advisor, 
and ignoring selection problems probably leads to underestimates of the true impact of 
advisors, because their advice tends to be solicited primarily by less sophisticated 
investors. Two recent experimental studies provide us with some guidance on this issue. 
                                                     
1
 This chapter has been co-authored with Robert Lensink. The joint paper has been submitted for publication 
under a different title, notably: “The Impact of Financial Advisors on the Stock Portfolios of Retail Investors”. 
2
 In the Netherlands—our research domain—approximately 51% of households with an investment portfolio 
rely on financial advice (Millward Brown, 2010); in the United States, ICI (2010) reports that 81% of mutual 
fund–owning households rely on a financial advisor. Bluethgen et al. (2008) also find that roughly 80% of 
individual investors in Germany rely on financial advice for investment decisions, and Hung et al. (2008) 
discover that 75% of investors participating in a U.S. survey consulted a financial advisor before conducting 
stock market or mutual fund transactions. 
3
 http://www.ibisworld.com/industry/default.aspx?indid=1316 
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Bhattacharya et al. (2012) offered 8,200 execution-only investors the option to receive free 
and unbiased advice in a financial advice choice experiment, and showed that investors 
that followed the advice improved their portfolio efficiency. Also in a laboratory choice 
experiment, Hung and Yoong (2010) find that participants who choose to follow the 
investment advice improved their investment performance. 
Randomized experiments have the obvious advantage to control for unobserved 
heterogeniety. Unobserved heterogeneity in individual investment behavior is well-
established in finance literature. Barnea, Cronqvist, and Siegel (2010) even document the 
impact of a genetic factor. Therefore, ignoring differences among individual investors 
creates inference problems. The sample selection bias associated with the endogenous 
choice to use an advisor could go either way: Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012) 
argue that more sophisticated investors exhibit greater advice-seeking propensity, but most 
models instead imply that advisors mainly provide services to less sophisticated investors. 
Stoughton, Wu, and Zechner (2010) assert that financial advisors sell underperforming 
active funds to unsophisticated investors, and Inderst and Ottaviani (2010) assume that 
naïve customers do not rationally anticipate conflicts of interest for their advisors. In the 
choice experiment of Hung and Yoong (2010) less sophisticated participants were more 
likely to take advice. Similarly, with a survey, Van Rooij, Kool, and Prast (2007) reveal 
that respondents who considered themselves more financially literate prefered more 
autonomy in their pension decisions.  
As this short review indicates, advice taking is a choice variable, so advice is not random. 
Yet no existing studies into the impact of financial advisors rigorously control for selection 
biases. To provide new evidence on the potential added value of financial advisors, we 
examine whether they provide tangible benefits to customers in terms of risk, returns, 
costs, and diversification while controlling for selection bias. We deliberately focus on 
common equity holdings, which is convenient given that it greatly reduces moral hazard 
behavior inherrent in mutual fund advice. It is important to note that we are not interested 
in determining whether financial advisors are capable of beating the market; rather, we aim 
to compare equity returns for individual investors when they do or do not hire advisors. 
In addition, we base our analysis on a unique, rich data set from a Dutch retail bank that 
allows all investors, even very small ones, to use advisors. The activities of this retail bank 
concentrate in the northern Netherlands and focus on small traders. Therefore, the pool of 
clients, whether they use advisors or not, shares a similar backgroud. However, selection 
bias is still possible. The data set features more than 190,000 monthly equity returns for 
approximately 5,500 Dutch common stock investors. Because the bank pays advisors a 
fixed wage, there is no direct financial incentive related to commissions, and the fee 
structure does not incentivize advisors to work only with the most profitable investors. 
Moreover, the bank uses random assignments to specific advisors. Both new and existing 
investment clients work with whichever advisor is available at the moment the client asks 
for advice or makes an appointment. Thus, most investors in our sample likely have dealt 
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with various financial advisors over time, and this setting eliminates the possibility that 
more skilled or experienced investors select the best advisors and/or that advisors select the 
best investors.  
The remaining selection bias therefore is a result of an investor’s binary choice to use an 
advisor. Finally, to control for this endogenous choice, we use a Hausman-Taylor panel 
estimator, which can identify time-invariant variables (e.g., binary choice to use an 
advisor4), even if some variables correlate with a time-invariant individual effect.  
In our empirical analyses, we first examine the impact of advisors, with the assumption 
that selection problems do not exist. For these analyses, we rely on ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions and find advisors do not add value or have only a minor effect. Next, 
we attempt to control for possible endogeneity problems by estimating the same models 
with the Hausman-Taylor estimator. In contrast with the OLS estimates, we find that using 
an advisor benefits individual investors. The impact of advisors on equity returns is 
significantly positive for the average private investor. Advisors reduce risk not as a result 
of naïve diversification (increasing the number of stocks) but likely as a result of 
sophisticated diversification. As an example Dorn and Huberman (2010) find a lower 
degree of volatility specialization in more sophisticated portfolios. In addition we find that 
advisors increase the share of domestic stock. These findings, as well as higher returns, 
receive support from evidence in other studies that indicate benefits of holding 
concentrated portfolios (Ivkovic, Sialm, and Weisbenner, 2008) and local portfolios (Coval 
and Moskowitz, 2011; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005). Moreover, our study reveals that 
advisors increase costs, though in an amount less than the increase in gross gains, so 
investors increase their net equity returns. Overall, our study provides a rather positive 
picture of the potential impact of advisors.  
In the next section, we provide a more detailed overview of related studies. Section 4.3 
contains the data and summary statistics; it also explains in detail how the advisory process 
functions for the clients in our sample. In Section 4.4 we present our results and describe 
our methodology for assessing the impact of advisors on portfolio returns. Finally, we 
conclude in Section 4.5. 
 
  
                                                     
4
 For common equity investors, the number of switchers between execution–only and advice is very small. 
Therefore, unlike section 3.5 of the previous chapter, we focus on the large majority of investors that do not 
switch, eliminating the possibility of using a fixed-effects estimator.  
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4.2. Overview of Related Research 
4.2.1 Possible Links Between Financial Advice and Individual Portfolio Performance 
Despite the debate about whether advisors provide clients with tangible benefits, a well-
established finding is that advisors have an incentive to missell. Zhao (2003) reports that 
when there is a conflict of interest, financial advisors—who ultimately serve as the 
decision makers for investments in load funds—guide customers to funds with higher 
loads. Vast theoretical literature cites conflicting interests as the main deterrent to unbiased 
advice. Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) find that they arise because financial advisors perform 
two tasks: prospecting for customers and advising on the suitability of products. Loonen 
(2006) also highlights different financial concerns of financial advisors, including (1) 
generating commissions for their financial institutions, (2) generating performance-based 
bonuses, and (3) enhancing the performance of investors’ portfolios. Stoughton, Wu, and 
Zechner (2010) model intermediaries as distinct agents between investors and money 
managers; in their model, financial advisors facilitate the entry of small investors into the 
market by economizing on information costs. However, when investors are 
unsophisticated, kickbacks to financial advisors support aggressive marketing and 
negatively affect the portfolio performance of mutual funds. Their model further predicts 
that underperforming funds get sold only to unsophisticated investors through indirect 
channels—a result confirmed empirically by Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009). 
A similar conclusion emerges from Inderst and Ottaviani’s (2010) model: When customers 
are naïve about the true conflict of interest, firms exploit their incorrect perceptions. In 
Krausz and Paroush’s (2002) model, conflicts of interest and information asymmetry 
induce advisors to exploit clients, so some exploitation occurs when investors pay for both 
financial advice and investment execution as a joint product and the cost of switching is 
nonnegligible. When different assets earn different commissions, advisors also might be 
tempted to choose higher commission products, regardless of their suitability for the client. 
Ottaviani (2000) derives similar conclusions from a model in which the advisor faces a 
trade-off between providing good advice, which leads to returning clients and good 
publicity, versus maximizing commissions and offering preferential treatment to product 
providers. 
In addition, financial advisors may be more biased than clients or, in facing agency 
conflicts, have an incentive to exacerbate clients’ biases. Shapira and Venezia (2001) find 
more trading activity in professionally managed accounts, which they propose is an 
outcome of greater overconfidence among the managed group. Glaser, Weber, and Langer 
(2010) document that though all participants are overconfident to some extent, financial 
professionals tend to be more overconfident than laypeople, and Kaustia and Perttula 
(2011) confirm overconfidence among financial advisors. Kaustia, Laukkanen, and 
Puttonen (2009) find strong framing effects among financial advisors too, whereas 
Mullainathan et al. (2010) analyze whether advisors debias clients. Although advisors tend 
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to match portfolios to client characteristics, they fail to debias customers and in some cases 
even exacerbate client biases. 
Such agency problems often give rise to biased advice that hurts the investor, but 
potentially, advisors can add value by providing greater financial sophistication, based on 
their investment experience, financial education, and investment knowledge. Kaustia, 
Alho, and Puttonen (2008) find that financial expertise significantly attenuates anchoring 
in financial decision making, and List (2003) shows that the degree of market experience 
correlates positively with the degree of rationality in decision making. Feng and Seasholes 
(2005) support this finding with evidence that increased sophistication and trading 
experience relate strongly to the elimination of biased decision making. Shapira and 
Venezia (2001) further report that professionally managed accounts exhibit less biased 
decision making than do independent individual investors. Dhar and Zhu (2006) also 
document a negative relationship among financial literacy, trading experience, and the 
disposition effect. Therefore, education and experience—characteristics that should be 
associated with a financial advisor—should reduce behavioral biases that hurt 
performance, even if they do not completely eliminate them.  
4.2.2. Portfolio Performance of Individual and Professional Investors 
Most prior studies of individual investor portfolio performance exclude investors who use 
financial advice or investigate only the behavior of online investors. The average 
individual investor in these studies performs poorly (e.g., Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean, 
2000; Barber et al., 2008; Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz, 2009). Yet we still find great 
heterogeneity in the results; some groups of investors perform well. Ivkovic, Sialm, and 
Weisbenner (2008) show that skilled individual investors earn abnormal returns by 
concentrating their portfolios in stocks about which they have favorable information. 
Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) also indicate that individual investors can exploit 
informational advantages about local holdings, though Seasholes and Zhu (2010) 
challenge their claim.  Coval, Hirschleifer, and Shumway (2005) instead document that 
some individual investors are persistently better than others.  
These empirical studies ignore the large proportion of investors who use financial advice. 
Some recent empirical studies explicity investigate the role and impact of financial 
advisors on retail portfolios. Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) investigate the 
value of brokers for helping clients select mutual funds: They compare the performance of 
directly and indirectly (i.e., funds sold through an advisor) sold funds, and they find lower 
risk-adjusted gross returns for broker-sold mutual funds than for directly sold funds. Thus 
they conclude that advisors deliver benefits that customers do not observe or that conflicts 
of interest prevent advisors from giving optimal advice. Yet they do not investigate the 
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portfolios of the investors directly.5 Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012) study 
German retail investors who receive advice from independent or bank financial advisors. 
The advised clients tend to be older, women, wealthier, and more experienced; 
furthermore, independent advisors are associated with lower returns but also lower 
portfolio variance, whereas bank advisors are associated with both lower returns and 
higher risk. Both advisors produce high turnover and a lower share of single stocks, 
indicating better diversification. Their main results thus rely on associations, though they 
attempt to solve the endogeneity issue. As we noted in the introduction, the (nonrandom) 
financial advice choice experiment of Bhattacharya et al.’s (2012) included 8,200 
execution-only investors, who had the option to receive free and unbiased advice. Clients 
who choose to participate received portfolio recommendations derived from a portfolio 
optimizer (Markowitz, 1952a), and those who rejected the offer acted as a control group. 
Only 385 (5%) investors accepted the offer, and 157 (2%) at least partly followed the 
recommendations. In line with Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012), clients that 
accepted the advice were older, wealthier, and more sophisticated, and those who followed 
the recommedations improved their portfolio risk–return trade-off. That is, if the advice is 
unbiased, it has the potential to benefit investors. Kramer (2012) investigates a sample of 
16,000 Dutch advised and self-directed investors and finds that the characteristics and 
portfolios of the two groups differ remarkebly. Although he finds no portfolio perfomance 
differences, advisors seem to add value through better diversifcation and lower 
ideosyncratic risk. A sample of investors that switch from execution-only to advice 
confirms these findings.  
Other studies compare the performance of professionals and retail investors more 
generally. Professionals (who have difficulty outperforming the market6) perform better 
than individual investors. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find that professional institutions 
significantly outperform less sophisiticated investors, such as domestic households; 
Shapira and Venezia (2001) confirm this claim by comparing independent and 
professionally managed investors in Israel and finding better performance among the latter. 
Barber et al. (2009) also document underperformance by the aggregate portfolio of 
Taiwanese individual investors, even when institutional investors gain in their trading. 
Thus, though retail and professional investors both tend to exhibit mediocre investment 
performance, in principle, advisors could improve the performance of individual investors.  
                                                     
5
 There may be an alternative explanation for their results: Broker-sold funds reveal a different universe than 
directly sold funds, so it is not clear whether the advisor performs poorly or if the problem lies with the supplier. 
A fund supplier might offer only underperforming funds to advisors’ distribution channel, as predicted by 
Stoughton, Wu, and Zechner (2010). Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) show that the asset-weighted 
performance of funds sold by brokers is not as poor as equally weighted performance. That is, the asset-
weighted returns indicate the quality of decisions, whereas the equally weighted returns represent available 
choice options. This finding implies that brokers provide customers with a valuable service, given choice 
options they have. 
6
 Jensen (1967) was one of the first to show that mutual funds cannot outperform buy-and-hold strategies on 
average. More recent studies indicate that money managers have difficulty outperforming passive indexes (e.g., 
Busse, Goyal, and Wahal, 2010; Fama and French, 2010). Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) indicate 
that equity funds in general, whether directly or broker sold, exhibit negative alphas. 
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As this literature survey shows, research on financial advisors is expansive and growing. 
Not all existing papers mention the potential for self-selection bias, but it seems surprising 
that no study explicitly and rigorously controls for possible endogeneity problems, even 
though advisor choice clearly is endogenous. Failing to account for possible selection 
problems can bias results considerably. The three studies most closely related to our study 
do not control for selection explicitly but attempt to estimate the likely impact of selection 
on their results. That is, Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) indicate that advised 
investors are less educated and more risk averse; Bhattacharya et al. (2012) acknowledge 
that their study is not based on a random assignment, though they argue that their basic 
empirical methodology (difference-in-difference) can ameliorate that shortcoming; and 
Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012, p.14 ) suspect “that portfolio performance 
actually induced the choice of the advisor” and attempt to estimate an instrumental 
variables model as a robustness check. They note that “finding suitable instruments in our 
context is not easy” (Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2012, p.14) and admit they cannot 
test the quality of their instrument.  
4.3. Data, the Advisory Process, and Descriptive Statistics 
For our analysis, we draw on the complete history of common stock portfolio holdings and 
transaction data for a sample of customers from a medium-sized, full-service retail and 
business bank that offers an array of financial products. The bank, which advertises itself 
as a relationship bank, offers services throughout the Netherlands through a network of 
bank branches, though it has a particularly strong presence in the northern part of the 
country. The bank offers both advisory and execution-only investment services. Customers 
typically have an account manager who communicates all the financial services the bank 
offers. Although the bank is accessible to all people, the typical investment client (both 
advised and execution only) is a man or couple, older than 50 years of age, with middle-
class income and wealth. 
The data span a 52-month period, from April 2003 to August 2007. We only use accounts 
of private investors with unrestricted accounts and exclude those owned by a business, 
portfolios linked to mortgage loans, or portfolios that represent part of a company savings 
plan, given that in these portfolios investors and their advisors may be restricted in making 
changes. Because we want to abstract from possible incentive conflicts that are inherent to 
mutual fund advice7, we deliberately consider only advisory impacts on common stock 
recommendations. The focus on common equity will also facilitate analyses given the 
large difference in asset allocations between advised and self-directed portfolios. This 
procedure, of course, reduces our sample size considerately. Whereas in chapter 3 our 
analysis was based on observations from 16,053 investors, in this chapter our sample is 
                                                     
7
 In the Netherlands new legislation has recently been adopted that aims at solving this conflict of interest. 
Therefore, it becomes more relevant to focus on the impact of advisors abstracting from incentive conflicts. 
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restricted to the 5,661 common equity investors with a total of 193,418 monthly equity 
return observations.  
For most investors in our sample, equity is the most important asset class (on average, 82% 
of portfolio value, with almost 60% in individual equity positions). We also gather 
information about the type of client (execution-only or advised), gender, zip code, and age. 
On a six-digit zip code level,8 we gain information about income and residential value. A 
comparison of some key characteristics in our data set with retail investor data sets in the 
Netherlands (Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz, 2009), Germany (Bhattacharya et al., 
2012); Dorn and Huberman, 2010), and the United States (Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005) 
reveal that our data offer a high degree of external validity. 
Execution-only and advised investors represent different departments, so investors with 
advisory relationships cannot trade through the execution-only department, and investors 
who use execution-only services cannot rely on the help of an advisor. The investors 
choose between an advisory relationship or execution-only services. For our sample 
period, all customers were eligible for advice, which is unusual, in that most banks require 
a minimum investment to be eligible for advisory services. Thus our data set is unique. 
After the sample period, the bank stopped offering advisory services to clients whose 
portfolios were worth less than €100,000; therefore, we restrict our sample to the period 
before 2008. 
Advisors receive a fixed wage only, so there is no direct personal financial incentive to 
generate commissions. Furthermore, clients’ assignments to advisors is random. Both new 
and existing investment clients work with advisors based on availability. The advisory 
relationship always starts with an initial intake meeting, in which an advisor assesses the 
investor’s investment goals, preferences, knowledge, and experience. From this first 
meeting, they develop a risk profile, which constitutes the main input for the recommended 
strategic asset allocation. This asset allocation advice is predetermined by the bank, and the 
individual advisor has no real impact. After the initial meeting, some advice is given in 
face-to-face meetings, but most recommendations occur over the telephone. We cannot 
discern whether granted advice is followed by the investors; Bhattacharya et al. (2012) 
report that less than 50% of investors that choose to receive advice actually follow it. 
However, the investors in their sample initially opted for an execution-only investment 
service, then considered whether to receive advice from an automatic portfolio optimizer. 
Their sample appears likely to behave quite differently than the investors in our sample, 
who deliberately opted to receive advice. In discussions with the bank management, we 
also learned that most calls initiated by the advisor contain explicit advice, as the very 
reason for the call, whereas calls initiated by investors rarely prompt any portfolio changes. 
                                                     
8
 In the Netherlands, 6,940,000 households represent 436,000 six-digit zip codes; these variables offer average 
values for an average of 16 households each. 
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Advisors offer concrete stock recommendations and have great latitude about which stocks 
to recommend. In our sample period, advisors received research on financial markets and 
individual firms from an external research agency. They could use this research in their 
recommendations as they pleased. Advisors also could recommend stocks based simply on 
their own preferences, as long as they would document this in the client file.  
Because we include accounts that were opened or closed during the sample period for only 
the months in which they were active, making survivorship bias less of a concern, although 
attrition bias may still exist. We calculate individual investor performance using a 
modified Dietz (1968) measure, which accounts for both the size and the timing of 
deposits and withdrawals. We report gross and net (market adjusted) returns, but we focus 
on the latter in our regression specifications; to calculate net returns, we deduct transaction 
and custodian fees. Net returns are calculated as:  
 
                                                                 (4.1) 
 
where  is the net monthly return of investor i in month t,  is the end-of-month 
market value of the portfolio,  is the net contribution (deposits minus withdrawals) 
in month t, and  is the weight attributed to each contribution, determined by the timing 
of contributions9. When a contribution takes place earlier in the month, its weight is higher. 
Finally,  are transaction costs and custodial fees, recalculated monthly.  
Table 4.I contains the summary statistics for the portfolio returns and investor and 
portfolio characteristics. Individual investors in our sample underperform the market by a 
small margin in gross terms, but they underperform in net terms by 20 basis points per 
month. Advised investors perform better than self-directed investors in both raw and 
market-adjusted gross and net terms, but the differences are modest. The average volatility 
of net returns is 5.45%, considerably higher than the volatility of the Dutch stock market 
(3.51%), which may reflect the average portfolio holding of only 4.4 stocks. Advised 
portfolios exhibit significantly less volatility and idiosyncratic risk, likely due to the higher 
number of stocks in their portfolios (5.2 versus 3.3 for self-directed portfolios). Advised 
portfolios also are associated with a lower market beta, though this difference is 
statistically insignificant. Most portfolios are joint accounts (44%), and 21% are held by 
women. Advised accounts are more common among joint account holders and women. 
The average age of the primary account holder is 57 years, but advised investors are  
                                                     
9
 This weight has been calculated as the absolute difference between the day the cash flow occurred and the 
number of calendar days in the month divided by the number of calendar days in the month. 
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All Advised Self-
Directed Difference p-value
Gross Monthly Return (%) 1.63 1.65 1.59 0.06 0.01
Net Monthly Return (%) 1.48 1.51 1.43 0.08 0.00
Gross Market Adjusted return (%) -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.05
Net  Market Adjusted return (%) -0.20 -0.18 -0.23 0.06 0.01
Observations (#) 193,418 121,413 72,005
Return Volatility (%) 5.45 5.34 5.74 -0.40 0.00
Market Beta 0.72 0.69 0.78 -0.09 0.61
Return Residual (%) 2.88 2.72 3.13 -0.42 0.00
Investors (#) 5,661 3,648 2,013
Woman (%) 21% 23% 18% 5% 0.00
Joint accounts (%) 44% 44% 45% -1% 0.00
Age (years) 56.50 58.68 52.86 5.82 0.00
Income (2006) (€) 2,205 2,251 2,131 119 0.00
Residential Value (2006) (€) 151,104 157,130 141,212 15,918 0.00
Active months 44,97 45,45 44,15 1,29 0.00
Common equity value (€) 44,866 62,534 15,075 47,459 0.00
Domestic equity (%) 92.7% 93.0% 92.3% 0.63% 0.29
Common equity positions (#) 4.44 5.21 3.29 1.92 0.00
Equity Turnover (%) 4.96 5.27 4.39 0.88 0.01
Equity Trades per month (#) 0.56 0.74 0.23 0.51 0.00
Panel D: Portfolio Characteristics
Table 4.I: Summary Statistics of Individual Investors and Portfolio Characteristics
The sample consists of 5,661 individual investors that hold common equity positions at least once during
the sample period of 52 months. Gross (Net) excess monthly portfolio return is the return in excess of 3
months Euribor. Gross (Net) Market adjusted return is the gross (net) monthly return minus the return on
the MCSI-Netherlands Index. Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the monthly net returns.
Market beta is the loading on the market factor obtained from using the Fama and French 3 factor model on
each individual investor's time series of portfolio returns. Return residual  is the idiosyncratic component of 
the factor model described above. Woman is the percentage of account held by a woman only. Joint 
Accounts is the percentage of portfolios held by 2 persons, mostly a man and a woman. Age is the age of
the primary account holder. Income is the average gross monthly income in the 6 digit zip code of the
investor. Residential Value is the average house price in the 6 digit zip code of the investor. Active months 
is the average amount of months that an investor holds a portfolio in our dataset. Account value is the
beginning of the month account value of common equity. Common equity positions is de average number of
stocks in each portfolio. Turnover is the sum of buys and sells of common equity divided by the beginning
of the month account value of common equity. 
Panel A: Monthly Returns
Panel B: Risk
Panel C: Investor Characteristics
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marginally older. Advised investors also seem wealthier in their gross monthly income, 
residential value, and portfolio value. The average size of advised stock portfolios is 
€57,000, almost four times greater than the size of self-directed portfolios. Common stock, 
the focus of our study, constitutes the largest asset class; almost 60% of the average 
portfolio consists of common stock, and the rest represents a combination of common 
bonds, equity and bond mutual funds, and structured products. Trading activity, with an 
average monthly turnover of almost 5%, appears broadly in line with activity documented 
in other studies.10 Advised portfolios reveal significantly higher turnover than self-directed 
portfolios and execute more trades. Among our observations, 60% come from advised 
investors who are active for an average of 45 months during the sample period, whereas 
40% represent the benchmark group of execution-only investors. 
4.4. Empirical Results 
To estimate the impact of an advisor on the returns of individual investor portfolios, we 
applied a general model:  
,              (4.2)  
where Yit is the net return on the portfolio of investor i in month t, α is a constant term, and 
Ai is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the investors receive investment advice 
and 0 otherwise.  
In addition, Xit represents a set of control variables known to influence returns. Bauer, 
Cosemans, and Eichholtz (2009) indicate that turnover, gender, age, income, and account 
size are significant determinants, and Barber and Odean (2000, 2001), suggest that 
portfolio turnover hurts net returns and that men trade 45% more than women. Because of 
the trading costs they incur, men underperform women by almost 1% per year. Bauer, 
Cosemans, and Eichholtz (2009) also report that the most active traders outperform in 
gross terms but underperform in net terms. Wealth often serves as a proxy for investor 
sophistication: Anderson (2008) finds a positive relation between portfolio value and 
trading performance, and Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz (2009) indicate that large 
portfolios outperform small portfolios. Yet Barber and Odean (2000) find no significant 
risk-adjusted return differentials between the largest and smallest portfolios. We use three 
variables related to wealth: portfolio value, residential value, and income (the latter two 
measured at the six-digit zip code level). Age also should relate to investor experience. 
Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz (2009) report a negative impact of age on performance, 
and Korniotis and Kumar (2011) show that older, more experienced investors exhibit 
greater investment knowledge, though they appear to have poor investment skills, perhaps 
due to cognitive aging, and suffer 3–5% lower annual returns.  
                                                     
10
 Barber and Odean (2000) report an average of 6%, and Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012) report an 
average of almost 5%. 
ititiit XAY εββα +++= 21
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Our sample might suffer from cross-sectional dependence too. Investors may make similar 
decisions at the same time and hold the same securities in their portfolios. Petersen (2009) 
shows that ignoring cross-sectional dependence leads to biased standard errors and overly 
small confidence errors. When time effects are fixed, such that they have the same impact 
on all investors, time dummies can completely remove correlations between observations 
in the same period. We therefore include time dummies in all our estimations.  
In Table 4.II, we present the results based on ordinary least squares (OLS); the first two 
columns show that the difference in raw and risk-adjusted performance between advised 
and self-directed investors is indistinguishable from 0.  Many of the other relationships 
between advice and portfolio behavior are also insignificant or small. Based on these 
estimates, without controlling for selection effects that arise because investors make the 
choice of whether to hire an advisor, the advisory impact seems rather limited.  
4.4.1. Controlling for Self-Selection 
We investigate the effect of an advisor on the outcome of investment decisions. If we 
assume no unobserved individual heterogeneity, we could estimate our model with OLS, 
as in Table 4.II. However, returns likely are affected by unmeasurable attributes, such as 
investment skills, financial literacy, or risk aversion, so an OLS model, which suffers from 
an omitted variable bias, is inappropriate. To allow for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, we can use fixed and random estimators. The random effects model 
assumes that all unobserved factors that affect returns are distributed randomly across 
cross-sectional units. It also assumes that unobserved, time-invariant individual effects are 
uncorrelated with all other regressors in the model. In our specification, this effect implies 
that unobservable variables such as skill, literacy, and risk aversion do not relate to the 
choice of advice, which seems highly unlikely. For every specification, we formally test 
differences in the coefficients from fixed effects and random effects regressions, using a 
Hausman test. The random effects estimator is rejected in all our specifications. The fixed 
effects estimator allows for correlation between unobserved individual effects and 
regressors. Because it also eliminates time-invariant elements, it cannot identify time-
invariant variables. However, our main variable of interest, the advice dummy, is time 
invariant, so identifying the impact of the advisor with a fixed effects model is impossible.  
Finally, the Hausman-Taylor approach (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) preserves the 
advantages of both a fixed effect estimator (i.e., correlation between individual effects and 
regressors) and the random effects estimator (i.e., identifying the effect of time-invariant 
regressors). Because of this the Hausman-Taylor approach is referred to as a hybrid model 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). It does not require external instruments, which solves the 
problem of finding suitable instruments. Because all the variables are instrumented in the 
fixed effects approach, including those that are exogenous, the Hausman-Taylor approach 
may be more efficient than a fixed effects model. However, it requires us to distinguish  
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between exogenous and endogenous variables, which in practice is not obvious, though 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest economic intuition can indicate which variables to 
treat as endogenous.  
The technique has been advocated by Angrist and Krueger (2001) and McPherson and 
Trumbull (2008), and is used in various economic settings, usually to assess the impact of 
some time-invariant variable or policy intervention assigned in a non-random fashion. 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) apply it to a classical example of estimating the effect of 
education on wages. Greenwood, McDowell, and Zahniser (1999) assess the influence of 
social programs on immigration; Garcia, Molinaab, and Navarroc (2010) consider the 
effects of education on spouse satisfaction; Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) investigate the 
effects of distance between countries on investment trades; Dixit and Pal (2010) study the 
impact of group incentives on firm performance; Serlenga and Shin (2007) use the method 
for gravity models in international trade; and Contoyannis and Rice (2001) employ it to 
determine the impact of health on wages in the United Kingdom. 
4.4.2 Hausman-Taylor Estimation 
The Hausman-Taylor specification assumes that any set of explanatory variables contains 
time-varying and time-invariant variables. A subset of both types of variables would be 
exogenous and assumed to be uncorrelated with the unobserved time-invariant individual 
effect, though some of both types of variables may correlate with the time-invariant 
individual effect. In line with the random effects, and fixed effects approaches, the 
Hausman-Taylor model assumes strict exogeneity (so the individual effect nor the 
regressors correlate with , the individual time-varying disturbance term). The model 
can be specified as follows: 
    	

  	  

      ,          (4.3) 
where Yit denotes the net returns of private investor i in period t; v is a constant term; the 
vectors X and M capture sets of observed time-varying and time-invariant control 
variables, respectively, that affect the outcome variable; µ i represents the individual fixed 
effect; and εit refers to the time-varying individual error. The subscript 1 denotes variables 
that are assumed to be uncorrelated with µ i (and εit), whereas the subscript 2 refers to those 
that are assumed to be correlated with µ i (but still uncorrelated with εit). Our main variable 
of interest is advice, which equals 1 if private investor i uses an advisor in period t, and 0 
otherwise. Because advice is entirely time invariant and likely endogenous, we include it 
in M2i We provide an overview of all included variables in Table 4.III. We assume all 
wealth-related variables are endogenous. Therefore, in addition to advice, portfolio value, 
residential value, and household income appear in our list of endogenous variables. Also 
experience is treated as endogenous. Unobservable variables such as ability, financial 
literacy, investment skill, or motivation likely drive these variables, in that they influence 
the portfolio performance measures that serve as our dependent variables. In other finance 
itε
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settings, wealth is also considered endogenous; for example, Becker (2006) argues that 
wealth may be endogenous for assessing CEO compensation, because highly skilled CEOs 
should have accumulated more wealth. Similarly, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) state that the 
traits that render some households more likely to accumulate wealth make them more 
likely to behave particularly in other settings too. All other variables (Women, Joint, Age, 
Turnover) are assumed to be exogenous. Antonakis et al. (2010) indicate that stable 
individual differences may serve as good instruments. For the first three of the variables 
that we defined exogenous, this poses no problem. We also assume that Turnover is 
exogenous, given that it may serve as a proxy for overconfidence, while overconfidence in 
turn may be considered a stable personality trait.  
Table 4.III:  List of Variables  
This tables provides an overview of the variables used in various HT-regressions. For each 
variable is indicated whether it is time variant or time invariant (TV or TI), and whether we 
treat the variable as endogenous (End) or exogenous (Ex). The last column (HT) refers 
explicitly to the Hausman-Taylor notation of model 4.3. 
Variable Description 
TV 
or 
TI 
Ex 
or 
End 
HT 
Advice 
Dummy variable that is 1 if the accountholder is 
advised by advisor from the bank, zero 
otherwise 
TI End M2 
Woman Dummy variable that is 1 if the account is held by a woman only TI Ex M1 
Joint Account Dummy variable that is 1 if the account is held by 2 person, mostly a man and women together TI Ex M1 
Age Age of primary account holder in years TV Ex X1 
Income Logarithm of gross monthly income in Euro's at 6 digit zip code level in 2006 TV End X2 
Residential Value Logarithm of residential value in Euro's in 2006 
at 6 digit zip code level TV End X2 
Account Value Logarithm of value of all common equity positions at the beginning of each month TV End X2 
Turnover 
Logarithm of the absolute sum of all buys and 
sells divided by the beginning of the month 
account value 
TV Ex X1 
Experience Number of months that investor hold a portfolio during our sample period TV End X2 
 
In the Hausman-Taylor approach, all dependent and independent variables are transformed 
as in a random effects estimation, and all the variables are instrumented. In line with the 
fixed effects model, both time-varying exogenous and endogenous variables are 
instrumented by a within-variable transformation, whereas the time-invariant endogenous 
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variables use the individual averages of the exogenous time-variant variables. The time-
invariant exogenous variables are instruments themselves. 
For all our estimations, we first report the Breusch-Pagan test to check whether panel 
techniques are more appropriate than OLS. For all our specifications we reject the null 
hypothesis of this test, which implies that investor-specific effects are present. Then we 
apply the Hausman test to determine if a fixed or random effects estimation is preferable. 
In all cases, the fixed effects estimator is preferred, but as indicated before, time invariant 
variables cannot be identified when using the fixed effect estimator. This directs us to the 
Hausman-Taylor technique. 
Given that in a Hausman-Taylor estimation the sampling distribution may be hard to 
derive, we calculate standard errors using the conventional nonparametric panel bootstrap 
with 250 replications. This bootstrapping allows estimating standard errors which are 
robust to possible heteroskedasticity that may arise as a result of multiple observations for 
each individual. As noted before the inclusion of time dummies in all our estimations 
removes the bias as a result of possible cross sectional dependence (Petersen, 2009). To 
confirm the quality of our instruments, we report the F-statistic for the first-stage 
regression with advice taking, and the Hansen-J statistic of overidentifying restrictions.  
4.4.3. Impact of Advisors on Portfolio Returns: Empirical Results 
In Table 4.IV, we present the performance results of our Hausman-Taylor specification, 
including the small, significant, positive impact of advice on portfolio performance. 
Advised portfolios are associated with lower market risk (see Table 4.I), so this advisory 
impact is slightly stronger when we consider risk-adjusted performance (column 2). This 
result contradicts findings by Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012) and Bergstresser, 
Chalmers, and Tufano (2009), but it aligns with the experimental findings of Battacharya 
et al.’s (2011) and Hung and Yoong (2010). We focus on common equity, for which 
unbiased advice is more likely, as was true for Battacharya et al. (2011), whereas the 
inclusion of mutual fund advice increases the likelihood of bias in the other studies. 
Mutual fund inflows relate positively to front-end loads, so advisors may put their own 
interests before those of clients. For common equity though, advisors have much less 
incentive to direct clients to securities that benefit only advisors, though conflicts of 
interest remain possible. Because income from stock advice primarily depends on trade 
commissions, advisors might encourage churn in portfolios, as we address subsequently. 
Fecht, Hackethal and Karabulut (2010) also find that banks relocate underperforming 
stocks from proprietary portfolios into retail clients’ portfolios. The bank of our sample  
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Log returns Log risk-adjusted 
returns
Risk
    (1)       (2)       (3)   
Advice   0.022***   0.029***  -1.488***
(0.000)   (0.008)   (0.000)   
Age   0.000**  -0.000     0.017***
(0.028)   (0.879)   (0.000)   
Woman  -0.002***  -0.003**   0.026   
(0.000)   (0.036)   (0.643)   
Joint Account  -0.001    -0.000    -0.192***
(0.147)   (0.717)   (0.000)   
Value  -0.009***  -0.008***  -1.220***
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Turnover  -0.004***  -0.004***   0.597***
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Income  -0.007    -0.007    -0.039   
(0.144)   (0.213)   (0.895)   
Residential Value   0.006*    0.005     0.020   
(0.094)   (0.143)   (0.929)   
Experience   0.000***  -0.000     0.001   
(0.000)   (0.748)   (0.729)   
Constant  -0.002     0.015     9.113***
(0.855)   (0.340)   (0.000)   
Observations 154,397 143,941 143,941
Breusch-Pagan LM test statistic, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
FE vs RE, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-statistic first stage regression 19.58 14.10 14.10
Hansen J Statistic, p-value 0.50 0.47 0.28
This table presents coefficient estimates on retail investor portfolio return and risk using the Hausman-
Taylor technique. Dependent variables are (1) Return which is the net monthly equity portfolio returns of
each individual portfolio, (2) Risk-adjusted return which is the individual portfolio beta's adjusted return
only calculated for investors with more than 24 return observations) and (3) Risk which is the monthly
absolute net return residual that has been calculated using the 3 factor Fama and French (1993) model for
each individual portfolio. Advice is a dummy variable equal to 1 is an investor is advised. Age is the age of
the primary account holder. Woman is a dummy equal to 1 if the account was held by a woman. Joint 
Account is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the account was held by 2 persons, mostly a man and a woman.
Value is the logarithm of the beginning of the month account value of common equity positions. Turnover 
is the logarithm of the sum of buys and sells of common equity positions divided by the beginning of the
month account value of common equity positions. Income is the logarithm of the average gross monthly
income in the 6 digit zip code of the investor. Residential Value is the logarithm of the average house price in
the 6 digit zip code of the investor. Experience is the number of months that each investor holds a portfolio
during the sample period. In each regression time dummies for each of the 52 months in the sample are used.
Portfolios with equity values of below € 250 are excluded. Nonparametric bootstrapped standard errors (in
parentheses) are presented below the corresponding parameters (based on 250 replications). ***, **, *
denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively
Table 4.IV: The Influence of Financial Advice on risk and Return, Hausman Taylor Estimates
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does not trade with its own money however, so this possible relocation is absent in our 
data. 
The negative coefficient for Turnover indicates that trading activity has a negative effect 
on returns; Barber and Odean (2000) similarly report that active traders underperform 
passive traders in net terms, because of their large trading costs. The small but negative 
coefficients for Woman and Joint Account contrast with Barber and Odean’s (2001) 
findings though. It appears that their finding that women’s performance is superior mainly 
reflects the lower turnover in portfolios held by women, for which we explicitly control.  
Portfolio size (Value) relates negatively to returns, but other wealth proxies have a positive 
(residential value) or insignificant (income) effect. The negative relation between portfolio 
size and returns contrasts with findings by Bauer, Cosemans, and Eichholtz (2009) but 
might be explained by Ivkovic, Sialm, and Weisbenner (2008), who report lower returns 
for better diversified portfolios. In our sample, larger portfolios tend to be better 
diversified. 
Our methodology controls for selection bias due to unobserved characteristics that do not 
change over time. Moreover, assignments to specific advisors are random. Yet we cannot 
entirely rule out the possibility that our results are partly biased by selection on time-
varying unobservable variables, such as investment experience. It has a positive impact on 
portfolio returns and increases over time. By including the number of months the investor 
is active in our sample period, we try to proxy for experience; the effect is insignificantly 
positive and quite small. 
All F-statistics of the first-stage regressions for Advice are greater than 10, so the 
instruments appears relevant and reasonably explanatory for the advice dummy. In 
addition, the high p-values on the Hansen-J statistics indicate the instruments are valid for 
all our specifications.  
4.4.4. Impact of Advisors on Risk 
The impact of advisors on portfolio returns is small but positive for the average investor. 
To assess the value of financial advisors, we consider their impact on the risk exhibited by 
clients’ portfolios. Contrary to lessons from portfolio theory, individual investors generally 
diversify poorly; as Barber and Odean (2000) document, a typical investor holds only four 
stocks (similar to the 4.4 stocks we report in Table 4.I). Finance textbooks routinely 
illustrate the positive effect of adding more stocks to a portfolio: It reduces nonsystematic 
risk (e.g., Berk and DeMarzo, 2010). Sophisticated investors follow these lessons, as 
Goetzman and Kumar (2008) show, but most investors still suffer significant idiosyncratic 
risk because they choose imperfectly correlated stocks. These findings reflect recent 
evidence noted by Dorn and Huberman (2010) that individual investors expose themselves 
to idiosyncratic risk due to volatility specialization. Because diversification is a basic 
lesson, we expect financial advisors, in principle, to increase portfolio diversification. 
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Bluethgen et al. (2008) and Kramer (2012) also confirm better portfolio diversification 
among advised investors, though mainly as a result of adding mutual funds to retail 
portfolios.  
To assess the impact of advisors on risk, similarly as in Cheng (2008), we obtain residuals 
from a Fama-French three-factor model, which we apply to all time series of net monthly 
portfolio returns for each individual investor with at least 24 monthly return observations 
in our sample. Second, we use the absolute value of the residuals11 of the regressions in the 
first step and regress it on the same predictors as in our previous models. Specifically, we 
estimate:  
                                         (4.4) 
where  is the return on the portfolio of investor i in month t; Rmt – Rft is the excess 
return on the MSCI Netherlands index in month t; Rft is a proxy for the risk-free rate, for 
which we use the three-month Euribor; SMBt is the return on a zero-investment factor that 
mimics portfolio size; and HMLt is the return on a zero-investment factor that mimics 
portfolio value. Both SMBt and HMLt have been calculated using Dutch stock market data 
given that the majority of stocks in our sample are Dutch. We take the residuals from this 
model and use the absolute value as a proxy for the variability of the investor’s portfolio 
return.  
The OLS results for the second step in Table 4.II indicate, similar to our previous return 
regressions, a small relationship with advisory intervention. Advised portfolios appear 
associated with less risk, but a selection bias may drive these results. We cannot infer the 
impact of advice from these regressions, so we turn again to the Hausman-Taylor 
methodology (see Column 3, Table 4.IV). For portfolio volatility, we find a much larger 
negative impact of advisory intervention. Apparently advisors improve diversification, as 
we discuss subsequently. Therefore, we assert that financial advisors provide the necessary 
investment knowledge and experience to increase diversification. The average value of the 
monthly return residuals of 2.9% in Table 4.I suggests the impact of advice is 
considerable.  
The controls we use exhibit the expected signs. Portfolio value has a large negative impact 
on idiosyncratic risk, in line with Dorn and Huberman’s (2010) reports of a negative 
relation between the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index12 and wealth. Diversification in 
portfolios of individual securities is less expensive when portfolios grow larger, 
considering the fixed costs associated with adding each new security. Turnover relates 
positively to diversifiable risk. Turnover is often considered a proxy for overconfidence, 
which drives excessive risk-taking. Barber and Odean (2000) report lower risk aversion for 
                                                     
11
 This procedure maintains the panel structure of the data. 
12
 This index is calculated as the sum of the squared weights of the assets in a portfolio and therefore serves as a 
proxy for the amount of diversification. 
itR
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active traders. Finally, in line with previous findings, we note that joint accounts are 
associated with lower avoidable risk, but the coefficient for women is insignificant.  
4.4.5. Impact of Advisors on Trading Activity and Costs 
In Table 4.V we report the Hausman-Taylor estimates of activity and cost measures. 
Trades is the number of common equity transactions in each month; Cost is the difference 
between the gross and net return of each individual investor in each month, such that it 
captures the effect of transaction costs and custodial fees. The coefficient for Advice 
reveals some interesting patterns. In contrast with the results in Table 4.II, we find that 
advisors lower the number of trades (Table 4.V, columns 1 and 2). Apparently, they reduce 
the number of trades investors execute, which conflicts with the commonly held belief that 
advisors induce churn to generate more commissions. Women and joint accounts engage 
in less trading activity, consistent with Barber and Odean’s (2001) findings that single men 
trade most. Increased portfolio value is associated with more trades, though these 
relationships appear nonmonotonic, according to the sign changes when we add a squared 
variable for value. By adding a squared term for age, we overidentify the model and can 
test for the quality of our instruments. When we include them, the impact of advice on 
trading diminishes, though the effect is still considerable. The Hansen-J statistics indicate 
no correlation between our instruments and the error term. In line with Dorn and 
Huberman (2005), our estimates show that respondents with more experience trade 
significantly less. 
Although trading declines in advised portfolios, advisors have a positive impact on costs 
(Table 4.V, column 3). When advisors execute trades, investors pay more in commissions 
compared with execution-only services. Consistent with our expectations, increased 
portfolio value lowers costs, and higher turnover increases costs. Experience lowers cost, 
though the effect is small. 
4.4.6. Impact of Advisors on Diversification 
Better diversification lowers unnecessary risk in portfolios. As Table 4.IV already 
revealed, advisors lower idiosyncratic risk, whether by increasing the number of securities 
in a portfolio or selecting securities with low correlations. Dorn and Huberman (2010) 
show that retail investors typically specialize in volatility, in that they select securities with 
similar volatilities rather than low correlations. To assess the diversification skill of 
advisors, we use two measures: the advisory impact on the number of individual shares in 
each portfolio and the effect on home bias. Although home bias is widespread (French and 
Poterba, 1991), debate continues about whether it actually harms investors. Normative 
finance theory indicates diversification benefits from investing abroad, but others argue  
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Trades Trades Cost
    (1)      (2)      (3)   
Advice  -0.400***  -0.264*    0.002***
(0.003)   (0.068)   (0.000)   
Age  -0.001     0.002     0.000   
(0.497)   (0.620)   (0.185)   
Age Squared            -0.000             
          (0.283)             
Woman  -0.075***  -0.084***  -0.000   
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.669)   
Joint Account  -0.047**  -0.028     0.000   
(0.031)   (0.196)   (0.519)   
Value   0.325***  -1.617***  -0.003***
(0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   
Value Squared             0.249***           
          (0.000)             
Turnover                       0.008***
                    (0.000)   
Income   0.142     0.155     0.000   
(0.150)   (0.113)   (0.750)   
Residential Value  -0.080    -0.120*   -0.000   
(0.248)   (0.089)   (0.725)   
Experience  -0.010***  -0.009***  -0.000***
(0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Constant  -0.678**   2.876***   0.010***
(0.015)   (0.003)   (0.000)   
Observations 154,397 154,397 154,397
Breusch-Pagan LM test statistic, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
FE vs. RE, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-statistic first stage regression 22.65 16.97 19.58
Hansen J Statistic, p-value 0.999 0.037
This table presents coefficient estimates on retail investor portfolio return and risk using the Hausman-
Taylor technique. Dependent variables are (1) Trades, which is the number of montly equity trades in each
individual portfolio and (2) Cost which is the difference between the gross and net monthly portfolio return.
Advice is a dummy variable equal to 1 is an investor is advised. Age is the age of the primary account holder.
Woman is a dummy equal to 1 if the account was held by a woman. Joint Account is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the account was held by 2 persons, mostly a man and a woman. Value is the logarithm of the
beginning of the month account value of common equity positions. Turnover is the logarithm of the sum of
buys and sells of common equity positions divided by the beginning of the month account value of common
equity positions. Income is the logarithm of the average gross monthly income in the 6 digit zip code of the
investor. Residential Value is the logarithm of the average house price in the 6 digit zip code of the investor.
Experience is the number of months that each investor holds a portfolio during the sample period. In each
regression time dummies for each of the 52 months in the sample are used. Portfolios with equity values of
below € 250 are excluded. Nonparametric bootstrapped standard errors (in parentheses) are presented
below the corresponding parameters (250 replications). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Table 4.V: The Influence of Advice on Trading Activity and Costs, Hausman-Taylor Estimates
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that home bias (or local bias within a country) may be driven by informational advantages 
(Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005); Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). We calculate home bias by 
dividing the initial monthly common stock portfolio value invested in Dutch stocks by the 
total initial monthly value in common equity. Our findings in Table 4.VI (column 1) reveal 
that though the coefficient of Advice on the number of equity position is positive, it is far 
from significant. With our assumption that lower sophistication drives advisor choice, we 
could predict a positive sign of advisory intervention on the number of equity positions. 
Given the large negative effect of idiosyncratic risk reported in table 4.IV, we must 
conclude that advisors use more sophisticated diversification rather than just increasing the 
number of stocks. This is in line with the recent finding of Dorn and Huberman (2010) that 
sophistication drives lower volatility specialization. In addition, recent evidence suggests a 
positive effect of holding concentrated portfolios (Ivkovic, Sialm, and Weisbenner, 2008), 
implying that just increasing the number of stock in a portfolio may not be beneficial at all 
in terms of returns. 
We also note from Table 4.VI (column 2) that advisors increase exposure to domestic 
equity, which seems intuitively to conflict with our previous finding that advisors lower 
idiosyncratic risk. It might be explained by findings from Kramer (2012) and Hackethal, 
Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012), who indicate a positive effect of advisors on mutual fund 
holdings. Most mutual funds distributed in the Netherlands have a strong international 
focus, so advisors could focus on domestic stocks for their domestic portfolio and diversify 
internationally through mutual funds. This finding also supports prior results (Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner, 2005; Coval and Moskowitz, 2001) that indicate investors benefit from local 
holdings due to the informational advantages. Our finding that advisors focus more on 
domestic equity and achieve higher returns is consistent with this view.  
4.5. Conclusion 
We estimate the causal impact of an advisor on the portfolio returns of an individual 
investor. We use a unique database of approximately 195,000 monthly equity returns for 
more than 5,500 Dutch investors, who are either advised or self-directed. Because our 
variable of interest is likely endogenous, due to self-selection, and does not change over 
time, we employ the instrumental variable approach developed by Hausman and Taylor 
(1981).  
We find, irrespective of the exact model specification, a small positive effect of advisors 
on portfolio returns for average individual investors. In addition, we show that advice 
lowers idiosyncratic risk which is the result of sophisticated diversification. There is a 
significant positive impact of advisory intervention on the home-country bias, but it does 
no harm in terms of risk and return, consistent with the view that retail and professional 
investors have an informational advantage when selecting domestic stocks. 
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No. Equity positions Share domestic stock
   (1)      (2)   
Advice   0.082     0.162***
(0.906)   (0.004)   
Age  -0.028***  -0.001***
(0.000)   (0.002)   
Woman  -0.573***  -0.011   
(0.000)   (0.292)   
Joint Account   0.231*    0.010   
(0.087)   (0.145)   
Value   4.428***   0.025** 
(0.000)   (0.013)   
Turnover  -0.065***   0.001   
(0.000)   (0.374)   
Income  -0.030     0.004   
(0.943)   (0.831)   
Residential Value   0.554    -0.016   
(0.114)   (0.243)   
Experience   0.025***   0.002***
(0.000)   (0.000)   
Constant -14.926***   0.732***
(0.000)   (0.000)   
Observations 154,353 154,353
Breusch-Pagan LM test statistic, p-value 0.00 0.00
FE vs. RE, p-value 0.00 0.00
F-statistic first stage regression 19.58 19.58
Hansen J Statistic, p-value 0.99 0.32
This table presents coefficient estimates on retail investor portfolio return and risk using the
Hausman-Taylor technique. Dependent variables are (1) Number of equity positions which is the
number of individual common stock positions in each individual investor portfolio at the
beginning of each month and (2) Share domestic stock which is the percentage of portfolio value
allocated to domestics common stock position at the beginning of each month. Advice is a
dummy variable equal to 1 is an investor is advised. Age is the age of the primary account holder.
Woman is a dummy equal to 1 if the account was held by a woman. Joint Account is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the account was held by 2 persons, mostly a man and a woman. Value   is 
the logarithm of the beginning of the month account value of common equity positions.
Turnover is the logarithm of the sum of buys and sells of common equity positions divided by
the beginning of the month account value of common equity positions. Income is the logarithm of
the average gross monthly income in the 6 digit zip code of the investor. Residential Value is the 
logarithm of the average house price in the 6 digit zip code of the investor. Experience is the
number of months that each investor holds a portfolio during the sample period. In each
regression time dummies for each of the 52 months in the sample are used. Portfolios with equity
values of below € 250 are excluded. Nonparametric bootstrapped standard errors  (in parentheses) 
are presented below the corresponding parameters (250 replications). ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Table 4.VI: The Influence of Advice on Diversification, Hausman-Taylor Estimates
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These results contrast with recent findings that incorporate mutual fund advice. Inherent to 
mutual fund advice is the moral hazard problem in an advisor–advisee relationship. Mutual 
funds typically have opaque fee structures that may benefit advisors, not their customers. 
However, our findings are supported by evidence based on unbiased advice. Thus, when 
considering common stock advice only, incentive conflicts may be less pronounced, and 
advisors add value. Although we lack an empirical test, our findings glean support from 
research that indicates a positive effect of experience and financial knowledge on less 
biased decision making.  
We also show that advisors affect trading activity. The number of trades declines as a 
result of advisory intervention. Advisors do not engage in churning behavior driven by 
conflicts of interest, perhaps because financial market regulations explicitly forbid 
churning.  
In summary, our results show that advisors improve the portfolio decision making of retail 
investors when conflicts of interest are minimal and endogeneity is controlled for. Current 
attempts by policy makers in many countries to replace the current incentive structure, 
based on product fees, with a more transparent fee model in which investors pay for advice 
directly, will likely benefit retail investors. 
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Chapter 5 
Financial Literacy, Cognitive Ability, and 
Financial Advice Seeking 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The relationship among financial literacy, cognitive abilities, and the propensity to seek 
expert financial advice is important, in that financial advice offers a potential mechanism 
to correct for inferior financial decision making resulting from a lack of financial literacy 
or poor cognitive abilities. Various studies also indicate just how widespread financial 
illiteracy and low cognitive abilities are. Using data from the U.S. Household and 
Retirement Survey (HRS), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a) find that only one-third of 
households can answer three basic economic principle questions correctly. Van Rooij et al. 
(2011a) report similar results among Dutch households, and Christellis et al. (2010) show 
that many Europeans score poorly on various indicators of cognitive ability. Lack of 
financial literacy can adversely affect the quality of financial decision making1, as a result 
of which one accumulates less wealth (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007c). In addition, growing 
evidence indicates that cognitive ability is an important predictor of financial outcomes2.  
Various remedies attempt to correct for the negative effects of financial illiteracy or poor 
cognitive ability and improve financial decision making. Collins (2010) proposes financial 
advice as one component of a broader financial capacity building system. Sensible defaults 
have proven powerful as well; Thaler and Bernarzi (2004) indicate that default 
participation in a retirement savings plan has positive effects on retirement savings. 
Financial education may improve financial decision making, though empirical findings on 
its effects are ambiguous (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a). 
Chapter 5 
                                                     
1
 See, for example Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b; Van Rooij et al., 2011a and 2011b; Guiso and Japelli, 2009; 
Bayer et al., 2009; Cole and Shastry, 2009; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009. 
2
 See, for example Agarwal and Mazumder, 2010; Grinblatt et al., 2011a; Cole and Shastry, 2009; Grinblatt et 
al., 2012; Korniotis and Kumar, 2012. 
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5.1. Introduction 
The relationship among financial literacy, cognitive abilities, and the propensity to seek 
expert financial advice is important, in that financial advice offers a potential mechanism 
to correct for inferior financial decision making resulting from a lack of financial literacy 
or poor cognitive abilities. Various studies also indicate just how widespread financial 
illiteracy and low cognitive abilities are. Using data from the U.S. Household and 
Retirement Survey (HRS), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a) find that only one-third of 
households can answer three basic economic principle questions correctly. Van Rooij et al. 
(2011a) report similar results among Dutch households, and Christellis et al. (2010) show 
that many Europeans score poorly on various indicators of cognitive ability. Lack of 
financial literacy can adversely affect the quality of financial decision making3, as a result 
of which one accumulates less wealth (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007c). In addition, growing 
evidence indicates that cognitive ability is an important predictor of financial outcomes4.  
Various remedies attempt to correct for the negative effects of financial illiteracy or poor 
cognitive ability and improve financial decision making. Collins (2010) proposes financial 
advice as one component of a broader financial capacity building system. Sensible defaults 
have proven powerful as well; Thaler and Bernarzi (2004) indicate that default 
participation in a retirement savings plan has positive effects on retirement savings. 
Financial education may improve financial decision making, though empirical findings on 
its effects are ambiguous (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a). 
Another option is the use of financial advice to correct for the impact of poor financial 
literacy or cognitive abilities. The financial advice and planning industry is substantial 
(IBIS, 2011), and a large fraction of retail investors rely on financial advice. In the United 
States, 81% of the households investing in mutual funds, outside a retirement plan, rely on 
a financial advisor (ICI, 2007), and 75% of them consult financial advisors before 
                                                     
3
 See, for example Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b; Van Rooij et al., 2011a and 2011b; Guiso and Japelli, 2009; 
Bayer et al., 2009; Cole and Shastry, 2009; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009. 
4
 See, for example Agarwal and Mazumder, 2010; Grinblatt et al., 2011a; Cole and Shastry, 2009; Grinblatt et 
al., 2012; Korniotis and Kumar, 2012. 
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conducting stock market or mutual fund transactions (Hung and Yoong, 2010). Bluethgen 
et al. (2008) indicate that roughly 80% of individual investors in Germany turn to financial 
advice for their investment decisions, and in the Netherlands, 51% of households with an 
investment portfolio rely on financial advice5 (Millward Brown, 2010). However, whether 
financial expert intervention benefits investors remains up for debate (Bergstesser et al., 
2009; Hackethal et al., 2012; Karabulut, 2011, Kramer, 2012), despite some consensus that 
it can improve retail investor portfolio decisions if conflicts of interest are minimized 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2012 Hung and Yuoong, 2010; Kramer and Lensink, 2012). 
If financial assistance is to mitigate limited financial literacy or cognitive abilities, it is 
necessary first to establish that those with lower literacy and/or cognitive abilities are more 
inclined to turn to financial experts. This link is not obvious. Instead, more literate or 
cognitively able investors might use financial advice more if they are less overconfident 
(Kruger and Dunning, 1999), have higher time-related opportunity costs (Hackethal et al., 
2011b), see advice as a complementary source of information (Calcagno and Monticone, 
2011), induce advisors to provide better advice (Bucher-Koenen and Koenen, 2011), or are 
less impatient (Fredrick, 2005). They might avoid advice though if they perceive potential 
conflicts of interest (Hackethal et al., 2012), see no need for assistance because of their 
information processing and learning capabilities and stronger social networks (Korniotis 
and Kumar, 2012), or are less risk averse (Frederick, 2005). Therefore, this study attempts 
to answer the empirical question of whether increased financial literacy and higher 
cognitive ability increase or lower the propensity to seek advice.  
We use portfolio and survey data from a randomly selected, representative sample of 
Dutch retail and merchant bank customers and base our main analysis on the 467 investors 
that participated in a survey (conducted in October 2011). With this approach, we find no 
significant relationship among measured financial literacy, cognitive ability, and financial 
advice seeking, even when we control for potential reverse causality between financial 
literacy and advice. Advice is not a sufficient remedy for bad financial decision making 
that results from low financial literacy. However, we find a strong negative association 
between perceived financial literacy and the choice to ask for help, even when we control 
for actual knowledge, in line with the competence hypothesis (Heath and Tversky, 1991). 
This hypothesis posits that people are more willing to act on their own judgments when 
they perceive themselves as more competent. Investing without the help of a financial 
advisor is a typical example of relying on one’s own judgment. Furthermore, we provide 
evidence of other factors related to advice-seeking behavior, such as the negative 
association of risk tolerance and positive links to age, wealth, and trust in advisors. 
Although less educated people exhibit a lower tendency to ask for expert help, regret 
aversion does not appear to play a role (cf. Shefrin, 2002). 
                                                     
5
 It is not entirely clear why this percentage is considerably lower; perhaps it results from the Netherlands 
having one of the highest Internet access rates in the world, or from the way advice is defined in various studies.  
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In addition to these main findings, we note differences in perceptions about financial 
advisors between advised and self-directed investors, as well as in their main choice 
motivations. The most important rationale for investors who opt for advisory services is 
their belief in the higher level of investment knowledge of the advisor. This outcome is 
consistent with our main finding that the degree of perceived literacy drives advice 
seeking. The primary reason investors choose execution-only services is their perception of 
control.  
In the next section, we provide an overview of related literature before introducing the data 
set and methods applied in Section 5.3. Then in Section 5.4, we report the results of our 
empirical analysis. We conclude in Section 5.5.  
5.2. Literature Review 
Abundant evidence indicates that investors make suboptimal investment decisions6 and 
underperform (Barber et al., 2009; Bauer et al., 2009). A major cause of biased financial 
decision making is a limited degree of financial literacy and/or a low level of cognitive 
ability. Bernheim (1998) cites the importance of financial literacy for household decision 
making; Bernheim et al. (2001) link better financial education to improved savings 
behavior. Bayer et al. (2009) and Cole and Shastry (2009) find that the less financial 
literate save less. Lusardi and Tufano (2009) also show that these less literate investors 
have more debt, and Gerardi et al. (2010) confirm their higher mortgage delinquency rates. 
Campbell (2006) finds less knowledgeable forgo refinancing possibilities when this is 
financially wise to do. Van Rooij et al. (2011b) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b) find that 
less financially literate plan less for retirement. As a result of which financially illiterate 
may accumulate less wealth (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a).  
Other researchers specifically relate financial literacy to investment decisions. Dhar and 
Zhu (2006) document a negative relationship between financial literacy and the disposition 
effect. Van Rooij et al. (2011a) indicate that less financially literate people are less likely 
to participate in the stock market. Both Guiso and Japelli (2009) and Calvet et al. (2009) 
find that less literate investors diversify their portfolios insufficiently. Hung et al.’s 
(2009b) measure of financial literacy can predict inappropriate behaviors, such as a lack of 
retirement planning, holding zero equity, and being too aggressive or too conservative.  
                                                     
6
 Studies indicate, for example, that individual investors trade excessively (Barber and Odean, 2000; Dorn and 
Huberman, 2005; Odean, 1999); hold underdiversified portfolios (Goetzman and Kumar, 2008); are subject to 
the disposition effect (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Odean, 1998); concentrate their portfolios in domestic 
(French and Poterba, 1999), local (Huberman, 2001; Seasholes and Zhu, 2010,), or own company (Bernarzi, 
2001) stock; select stocks on the basis of their volatility similarity (Dorn and Huberman, 2010); apply naïve 
diversification strategies (Bernartzi and Thaler, 2001); and buy stock because it catches their attention (Barber 
and Odean 2008) or because of the affective response it induces (Statman et al., 2008). However, it is not clear 
whether deviations from normative theories always lead to inferior outcomes (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; 
Ivkovic et al., 2008; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005), and substantial heterogeneity appears in both behavior and 
performance (Coval et al., 2005). 
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Cognitive ability, which implies an ability to acquire and process information, also might 
drive suboptimal financial behavior. People with higher cognitive abilities likely develop 
better social networks, information-gathering capabilities, information interpretations, 
learning ability, and analytical and numerical abilities (Korniotis and Kumar, 2012). 
Agarwal and Mazumder (2010) find that low cognition relates to mistakes in credit card or 
home loan decisions. Grinblatt et al. (2011a) provide compelling evidence of a strong and 
sizable relation between IQ and stock market participation, a finding supported by both 
Cole and Shastry (2009) and Christelis et al. (2010). Benjamin et al. (2006) also show that 
intelligence influences the holding of financial assets more generally.  
For participants in financial markets, a positive relationship arises between their cognitive 
abilities and the quality of their portfolio decisions. According to Grinblatt et al. (2011b), 
people with low IQs maintain portfolios with fewer stocks and are less likely to include a 
mutual fund; they also bear more idiosyncratic risk and achieve lower Sharpe ratios. Using 
the same data, Grinblatt et al. (2012) report that high IQ investors show significantly better 
portfolio performance, because they are less sensitive to the disposition effect, pick better 
stocks, have better market timing, pay lower trading costs and mutual fund fees, and are 
less likely to herd. Their trades also are informative about future price movements. 
Korniotis and Kumar (2012) reveal that portfolio distortions like concentration, excessive 
trading and holding local stocks must be conditioned on cognitive abilities. Departures 
from normative theories lead only to inferior outcomes for lower cognitive individuals, 
while high cognitive investors benefit, apparently because their actions are driven by 
informational advantages. Müller and Weber (2010) provide evidence of a positive impact 
of financial literacy on the likelihood of investing in low cost mutual funds but only weak 
evidence of superior fund selection.  
Assuming a detrimental impact of low financial literacy and low cognitive abilities on 
portfolio decisions, we need to determine whether these investors try to overcome their 
limitations by asking for help in their investment decision making—even though the 
question of whether advisors improve portfolio decisions remains uncertain7. For advisors 
to aid less financially literate or cognitively able investors, there seemingly should be a 
negative relationship between financial literacy and cognitive abilities and advice-seeking 
                                                     
7
 Bergstresser et al. (2009) show that mutual funds sold though the broker channel tend to underperform directly 
sold funds, in line with Zhao’s (2003) finding that financial advisors guide customers to funds with higher fees. 
Even when advisors match portfolios to client characteristics, they fail to debias customers and, in some cases, 
even exacerbate those client biases (Mullainathan et al., 2010). Hackethal et al. (2012) indicate that advisors are 
associated with lower returns and higher turnover but also with better diversification. Such improved 
diversification is confirmed by Kramer (2012), though he cannot confirm lower returns in advised portfolios. 
Shapira and Venezia (2001) find more trading activity in professionally managed accounts but also a lower 
degree of disposition effect. According to Von Gaudekker (2011), losses from insufficient diversification are 
greatest for overconfident investors who combine poor financial skills with reliance on their own financial 
judgments. In a financial advice choice experiment, many investors rejected the offer to receive advice, whereas 
those who follow the advice actually improved their portfolio risk–return trade off (Bhattacharya et al., 2012). 
This finding is in line with Hung and Yoong’s (2010) assertion that only solicited advice helps improve 
portfolio outcomes. 
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propensity. Although, this relationship has, to our knowledge, not been studied as 
extensively as we do, some studies provide some indicative evidence. Hackethal et al. 
(2011) find that investors who rely more on financial advice perceive themselves as less 
knowledgeable, and in Hung and Yoong’s (2010) choice experiment, less sophisticated 
people were more likely to take advice. Similarly, in a survey, respondents who considered 
themselves more financially literate preferred more autonomy in their pension decisions 
(Van Rooij et al., 2007). Guiso and Japelli (2006) also find that investors who spend more 
time acquiring financial information (who should be more financially literate) delegate 
their financial decisions less. Although Georgarakos and Inderst (2011) suggest that advice 
matters most for households with low financial capability, they acknowledge that the 
finding holds only when households trust the advice. People with less cognitive ability are 
more risk averse (Dohmen et al., 2010; Frederick, 2005) and may be more willing to ask 
for help, because investing on their own seems more risky. Overall, advised investors are 
indeed more risk averse (Bluethgen et al., 2008). 
Less financially literate (lower cognitive ability) investors may, in addition, be less aware 
of potential conflicts of interest and therefore less hesitant to consult an advisor. 
Theoretical models even suggest that advisors mainly provide services to less sophisticated 
investors: Stoughton et al. (2011) assert that financial advisors sell underperforming active 
funds only to unsophisticated investors, and Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) assume that naive 
customers do not anticipate advisors’ conflict of interest. Hackethal et al. (2011) confirm 
that investors who rely more on financial advice perceive less conflict of interests, which 
may be explained by Ottaviani’s (2000) model, in which advisors shift their moral hazard 
behavior according to the sophistication of their clients, such that more sophisticated 
investors receive better advice. Yet Collins (2010) warns against overstating the conflict of 
interest between advisors and their clients, because advisors care about reputation effects. 
The negative relationship for advice-seeking propensity and financial literacy and 
cognitive abilities is not ambiguous, though. Calcagno and Monticone (2011) and Collins 
(2010) consider that financial literacy and financial advice complements rather than 
substitutes. Advisors may reveal information only to more knowledgeable investors, who 
anticipate such benefits and seek advice more often. Bucher-Koenen and Koenen (2011) 
reveal that more literate investors make more use of advisors because they can induce 
advisors to provide better advice. More sophisticated investors might have higher advice-
seeking propensities because of their higher opportunity costs of time too (Hackethal et al., 
2011). Van Rooij et al. (2011a) find that people who are less financially literate rely more 
on informal sources of financial advice, such as friends and family, whereas more literate 
investors opt more for professional financial advice. According to Hackethal et al. (2012), 
wealthier investors, who tend to be more sophisticated, are more often matched with 
advisors than poorer investors. The finding that less literate people rely less on advice also 
resonates with psychological literature, which indicates that less knowledgeable people 
lack the ability to recognize their illiteracy, leading them to overestimate their ability and 
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not seek advice (Kruger and Dunning, 1999). Finally, people with less cognitive abilities 
are less patient (Dohmen et al., 2010; Frederick, 2005), so they may avoid expert help and 
opt for execution-only trades instead to lower the barrier to making and executing portfolio 
decisions. 
In summary, the exact relationship among financial literacy, cognitive abilities, and the 
propensity to seek professional financial advice is still unclear. Arguments exist for both 
positive and negative relationships. To clarify the issue, we ask whether proxies for 
financial literacy and cognitive ability can predict advice-seeking behavior and derive 
answers from survey data obtained from a group of retail investors at a Dutch retail bank 
that offers both execution-only and advisory investment services. 
5.3. Data and Methods 
5.3.1. The Sample 
We used two main data sources. First, we obtained detailed information about a randomly 
selected sample of retail investors from a Dutch, medium-sized, retail and merchant bank 
that provided information about each client’s financial assets, debt, portfolio composition, 
and type of investment service chosen (execution only, investment advice, or delegated 
portfolio management). Second, we surveyed these same randomly selected investors with 
an e-mailed questionnaire, sent in October 2011 and then repeated after two weeks for 
investors who had not responded. If investors had no e-mail address listed, we sent them 
an invitation to participate through postal mail,8 sent on the same day as the e-mail 
invitation but without any reminder. Of the 4,586 randomly selected investors, 251 could 
not be reached due to e-mail bounces. We received completed surveys from 467 investors, 
for a net response rate of 10.8%. 
The bank that provided the data is a medium-sized retail and merchant bank operating 
throughout the Netherlands. The bank advertises itself as a relationship bank; many 
services are sold through account managers, private bankers, or retail advisors. Its services 
and products include checking accounts, savings, mortgages, insurance, business loans, 
investments, private equity, leasing, and pensions. Because we obtained data from just one 
retail bank, we took great caution to ensure that our sample of respondents was both 
internally and externally valid. We compared the respondents with nonrespondents and 
other similar data sets on various key variables in Table 5.I. Although some differences 
arose in the investor and portfolio characteristics between respondents and nonrespondents 
and between our sample and other databases, our overall impression suggests that sample 
selection bias is not a concern.  
                                                     
8
 For both e-mail and postal invitations, participants answered the questions in a web-based environment. 
Stanton and Rogelberg (2001) warn that web-based surveys may suffer from the so-called digital divide, in that 
some groups have much less Internet access. The Netherlands has one of the highest Internet access rates in the 
world, so it is unlikely to be a problem. 
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5.3.2. Defining Advice 
Help for investment portfolio decisions can take various forms. Investors may rely on the 
advice of professional (financial) advisors or delegate their portfolio decisions to a 
portfolio manager. We use the group of investors who opt for execution-only as our 
benchmark; they use no financial advice or delegated portfolio management services. All 
others, who opt for some sort of financial expert assistance, constitute the financial advice-
seeking group.  
Our partner bank organizes its investment services as follows: All investors may open 
execution-only accounts after establishing the legally required limited client profile. 
Clients with at least €20,000 in financial assets available for investments can opt for 
execution-only services or delegate their portfolio decisions. Investors with financial assets 
of at least €100,000 may choose to have their own personal investment advisor or 
delegation, as well as execution-only. Considering our focus on drivers of help-seeking 
behavior in investment decisions, we limit our sample to investors with €20,000 available, 
who may act on their own or ask for help through portfolio management or financial 
advice. As a robustness check we estimated the restricted samples of investors who may 
only choose between execution-only or delegation (portfolio values of €20,000–€100,000) 
Full 
sample Respondents
Non-
Respondents
Bhattacharya 
et al., 2011 
(Germany)
DNB Data, as 
of 31 June 
2012 (The 
Netherlands)
Age 54.2 58.4 53.7 49.2
Male (%) 73.1 79.0 72.4 81.8
Liquid Assets (€) 66,170 95,675 66,142
Debt (€) -69,020 -87,476 -66,792
Portfolio Value (€) 59,709 79,970 57,263 68,208 64,672
Equity (%) 70.8 69.7 71.0 731.0 53.77
Bond (%) 10.1 16.8 9.3 61.0 33.9
Cash (%) 19.0 13.5 19.7
Mutual Funds (%) 46.9 47.8 46.8 30.0 51.3
Options (% of portfolios) 2.8 4.7 2.5
N 4,335 467 3,868 8,195 1,200,000
Response (%) 10.77%
1based on subsample that chose for advice
Other samplesOur sample
Table 5.I. Sample Validity
This table compares respondents and non-respondents in our sample to check for internal
validity and compares our sample with other samples to check for external validity. DNB Data
refers to data from the Dutch Central Bank.
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and investors who may also choose between financial advice or execution-only (portfolio 
values above €100,000). 
Some execution-only investors in our sample also received advice from professional 
financial advisors external to the focal bank. When respondents indicated their connection 
to an investment portfolio at another bank, we added them to the advised group, rather than 
the execution-only group. 
5.3.3. Measuring Financial Literacy 
Most studies of financial literacy use three basic questions about inflation, compounding, 
and risk from the U.S. Health and Retirement Survey (HRS; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a, 
2007b, 2008; Van Rooij et al., 2011a). However, because our sample consists of investors, 
rather than general households, these three questions may be too easy for the respondents 
and may not enable us to distinguish between more and less literate investors. Therefore, 
we use more advanced literacy questions (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b; Van Rooij et al., 
2011a), specifically, eight of the eleven advanced questions from the DNB Household 
Survey (excluding three questions that require very similar knowledge). The eight survey 
questions have been well validated (Hung et al., 2009b) as having good internal 
consistency and test–retest reliability. Thus, the questions in our survey relate to important 
elements of adequate investment decision making: the differences between saving 
accounts, stocks, and bonds; the function of the stock market; the relationship between 
interest rates and bond prices; how diversification works; and the use of mutual funds. 
Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the questions in our survey. 
Instead of measuring literacy so directly, some authors rely on self-assessed financial 
literacy measures, because perceived literacy may have predictive value of its own (Hung 
et al., 2009b). People may not be able to assess their actual financial knowledge and may 
base their decisions on how much they think they know. If they think they know more than 
they actually do, people exhibit a tendency toward overconfidence. Hung et al. (2009b) 
find that self-assessed literacy better predicts financial behaviors than measured financial 
literacy, and Parker et al. (2011) indicate specifically that confidence in one’s own 
knowledge predicts financial behaviors, apart from actual knowledge. In providing 
evidence that self-perceived competence relates to both trading behavior and the home 
bias, Graham et al. (2009) relate their findings to the competence hypothesis (Heath and 
Tversky, 1991). That is, people rely more on their own judgment if they consider 
themselves more competent. Yet measured and perceived financial literacy are generally 
(moderately) positively correlated (Hung et al., 2009b), and both have some predictive 
power for estimating stock market participation (Van Rooij et al., 2011a). Because self-
assessed literacy may be more related to actual behavior than our measure of financial 
literacy, we also asked about perceived literacy to test our predictions. Specifically, we 
measure perceived financial literacy using the question in Figure 5.2.  
FINANCIAL LITERACY, COGNITIVE ABILITY, AND FINANCIAL ADVICE SEEKING  
119 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Measured Financial Literacy Questions  
(All questions also included a “don’t know” option). 
 
1) Which of the following statements describes the main function of the stock market?  
○ The stock market helps to predict stock earnings 
○ The stock market results in an increase in the price of stocks  
○ The stock market brings people who want to buy stocks together with those who 
want to sell stocks  
○ None of the above. 
2) Which of the following statements is correct?  
○ Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first 
year  
○ Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and 
bonds  
○ Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past 
performance  
○ None of the above. 
3) If the interest rate falls, what should happen to bond prices?  
○ Rise  
○ Fall  
○ Stay the same 
○ None of the above. 
4) True or false? Buying a company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock 
mutual fund.  
○ True 
○ False. 
5) True or false? Stocks are normally riskier than bonds.  
○ True 
○ False. 
6) Considering a long time period (for example 10 or 20 years), which asset normally 
gives the highest return?  
○ Savings accounts 
○ Bonds 
○ Stocks. 
7) Normally, which asset displays the highest fluctuations over time?  
○ Savings accounts 
○ Bonds  
○ Stocks. 
8) When an investor spreads his money among different assets, does the risk of losing 
money:  
○ Increase 
○ Decrease  
○ Stay the same. 
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Figure 5.2: Perceived Literacy Question 
Financial knowledge varies from person to person. How would you assess your own 
financial knowledge? 
Very 
Low 
     
Very 
High 
 Don't 
Know 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○  ○ 
 
5.3.4. Reversed Causality 
In estimating the relationship between advice seeking and financial literacy, we must 
consider the possibility that measured financial literacy is endogenous, because the choice 
of asking for expert help may influence the level of financial literacy. The sign of this 
relationship is not clear a priori. Both advised and self-directed investors may increase 
their literacy from interacting with financial markets; the effect even may be greater for 
self-directed investors, who deal with financial markets directly, find information 
themselves, and decide on their own which investments to pursue. Alternatively, advised 
investors may learn from their interactions with their financial advisor, who teaches them 
about risk, return, and diversification. In the group of help-seeking investors, we also 
anticipate that the learning mechanism through expert advice is probably stronger for 
investors who hold advised rather than managed portfolios.  
To address causality directions, we included another question in the survey about the 
amount of education respondents received on economics before they entered the job 
market, which should be before they started to invest. Economic education thus should 
correlate positively with current financial literacy but be unrelated to having a financial 
advisor (e.g. Cole and Shastry, 2009; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b; Van Rooij et al., 
2011b). Specifically, with a seven-point scale ranging from “very little” to “very much,” 
respondents indicated: “How much of your formal education was devoted to economics?” 
We then created two dummies: one for respondents who indicated some economic 
education (score of 3–5) and one for respondents who indicated a lot of economic 
education (score of 6–7). Those with little economic education (score of 1–2) constitute the 
benchmark group. 
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5.3.5. Measuring Cognitive Ability 
Cognitive ability may relate to various cognitive domains, such as mathematical 
(numerical) and verbal skills and memory functioning (Christellis et al., 2010). Education 
and income can serve as proxies for cognitive abilities, though most studies attempt to 
measure them directly. The Wonderlic Personality Test, need for cognition scale, 
Scholastic Achievement Test, and American College Test are common in the United States 
for example. Such tests consist of many items and require considerable time to complete, 
and thus, for our survey methodology, they are not feasible. Frederick (2005) instead 
proposes a three-question cognitive reflection test (CRT). For applied researchers 
interested in allocating people to cognitive groups, the CRT is attractive because it 
demands a limited amount of time and correlates sufficiently with the scores on other IQ 
tests. It ranked as the best or second-best predictor across four decision-making domains in 
a comparison with four other tests (Fredrick, 2005). The CRT asks the three questions in 
Figure 5.3.  
The noninvestment nature of these questions deviates considerably from the rest of the 
survey and may make respondents suspicious.  Therefore, we framed the questions as a 
contest, in which participants could win one of two €50 prizes. A moderate proportion of 
93 respondents (20%) opted not to participate in the contest, so our sample size drops to 
374 when we include cognitive ability in our analysis. Both advised and self-directed 
investors participated equally. However, the nonparticipants might have obtained lower 
cognitive ability scores than participants; these nonparticipants scored significantly lower 
on measured financial literacy (t-value = -2.45, p = 0.02), and financial literacy correlates 
positively with cognitive ability (ρ = 0.29, p = 0.00). 
 
Figure 5.3. Cognitive Ability Questions 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? _____ cents. 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? _____ minutes. 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half of the lake? _____ days. 
 
  
CHAPTER 5 
122 
 
5.3.6. Control Variables 
Guiso and Japelli (2006) indicate that men are less willing to delegate their portfolio 
decisions, which may relate to their higher level of overconfidence in financial matters 
(Barber and Odean, 2000) or their generally higher degree of financial literacy. Both 
Hackethal et al. (2012) and Bluethgen et al. (2008) find that men seek advice less often; 
they also indicate that age, account volume, self-employment, and investment experience 
relate positively to advice seeking. Although Bhattacharya et al. (2012) find a positive 
relationship between male gender and advice seeking, they confirm the positive relations 
with age and portfolio value. Older investors may opt for financial advice to compensate 
for their cognitive aging (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). Elmerick et al. (2002) find that the 
likelihood of using a financial planner relates positively to educational achievement, 
income, and wealth and negatively to self-employment or being a married man. Self-
employed people may be accustomed to making decisions independently; high income and 
high wealth investors likely have higher opportunity costs of time, which induces them to 
ask for assistance. Hung and Yoong (2010) find being married increases the propensity to 
seek advice. Therefore, we include the following socio-economic variables as controls in 
our multivariate analysis: gender, age, education, occupation, household composition, 
income, portfolio value, and investment experience. 
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Degree of Financial Literacy, Cognitive Ability, and Advice Seeking 
In Table 5.II we provide an overview of responses to the eight literacy questions (see also 
Figure 5.1). Although some of the questions may be considered difficult, the investors in 
our sample did remarkably well. The proportions of advised and self-directed investors 
that answered seven or eight of the eight questions correctly (Panel B, Table 5.II) were 
47% and 43%, respectively, considerably higher than in similar studies. Only 11% of 
respondents answered no, one, or two questions correctly. The questions answered 
correctly by the largest majority (approximately 85%) were those on asset volatility and 
diversification (questions 7 and 8). The two most difficult questions refer to the 
determinants of bond prices and assets returns (questions 3 and 6). These results are 
similar to van Rooij et al.’s (2011a), though the respondents in our sample score much 
better.   
The higher degree of financial literacy among our respondents, compared with other 
studies, likely is due to our sample selection process. We drew our sample from a group of 
households that already participate in financial markets; most other studies use samples 
from households in general. It seems reasonable that those who participate in financial 
markets are more financially literate than those who do not, such that the average literacy 
in our sample should be higher. 
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A significantly greater proportion of self-directed investors answer some questions (1 and 
2) incorrectly, compared with advised investors, though the proportion of self-directed 
investors who answer “don’t know” is generally lower. Another notable pattern (Panel B, 
Table 5.II) is the slight U-shaped relationship between financial advice seeking and the 
number of correct answers: Advised investors are overrepresented in the groups that 
answer only a few (zero, one, or two) and that answer the most (seven or eight) questions 
correctly. The self-directed group is overrepresented in the middle category (three–five 
questions answers correctly): 32% of the self-directed investors are in this middle category, 
as opposed to only 23% of the advised group, and the difference is significant at the 5% 
level (t-statistic = 1.95). This finding may offer a preliminary indication that advisors cater 
to both the least and the most literate, serving as a substitute for the least and a 
complement for the most literate. We address this issue in more detail in the multivariate 
analysis in Section 5.4.4. 
To obtain a score on financial literacy for each respondent, we perform a factor analysis 
similar to van Rooij et al. (2011a). We also use information contained in the difference 
between incorrect answers and “don’t know” answers. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b) show 
that those who answer “don’t know” are different from other respondents: They are less 
likely to plan and succeed in a planning effort, even compared with those who give an 
incorrect answer. We therefore constructed two dummies for each of the questions. The 
first dummy indicates whether the question was answered correctly, and the second refers 
to “don’t know” responses. From a factor analysis of these 16 dummies, we retained one 
key factor underlying the level of financial literacy. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of 
sampling adequacy (Kaiser, 1970) returned a value of 0.823, which indicates that factor 
analysis was appropriate. In addition, in Appendix 5.A we provide the factor loadings for 
our 16 variables. The use of a single factor to indicate literacy also was confirmed by a 
scree plot, which displays a point of inflexion after one factor (Field, 2005). We use the 
Bartlett (1937) method to determine factor scores for each respondent in our sample, 
which indicate their measured financial literacy. This variable ranged from -3.25 to 0.84.  
Table 5.III provides the results of the cognitive test. Of the three questions, the bat and ball 
problem is by far the most difficult, and only about 35% of respondents gave the correct 
answer. The machines and lake problems were answered correctly by approximately 50% 
and 62%, respectively. No clear differences arose between advised and self-directed 
investors; questions 1 and 2 were answered correctly slightly more often by advised 
investors, but self-directed investors scored a little better on problem 3.  
In Panel B of Table 5.III, we provide an overview of the distribution of correct answers; it 
is remarkably well spread out over the four categories. On average, the respondents 
provided 1.48 correct answers, more than the average of 1.24 reported by Frederick 
(2005). Although no significant difference in the mean score between advised and self-
directed investors became apparent, we observed a slight U-shape, similar to that in the 
distribution of literacy questions. Advised investors were overrepresented in the low (zero 
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correct) and high (three correct) cognitive groups; self-directed investors were 
overrepresented in the middle (one or two correct). 
 
 
Table 5.IV contains the overview of perceived financial literacy. Many respondents opted 
for the middle category, yet some interesting patterns still emerge. First, the mean 
perceived literacy score for advised investors was 3.95, significantly less than the 4.39 
score by self-directed investors (t-statistic = -2.94). Second, the proportion of advised 
investors nearly monotonically decreased in perceived financial literacy. In the “very little” 
category, 80% of respondents sought advice, but only 43% of them did so in the “very 
much” category.  When confronting perceived literacy to actual literacy, we observe that 
the mean perceived literacy score increases when moving up the actual financial literacy 
scores. The difference in the perceived literacy score between the highest and the lowest 
financial literacy quartile is 1.73 (t-statistic = 9.19). For cognitive ability scores a similar 
pattern is visible:  investors with higher cognitive ability scores, rate their own financial 
literacy significantly higher that the low cognitive able.  
In Table 5.V we detail the correlation between our key dependent and independent 
variables. The correlation between advice seeking and perceived literacy was significantly 
negative (rho = -0.14, p = 0.00). There were significant positive correlations between 
perceived literacy and measured financial literacy (rho = 0.44, p = 0.00); perceived literacy 
and cognitive ability (rho = 0.22, p = 0.00); and measured financial literacy and cognitive 
ability (rho = 0.29, p = 0.00), which should come as no surprise. Hung et al. (2009b)  
ADV SD ADV-SD ADV SD
ADV-
SD ADV SD
ADV-
SD
1. Bat and ball problem 37.7 33.3 4.4 59.1 65.0 -5.8 3.1 1.7 3.1
2. Machines problem 50.6 48.7 1.9 46.3 48.7 -2.4 3.1 2.6 3.1
3. Lake problem 61.1 63.2 -2.2 33.9 29.9 3.9 5.1 6.8 5.1
ADV SD ADV-SD
None Correct 22.6 20.6 2.0 58.1 24.1 82.1 0.707 0.293
1 Correct 21.8 23.4 -1.6 55.9 27.3 83.3 0.672 0.328
2 Correct 30.5 35.5 -5.0 78.5 41.6 120.0 0.654 0.346
3 Correct 25.1 20.6 4.5 64.5 24.1 88.6 0.728 0.272
Mean # correct 1.49 1.45 0.04
Table 5.III.  Cognitive Ability Score
This tables reports the proportion of advised (ADV) and self-directed (SD) investors providing correct,
incorrect and "don't know" answers to 3 cognitive ability questions. Panel B reports the distribution of the
number of correct answers for both advised and self-directed investors. ***, **, * denote significance at the
1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Percentages of total number of respondents
Panel B: Number of correct answers, percentages of respondents that are advised or self-directed.
% correct % Incorrect % Don't know
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indicate that cognitive ability supports financial literacy and that though people think they 
know more than they actually do, actual and perceived knowledge are positively, 
moderately correlated. Our data support these claims.  
 
To validate our individual financial literacy and cognitive ability scores, we contrasted the 
three measures with investor characteristics (Table 5.VI). The chi-square of advice seeking 
related to our literacy and cognitive ability measures was significant only for perceived 
financial literacy. In addition, the results in Table 5.VI indicate patterns in the distribution 
of socio-economic variables. Specifically, educational achievement was significantly 
associated with the propensity to seek advice; those with the least education were least 
inclined to seek expert help. Investors in low education groups also scored significantly 
lower on both financial literacy and cognitive ability tests, so this finding may indicate that 
those who might benefit the most from advice use it the least. Other significant differences 
included gender (women used expert help more often than men) and age (investors older 
N % ADV SD 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 0 1 2 3
1 "very little" 30 6.4   80.0 20.0 63.3 16.7 20.0 0.0 52.2 17.4 17.4 13.0
2 44 9.4   75.0 25.0 45.5 25.0 18.2 11.4 38.2 17.6 32.4 11.8
3 67 14.3 76.1 23.9 38.8 26.9 19.4 14.9 32.0 16.0 36.0 16.0
4 125 26.8 67.2 32.8 20.8 32.8 31.2 15.2 24.3 23.3 31.1 21.4
5 104 22.3 72.1 27.9 12.5 24.0 29.8 33.7 21.7 26.5 30.1 21.7
6 69 14.8 58.0 42.0 8.7 17.4 42.0 31.9 12.5 19.6 32.1 35.7
7 "very much" 14 3.0   42.9 57.1 0.0 14.3 28.6 57.1 21.4 21.4 21.4 35.7
Don't Know 14 3.0   50.0 50.0 50.0 21.4 7.1 21.4 27.3 36.4 18.2 18.2
Mean Score 3.95 4.39 3.11 4.00 4.42 4.84 3.61 4.27 4.16 4.60
Difference (t-stat.)
1 this refers to measured financial literacy
Table 5.IV. Perceived Financial Literacy
Sample Investor Financial Literacy Quartiles1 Cognitive Ability Score
This table reports the proportion of advised (ADV) and self-directed (SD) investors indicating their perceived
financial literacy by answering the following question: "Financial literacy differs from person to person. How much
financial knowledge do you possess?" on a 7-point scale ranging from "very little" to "very much". Differences are
between the extreme ratings.
-1.73 (-9.19) -0.99 (-4.40)-0.44 (-2.94)
4.09
Advised Measured 
Financial Literacy
Perceived 
Financial Literacy Cognitive Ability
Advised 467 453 346
Measured Financial Literacy -0.01 453 346
Perceived Financial Literacy -0.14*** 0.44*** 338
Cognitive Ability 0.01 0.29*** 0.22***
Table 5.V. Correlation Coefficient Matrix
This table presents correlation coefficients between key variables. Numbers above the diagonal are the sample sizes 
from which the correlation coefficients have been calculated. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5
percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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than 60 years used advice more often than younger investors). Household income revealed 
no significant relation with advice seeking, nor did investment experience. Portfolios of 
advised investors on average were twice as large as those of self-directed investors. Within 
these portfolios, advised investors allocated considerably more to mutual funds (57%) than 
self-directed investors did (28%). In addition, advised portfolios contained options much 
less frequently (3.8% vs. 6.8% for self-directed portfolios). 
The findings in Table 5.VI also confirm previous results regarding the relationship of 
socio-economic variables with financial literacy and cognitive ability. Literacy (measured 
and perceived) was positively associated with educational achievement, such that 57% 
(8%) of investors with little education ranked in the first (fourth) literacy quartile, and 
investors with college degrees were overrepresented in the third and fourth literacy 
quartiles (62%). A similar pattern emerged for cognitive ability groups. Among the least 
educated, 30% solved two or three problems correctly, a percentage which rose to 66% for 
those with more education. 
Gender correlated strongly with (measured and perceived) literacy and cognitive ability; 
men scored significantly higher on all three variables. Of the female (male) respondents, 
more than 46% (19%) fell into the lowest financial literacy quartile, 29% (13%) were in 
the lowest perceived literacy group, and 34% (19%) represented the lowest cognitive 
ability class. Although the chi-square of age in relation to literacy and ability was 
insignificant, we observed some consistency with previous studies that report hump-
shaped patterns in the relationship between cognitive abilities and age (Dohmen et al., 
2010, Korniotis and Kumar, 2011). Investors between 30 and 59 years of age were 
overrepresented in the higher literacy and ability groups; those 60 years and older scored 
lower. Similar to many other studies, income was significantly and positively associated 
with measured (perceived) financial literacy and cognitive ability: 56% (32%) of the 
households with the lowest earnings ranked in the lowest literacy group, and only 5% (7%) 
in the highest quartile. The corresponding numbers for the highest earning households 
were 11% (6%) and 29% (39%), respectively. We observed a similar pattern in the 
cognitive ability groups. 
Finally, regarding the relationships of investment-related data, literacy, and cognitive 
ability, we again uncovered some interesting patterns. First, experienced investors (more 
than five years of investment experience) scored significantly higher on (measured and 
perceived) financial literacy, which may indicate that literacy can be improved through 
interactions with financial markets, or else that more literate investors survive in the 
market longer. For the cognitive ability groups, we found no relation with experience. 
Portfolio size was considerably higher for more literate and cognitively able investors, 
namely, three times as large for investors in the highest literacy quartile. Within the 
portfolios of the most literate investors, derivatives appeared five times more often than in 
those owned by less literate investors. This difference rose to a factor of ten in the 
comparison pertaining to perceived literacy. 
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5.4.2. Impact of Financial Literacy and Cognitive Abilities on Advice Seeking  
To determine whether financial literacy and cognitive ability influence the propensity to 
seek expert help, we estimated various linear probability models.9 In Table 5.VII, we 
provide the results of our baseline estimations; they confirm results from prior studies on 
advice seeking (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2012; Bluethgren et al., 2008; Hackethal et al., 
2012). Less educated investors have a significantly lower propensity to seek advice; 
investors older than 60 years seek advice more often; portfolio size and being male relate 
positively to advice seeking.  
We also include our literacy and cognitive ability measures in Table 5.VII. Both measured 
financial literacy and cognitive ability were unrelated to financial advice seeking (columns 
2 and 4), but perceived financial literacy was strongly negatively associated with it 
(column 3), even after we added measured financial literacy and cognitive ability as 
additional regressors (column 5). It appears that how much people think they know matters 
more than how much they actually know, consistent with the competence hypothesis 
(Heath and Tversky, 1991). In line with Parker et al. (2011) we thus show that confidence 
matters more for behavior than actual knowledge. In column 6 we used an instrumental 
variable approach to control for possible reverse causality and confirmed the insignificant 
effect of measured financial literacy. Appendix 5.B contains the results of the underlying 
first-stage regression. Measured financial literacy related significantly positively to being 
self-employed, being male, having investment experience, and portfolio value; it related 
negatively to less education. Two instruments based on the amount of formal education in 
economics strongly predicted financial literacy, in the expected direction. We also could 
confirm our instrument relevance with an F-statistic for the excluded instruments equal to 
11.18; they pass the Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions with a p-value of 0.34.  
5.4.3. Adding Preferences 
Thus far, we have not taken heterogeneity in preferences into consideration, though 
preferences vary considerably and have significant effects on choice behavior. Therefore, 
preferences should be additional drivers of financial advice seeking, and excluding them 
from our estimations may lead to incorrect inferences as a result of omitted variables bias. 
We therefore included risk tolerance, time preference, regret aversion, and trust as 
additional controls in our analysis. 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) show that the level of trust affects economic 
decisions in general; Georagakos and Inderst (2011) specifically indicate that trust in  
                                                     
9
 A probit model is usually preferred for a bivariate dependent variable. We performed all the estimations using 
a probit model and achieved qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. The use of linear probability models 
is advocated with an instrumental variables technique; for example, Freedman and Sekhon (2010) state that 
nonlinearity in a probit model is an essential difficulty for a two-step correction. The error term of a linear 
probability may suffer from heteroskedasticity. Therefore, we used heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in all 
reported estimations. 
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OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Literacy and Cognitive Abilities
Measured Financial Literacy -0.01 0.00 -0.12
(0.79) (0.90) (0.35)
Perceived Financial Literacy -0.05*** -0.06***
(0.00) (0.00)
Cognitive Abilities 0.00 0.01
(0.88) (0.71)
Education (base group is higher vocational or University)
Primary or preparatory  intermediate vocational -0.17** -0.18** -0.21*** -0.17** -0.19** -0.24**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
Higher secondary education or secondary pre-university -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.04
(0.60) (0.60) (0.77) (0.63) (0.81) (0.63)
Intermediate vocational 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07
(0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.26) (0.21) (0.24)
Age (Base group: age<40)
Age 40-49 0.08 0.08 0.06 -0.07 -0.06 0.12
(0.54) (0.53) (0.63) (0.62) (0.66) (0.38)
Age 50-59 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.11
(0.47) (0.46) (0.43) (0.95) (0.95) (0.37)
Age >=60 0.25** 0.25** 0.25** 0.15 0.17 0.27**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.27) (0.20) (0.03)
Retired -0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.05
(0.29) (0.30) (0.13) (0.01) (0.01) (0.49)
Self-employed -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.14 -0.04
(0.28) (0.30) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.72)
Employee 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.05
(0.79) (0.77) (0.98) (0.45) (0.48) (0.51)
Income (base group: >100.000)
Income<33.000 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.05
(0.32) (0.34) (0.79) (0.16) (0.55) (0.57)
Income 33.000-<50.000 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02
(0.55) (0.56) (0.26) (0.71) (0.48) (0.74)
Income 50.000-<100.000 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 0.00
(0.51) (0.54) (0.33) (0.29) (0.23) (0.96)
Kids -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04
(0.53) (0.53) (0.62) (0.24) (0.27) (0.46)
Married 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.05
(0.25) (0.26) (0.35) (0.68) (0.85) (0.39)
Male -0.10** -0.10* -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03
(0.05) (0.07) (0.19) (0.41) (0.59) (0.77)
Experienced -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.02
(0.85) (0.88) (0.59) (1.00) (0.41) (0.73)
ln (Portfolio value) 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Constant 0.15 0.14 0.38* 0.35 0.55** -0.04
(0.49) (0.53) (0.09) (0.15) (0.03) (0.88)
R2 0.104 0.104 0.130 0.115 0.136 0.063
Number of observations 454 454 440 338 330 454
F-Statistic Excluded Instruments 11.18
Hansen J test p-Value 0.596
p-value exogeniety test 0.339
Table 5.VII. The Impact of Financial Literacy and Cognitive Ability on Financial Advice Seeking, Baseline Results
This table presents coefficient estimates of various linear probability models on measures of financial literacy and
cognitive abilities. De dependent variable is a dummy where 0 corresponds to investors that invest by means of execution-
only, and 1 to investors that ask for financial expert-help at the bank of our sample or at any other bank. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-values in parentheses based on robust
standard errors.
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financial advice affects stock market participation, especially for less literate investors. 
Trust therefore may directly affect the decision to ask for help. Guiso and Japelli (2006) 
find that trust is positively associated with portfolio delegation. We include two trust 
variables in our analysis, adapted from the World Values Survey. Specifically, we asked 
about respondents’ degree of agreement (seven-point scale, 1 = “totally disagree” to 7 = 
“totally agree”) with two statements: (1) “Most people can be trusted” (which we label 
“trust general”) and (2) “Most financial advisors can be trusted” (“trust advice”). 
Willingness to take risk also is heterogeneous across people (Dohmen et al., 2011) and 
advised investors tend to be more risk averse (Bluethgen et al., 2008; Gerhardt and 
Hackethal, 2009). Dohmen et al. (2010) use a survey question to measure risk aversion 
and show that it predicts behavior especially well when asked in reference to specific 
domains, such as financial matters. Lönnqvist et al. (2010) find the survey measure more 
reliable than a lottery choice task to assess appetites for risk (Holt and Laury, 2002). We 
therefore used a survey measure from Dohmen et al. (2011), measured on a seven-point 
scale: “How would you rate your willingness to take risks in financial matters?”  
Simonson (1992) indicates strong correlation between regret and responsibility. We 
consider advice seeking a responsibility-shifting mechanism that helps the investor protect 
against the feelings of regret. Shefrin (2002) argues that handholding is the one of the most 
important services an advisor provides; if the investment decision turns out poorly, 
investors have the option of blaming the advisor. Therefore we included a question to 
assess the degree of regret aversion on a seven-point scale: “Image that your zip code wins 
a large price in the zip code lottery,10 how much regret would you feel if you did not 
purchase a lottery ticket?” 
Time preference relates to impatience and also may drive advice-seeking. Impatient people 
should be more likely to invest through an execution-only platform, because its barriers to 
executing investment decisions are lower, compared with contacting a financial advisor 
first, discussing the proposed trade, and then having it executed. To keep the survey length 
acceptable, we used one time preference trade-off as a rough approximation of the degree 
of impatience. Frederick (2005) found a large intergroup difference for the choice between 
€3.400 this month or €3.800 next month; both amounts and the difference between them 
were considerable,11 but there is also a clearly rational choice, such that the impatient 
choice implies an annual discount rate of 280%. 
In the lower panel of Table 5.VI we provide the scores on the preference questions: 
Advised investors scored lower on both risk tolerance and regret aversion but higher on 
                                                     
10
 The Dutch Zip Code Lottery provides a unique platform to measure regret. Even if people do not buy a 
lottery ticket, they receive a lottery number (i.e., their zip code). Thus people know the outcome of their 
decision, even if they do not participate, which may induce feelings of regret. 
11
 Almost 80% of our respondents indicated a gross household income of less than €100,000 per year, which 
implies a net monthly income of approximately €4,000. 
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both trust variables. Although most respondents made the patient choice in the time 
preference question, more advised investors made the impatient choice. More literate and 
cognitively able investors were much more risk tolerant (Frederick, 2005), suffer less from 
regret aversion, and score higher on trust measures. These findings indicated that in 
estimating the effect of financial literacy and cognitive abilities on the choice to ask for 
financial expert help, preferences serve an important explanatory role. 
 
 
In Table 5.VIII we provide the results for our estimations, after adding the preference 
controls. As expected, risk tolerance was significantly and negatively associated with 
advice-seeking behavior. Time preference showed a positive association; contrary to our 
expectations, impatient investors chose advice more often. Trust in general bore no relation 
to propensity to ask for help, whereas trust in advisors indicated a positive association 
(Guiso and Japelli, 2006). Causality may run in both directions though: People who place 
more trust in advisors may be more inclined to hire one, and having an advisor may 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measured Financial Literacy 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.13
(0.84) -0.54 (0.75) (0.52)
Perceived Financial Literacy -0.03* -0.03* -0.03
(0.07) (0.05) (0.17)
Cognitive Abilities 0.01 0.01
(0.68) (0.63)
Risk Tolerance -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.28)
Time Preference 0.14* 0.14* 0.21** 0.13 0.20** 0.18*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03) (0.06)
Regret Aversion -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.36) (0.37) (0.65) (0.38) (0.75) (0.34)
Trust General -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.78) (0.80) (0.71) (0.82) (0.63) (0.64)
Trust Advice 0.04** 0.04** 0.05** 0.04* 0.04* 0.05**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Other controls (see table 5.VII) yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.156 0.159 0.179 0.160 0.181 0.107
Number of observations 418 410 317 410 312 418
F-Statistic Excluded Instruments 5.74
Hansen J test p-Value 0.413
p-value exogeniety test 0.467
Table 5.VIII. The Impact of Financial Literacy and Cognitive Abilities on Financial Advice 
Seeking, Adding Preferences
This table presents coefficient estimates of various linear probability models on measures of financial literacy
and cognitive abilities. De dependent variable is a dummy where 0 corresponds to investors that invest by
means of execution-only, and 1 to investors that ask for financial expert-help at the bank of our sample or at
any other bank. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
P-values in parentheses based on robust standard errors.
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increase trust. The most important finding from Table 5.VIII was that our main 
conclusions remained unaltered: Perceived financial literacy lowered the propensity to ask 
for expert assistance in portfolio decision making; measured financial literacy and 
cognitive ability were unrelated. 
5.4.4. Additional Results 
Our univariate results in Section 5.4.1 indicated a possible U-shaped pattern between 
advice seeking and both measured financial literacy and cognitive abilities. We therefore 
included a squared term for both variables in Table 5.IX.  
 
Although the signs for measured financial literacy supported the U-shaped relationship, the 
coefficients were insignificant. Using instruments for measured financial literacy (column 
3, Table 5.VII) made no difference. That is, measured financial literacy does not drive 
OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Measured Financial Literacy -0.15 -0.09
(0.14) (0.36)
Measured Financial Literacy Squared 0.03 0.02
(0.11) (0.38)
Cognitive Ability -0.13
(0.11)
Cognitive Ability Squared 0.04*
(0.06)
Cognitive Ability=1 -0.08
(0.27)
Cognitive Ability=2 -0.07
(0.34)
Cognitive Ability=3 0.02
(0.75)
Other controls & preferences (see table 5.VIII) yes yes yes yes
R2 0.162 0.188 0.188 0.106
Number of observations 418 317 317 418
F-Statistic Excluded Instruments 9.67
p-value exogeniety test 0.530
Table 5.IX. The Impact of Financial Literacy and Cognitive Abilities on Financial Advice 
Seeking, Adding Squared Terms and Dummies
This table presents coefficient estimates of various linear probability models on measures of financial
literacy and cognitive abilities. De dependent variable is a dummy where 0 corresponds to investors
that invest by means of execution-only, and 1 to investors that ask for financial expert-help at the
bank of our sample or at any other bank. Ijn column 3, the base group is a cognitive ability of 0. ***,
**, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-values in
parentheses based on robust standard errors.
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financial advice-seeking behavior, nor is financial advice an adequate solution to substitute 
for a lack of financial literacy. Adding the squared term of cognitive ability confirmed the 
U-shaped pattern (column 2), though it was significant only for the squared term. To 
assess the robustness of this result, we added a specification with three cognitive ability 
dummies (column 3). The signs were in line with the U-shaped relationship, but the 
coefficients were not significant. Therefore we conclude, that for both measured financial 
literacy and cognitive ability, neither a linear nor a U-shaped relationship could be 
observed.  
The help-seeking group consisted of two possible types of advice, so we also repeated our 
estimations separately for the two relevant subsamples (see Table 5.X). In Panel A, we 
provide results for portfolios of less than €100,000; they are basically unaltered. Only 
perceived financial literacy was negatively associated with advice seeking. In Panel B, the 
results for investors with portfolios of more than €100,000 (i.e., excluding those who opted 
for delegated portfolio management) reflected a drastically reduced sample size, with 
decreased significance levels, but they still generally confirmed our previous findings. 
5.4.5. Financial Literacy, Cognitive Ability, and Perceptions of Advice Seeking 
To determine what drives the negative relationship between perceived financial literacy 
and the propensity to ask for financial expert help, we analyzed three additional questions 
that appeared in our survey. First, we asked investors which information sources they used 
in their investment decisions. Second, we asked them about their motives for hiring an 
advisor or not. Third, we measured perceptions of financial advice and execution-only 
investing.  
The overview in Table 5.XI pertains to information sources used by advised and unadvised 
investors. A financial advisor was among the most frequently mentioned sources for 
advised investors, of course; they also used non-investment advisors significantly more. 
Self-directed investors relied on information from family and friends, as well as television, 
newspapers, and financial websites. This interesting result implies that advisors serve as a 
substitute source of information. Furthermore, we observe large differences in the 
information sources used by more and less financially literate people. The highest literacy 
quartile relies significantly more on all information sources, though the differences are 
even greater for non-advisor information sources. The least literate group most commonly 
indicated: “I don’t use any sources.” Thus, financially literate investors use all information 
sources more frequently, which even may drive their higher literacy. For cognitive ability, 
the group differences showed a similar pattern, though not as pronounced. In Table 5.XI, 
we note that financial websites were used significantly more often among the highest 
cognitive ability group; all other differences were insignificant. 
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Table 5.XII contains the overview of investors’ motives for choosing help or execution-
only investments. The most important reason investors ask for help (56% of advised 
investors) was their belief that advisors had more investment knowledge. Other important 
motives included portfolio monitoring (39%), finding relevant information (38%), creating 
a better portfolio (36%), and saving time (29%), consistent with economic theory. Thus, 
economies of scale in portfolio management and information acquisition, as well as the 
potentially better investment decision-making abilities of advisors, appear to help investors  
OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Measured Financial Literacy 0.00 -0.19
(0.91) (0.46)
Perceived Financial Literacy -0.06***
(0.01)
Cognitive Abilities 0.01
(0.70)
Other controls & preferences (see table VIII) yes yes yes yes
R2 0.157 0.171 0.203 0.057
Number of observations 289 283 219 289
F-Statistic Excluded Instruments 4.2
Hansen J test p-Value 0.345
p-value exogeniety test 0.406
Measured Financial Literacy -0.03 -0.14
(0.72) (0.81)
Perceived Financial Literacy -0.07
(0.13)
Cognitive Abilities 0.18*
(0.05)
Other controls & preferences (see table 5.VIII) yes yes yes yes
R2 0.274 0.306 0.336 0.258
Number of observations 71 71 51 71
F-Statistic Excluded Instruments 0.41
Hansen J test p-Value 0.728
p-value exogeniety test 0.836
Panel A:  Delegated Portfolio Management vs. Self-Directed
Panel B:  Advised vs. Self-Directed, and Portfolio Size > €100,000
Table 5.X. The Impact of Financial Literacy and Cognitive Abilities on Financial Advice 
Seeking, Subsamples.
This table presents results based on two subsamples. Panel A presents the coefficient estimates for the 
subsample of investors that choose for delegated portfolio management or execution-only; panel B is 
based on the subsample of investors that choose between financial advice or execution-only. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. P-values in 
parentheses based on robust standard errors.
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(Hackethal, et al., 2012). According to Stoughton et al. (2011), small investors use 
financial advisors to economize on information costs as well. Finally, advisors serve as 
stress relievers; “peace of mind” was mentioned by 32% of the respondents. This finding 
may relate to advisors’ ability to minimize regret (Shefrin, 2002). However, self-control 
(“an advisor makes sure that I put aside enough money”) appears to play no role. 
In contrast, entertainment or thrill-seeking motives (Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009) appeal 
to self-directed investors (Panel B, Table 5.XII); “investing on my own is more fun” was 
the second most important reason to opt for execution-only investing. The most important 
reason was a feeling of control over the portfolio. Agency issues leading to moral hazard 
behaviors were not major drivers for these execution-only respondents, but cost 
considerations were. Only 19% of the respondents indicated conflicts of interest with an 
advisor as a major reason to opt for execution-only, while 30% indicated lower costs. 
When relating these motives to (perceived) financial literacy and cognitive ability, some 
interesting patterns emerged. Literate investors regarded advisors as a sounding board in 
their investment decisions (Panel A, column 7, Table 5.XII), consistent with the idea that 
advisors provide complementary sources of information for literate investors. Time saving 
was a more important motive for more literate investors, who may have higher time-
related opportunity costs. These investors also believe that advisors are better able to find 
relevant information (column 4), though those who perceive themselves to be more literate 
(column 7) are driven less by their belief in advisors’ greater investment knowledge. 
The three most important reasons for self-directed investing became especially pronounced 
among the more literate group (Panel B, Table 5.XII). Cost, control, and fun were critical 
to the most financially literate; the least literate mentioned “don’t know” as their motive 
more often. The differences between perceived literacy groups were similar but not 
significant. Those who perceived themselves as highly literate also perceived more 
potential conflict of interest problems (Column 7, Panel B) and believed they could invest 
just as well, or better, than a financial advisor. 
We applied a more robust test to the possible motives for this choice between advised and 
self-directed investing. In Table 5.XIII we list the estimates of the effects of financial 
literacy and cognitive abilities on perceptions of (dis)advantages of investing execution-
only or with help. We used six statements related to the (dis)advantages of execution-only 
and six statements about the (dis)advantages of financial advice. The exact wording and 
univariate statistics appear in Appendix 5.C.  
Perceived literacy (Panel B, Table 5.XIII) better explained the degree of agreement with 
all 12 statements than did measured financial literacy (Panel A) or cognitive abilities 
(Panel C). When we included the three literacy and ability variables in our specifications 
simultaneously (Panel D), perceived literacy emerged as the main driver of beliefs. 
Perceived financial literacy was positively associated with the judgment of advantages of  
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execution-only (statements 1–3) and negatively with its disadvantages (statements 4–6). It 
related negatively to advantages of a financial advisor (statement 7–9) but not to 
judgments of possible disadvantages (statements 10 and 12).  
The findings in this table also imply that people with lower self-assessed literacy believe 
advisors make better decisions (statement 8), have more information (statement 9), and 
think that investing on their own would lead to more investment mistakes (statement 4) 
and more risks (statement 6). Advisors thus serve a substitute role mainly for those who 
think they lack financial knowledge. Investors with higher self-assessed literacy believe in 
the advantages of being self-directed: It is fun and grants more control to the investor. 
5.5. Conclusions and Discussion 
We found self-reported evidence that advisors serve a substitute role. Advised investors 
use various information sources (other than advisors) significantly less than self-directed 
investors. A substitute role for advice would predict a negative linear relationship between 
financial literacy or cognitive ability and the propensity to seek expert help. We found no 
such relationship for measured financial literacy and cognitive ability, but there was strong 
evidence that perceived financial literacy negatively affected the choice to use expert help, 
even when we controlled for actual knowledge.  
Perceived financial literacy also explained significant differences in the beliefs about the 
advantages and disadvantages of advised and self-directed investing. People who assess 
their own financial knowledge as lower agree more about the advantages of financial 
advice and the disadvantages of being self-directed. These findings confirm the role of 
advisors as substitutes when investors think they lack the financial literacy needed to make 
sound financial decisions, in line with the competence hypothesis (Heath and Tversky, 
1991). If people feel more competent (perceive literacy as higher), they rely more on their 
own judgment (execution-only).  
Although we found no relationship of measured financial literacy or cognitive ability with 
financial advice-seeking behavior, advisors clearly served different roles for more and less 
literate and cognitively able investors. Investors with higher literacy and cognitive ability 
rated the “sounding board” function of advice higher, which implies a substitute role. The 
time-saving function of advice also was more relevant for literate investors. When 
investors lacked cognitive abilities, advisors instead served as stress relievers and means to 
avoid investment mistakes.  
For policy makers, these findings have several relevant implications. Financial institutions 
offering investment services to retail investors must assess the suitability and 
appropriateness of any financial service or product for the individual client. The creation of 
an appropriate client profile should include self-assessed levels of investment expertise, 
because it relates strongly to perceptions, motives, and choice, and thus could help identify 
appropriate services for different perceived literacy groups.  
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In addition, there is an ongoing debate about whether financial advice actually provides 
help by substituting for a lack of financial literacy or cognitive ability. Our findings 
indicate it does not; neither financial literacy nor cognitive ability exhibit a relationship 
with the propensity to seek financial advice. Financial advice thus appears to be an 
inadequate mechanism to assist those who need it the most.  
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Question Answer Factor Loadings
Correct 0.605
Don't Know -0.708
Correct 0.646
Don't Know -0.754
Correct 0.469
Don't Know -0.599
Correct 0.699
Don't Know -0.666
Correct 0.674
Don't Know -0.688
Correct 0.538
Don't Know -0.526
Correct 0.675
Don't Know -0.636
Correct 0.541
Don't Know -0.599
7. Normally, which asset displays the highest fluctuations over 
time?
8. What happens to the risk of losing money when an investors 
spreads money among different assets?
Appendix 5.A. Factor Loadings Financial Literacy Questions
1. Which statement describes the main function of the stock 
market?
2. Which statement about mutual funds is correct?
3. What should happen to bond prices if interest rates fall?
4. Buying a company stock usually provides a safer return than a 
stock mutual fund that invests worldwide?
5. Stocks are normally safer than bonds, true or false
6. Considering a long time period, which asset normally gives the 
highest return?
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(1) (2)
Instruments (Base Group: Little Economics Education)
A lot of Economics Education 0.43*** 0.29***
(0.00) (0.00)
Some Economics Education 0.32*** 0.18*
(0.00) (0.05)
Education (Base group is higher vocational or University)
Primary or preparatory  intermediate vocational -0.58*** -0.62***
(0.00) (0.00)
Higher secondary education or secondary pre-university 0.05 0.07
(0.73) (0.60)
Intermediate vocational -0.16 -0.14
(0.15) (0.22)
Age (Base group: age<40)
Age 40-49 0.34 0.40*
(0.15) (0.07)
Age 50-59 0.18 0.25
(0.40) (0.23)
Age >=60 0.12 0.33
(0.61) (0.15)
Retired 0.25 -0.05
(0.19) (0.77)
Self-employed 0.49** 0.10
(0.02) (0.57)
Employee 0.31 0.02
(0.15) (0.91)
Income (Base group: >100.000)
Income<33.000 -0.24 -0.14
(0.23) (0.44)
Income 33.000-<50.000 0.13 0.13
(0.30) (0.30)
Income 50.000-<100.000 0.34*** 0.34***
(0.00) (0.00)
Kids -0.08 -0.05
(0.37) (0.62)
Married -0.13 -0.22*
(0.27) (0.05)
Male 0.57*** 0.43***
(0.00) (0.00)
Experienced 0.25** 0.28**
(0.04) (0.02)
ln (Portfolio value) 0.06*** 0.05**
(0.00) (0.01)
Risk Tolerance 0.16***
(0.00)
Time Preference 0.24
(0.20)
Regret aversion -0.00
(0.93)
Trust general -0.03
(0.34)
Trust in Adviser 0.06*
(0.07)
Constant -1.77*** -1.97***
(0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.321 0.378
Number of observations 454 418
F-Statistic Instruments 11.18 5.74
Appendix 5.B. First Stage Regressions on Measured Financial Literacy
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6.1 Summary of the Main Findings 
This thesis aims to enhance our knowledge of the value of advisors. Whether advisors 
provide added value is not clear a priori. They may improve financial decisions because 
they share their expertise or debias their clients. They may decrease the quality of their 
client’s financial decisions because they lack expertise, induce their own biases, or 
stimulate biased reasoning by their clients. In addition, their interests may conflict with the 
interests of their clients.  
To determine the added value of financial advisors, this thesis offers three empirical 
contributions. In two of them, I investigate the value of financial advisors in terms of 
portfolio composition, performance, and trading activity. In the third, I report on what 
retail investors have to say about their choice of hiring an advisor or not, then test whether 
an advisor actually corrects for a lack of financial literacy and/or cognitive abilities of the 
investor. As an introduction to these three empirical contributions, I provide a framework 
and literature overview. This summary describes each of the previous five chapters in 
more detail. 
Chapter 1 introduces economic and behavioral approaches to the study of investment 
decision making, the role(s) of financial advisors, and the specific elements of the 
environment in which the empirical studies take place. The economical approach provides 
a normative framework in which rationality, expected utility, and portfolio theory are key 
ingredients. The behavioral approach, which is descriptive in nature, uses people’s 
bounded rationality as a starting point. Boundedly rational agents make judgments and 
decisions that may be frame dependent and driven by heuristics. Also judgment and 
decision making are subject to emotions, self-attributes, self-deception, and social forces. 
Financial advisors serve several roles, such as financial economist, financial psychologist, 
personal advisor, relationship manager, salesperson, and teacher. In each advisory 
relationship, each role may be present to greater or lesser extents. The Dutch institutional 
environment is strongly influenced by the legal framework of the Dutch Wft and European 
MiFID, which distinguish investment advice from execution-only investment services 
when mandating the required level of due care. New institutional developments include the 
Dutch banking code (Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken [NVB], 2009) that requires 
CHAPTER 6 
150 
 
banks to put client interests first and a new financial markets directive (Dutch Ministry of 
Finance, 2012) that proposes a ban on commission sales and introduces a bankers’ oath. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview from the literature of previous empirical research on the 
actual behavior of individual investors. Although such behaviors naturally are rather 
heterogeneous, some stylized facts emerge about portfolio compositions, trading 
frequency, and buying and selling decisions. The portfolio of a typical retail investor is 
characterized by a limited amount of diversification, as a result of naïve diversification 
and/or proximity-driven investments (e.g., overweighing of own-company, local, own-
industry, or own-country stocks). Trading frequency may be either excessive, or an 
investor may not trade at all. Buying and selling behavior is influenced by various 
heuristics, emotions, and framing effects. Such behavioral induced effects are partly 
mitigated by introducing sophistication into portfolio decision making, while studies on the 
effects of advisory interventions provide mixed results. 
Chapter 3 is an empirical study comparing the investment portfolios held by advised and 
execution-only individual investors. The results indicate significant differences in their 
characteristics and portfolios but no evidence of differences in their risk-adjusted 
performance. Portfolios of advised investors are better diversified and carry significantly 
less idiosyncratic risk. In addition, an analysis of investors who switch to advice taking 
indicates that improved diversification reflects the effect of advisory intervention. After the 
advisory intervention, advised portfolios for example contain more mutual funds and more 
asset classes. 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of financial advisors on portfolio returns, risk, trading, 
and diversification. This chapter uses an improved methodological approach to deal with 
the self-selection bias that is inherent in any comparison of two groups whose members 
themselves choose to receive a treatment (advice) or not. With a more limited data set 
using individual stocks only, I facilitate this comparison. The Hausman-Taylor panel 
estimation technique is applied, which can solve the estimation of endogenous variables 
that are time invariant. These estimations confirm prior experimental results about the 
benefits of advisory interventions that control for moral hazard behavior and endogeneity 
as a result of self-selection. Advice marginally improves risk-adjusted equity returns and 
strongly reduces ideosyncratic risk. In addition, advisors reduce trading activity, as proxied 
by the frequency of trades.  
Chapter 5 is an analysis of survey data collected from a randomly selected, representative 
sample of Dutch retail investors. It aims to identify possible links between financial 
literacy, cognitive ability, and the propensity to seek help from financial experts. The 
chapter also provides evidence about drivers of advice seeking, according to retail 
investors. The main result indicates that perceived financial literacy is negatively 
associated with asking for help from financial experts. Apparently, people opt for advice 
when they believe they lack investment knowledge. Consistent with this finding, perceived 
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financial literacy negatively relates to the perceived advantages of advised investing and 
perceived disadvantages of execution-only investing. Financial advice thus serves a 
substitute role for people who view themselves as less financially literate. Furthermore, 
neither measured financial literacy nor cognitive ability relate to advice seeking, which 
implies that advice is not a sufficient remedy for less literate or cognitively able persons. 
Other interesting determinants of advice seeking emerge though: Less educated and more 
risk-tolerant investors exhibit a lower propensity to seek advice, whereas wealthy, older 
investors who place trust in advisors seek advice more often. Finally, I determine 
investors’ motivation to use a financial advisor. The main motivations relate to reduced 
information costs, in that they believe the advisor has more knowledge, creates a better 
portfolio, finds more relevant information, and saves time. People opt for execution only 
because it provides them with control over portfolio decisions, and because they believe it 
is more fun. 
6.2. Discussion  
Chapter 2 revealed that many households could benefit from guidance. Many people are 
poorly informed and make inferior financial decisions, which is driven by the complexity 
of financial decision making combined with poor financial capability and will power. 
Therefore, an important finding of this thesis is that financial advice may provide a helpful 
mechanism for improving investment decisions—though only, of course, for those who 
choose to take (and presumably follow) that advice. Those who may benefit the most from 
advisory expertise (i.e., those with financial literacy and/or cognitive abilities) are not 
necessarily more inclined to hire an advisor. Financial advice in and of itself thus is not 
enough a remedy for inferior financial decision making. I propose instead using financial 
advice within a broader framework designed to improve financial decisions. In addition to 
possible benefits of financial education and choice architecture, I offer some suggestions 
for improving the skills and value of financial advisors. 
6.2.1. Financial Education 
Financial literacy appears crucial to ensuring people have a financially healthy future. To 
improve financial knowledge and understanding, financial education seems a plausible 
remedy. But measuring the impact of such education is not easy, and evidence about its 
impact on behavior is mixed. Roa García (2011, p. 11) summarizes evidence on the effect 
of financial education: “rather than the differences in financial knowledge, it is 
psychological differences that underlie differences in individuals’ financial capabilities.” 
De Meza (2008) finds that financial capability is mainly a matter of psychology, which 
implies a relatively modest effect of information-based approaches. Financial education 
requires the motivation to learn and a certain level of cognitive ability. If courses are not 
compulsory, people may not be motivated to join; if they are compulsory, people may not 
pay attention. Even if people join, pay attention, understand the material, and intend to use 
it, they still may not change their behavior. Financial education even could cause harm, in 
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that it fosters overconfidence. Highly educated finance specialists make mistakes and 
exhibit biased behavior too, in anecdotal support of my assertion that education alone is 
not enough.  
However, contrasting evidence indicates that long-lasting, continued exposures at an early 
age to financial information encourages the internalization of knowledge and thus 
improves financial decisions later in life. Financial literacy programs during mandatory 
school years might be an appealing idea. Financial education programs appear to have 
greater effects when received over time, such as through five- to seven-year mandatory 
programs taught in schools. De Meza (2008) finds that in the United States, long-term 
compulsory financial education grew more effective the longer it was in place, though he 
recognizes other possible reasons that behavioral changes result from mandatory financial 
literacy programs.  
The form of the educational intervention makes a huge difference as well. Based on a 
randomized control experiment, Drexler, et al. (2010) provide evidence on improved 
financial behavior and outcomes that result from rule-of-thumb financial literacy training, 
while no effect emerges from traditional courses. People are thus inclined to change 
behavior when exposed to simple, sensible, easy-to-implement and practical rules. In a 
similar vein, Roa García (2011) suggests ways to enhance the effect of educational 
interventions: Students must gain experience by putting their lessons into practice, 
education programs must be complemented with protection policies, and education must 
be ongoing.  
6.2.2. Choice Architecture. 
Sunstein and Thaler (2003) introduced the concepts of choice architecture and libertarian 
paternalism. Choice architects organize the context in which people make decisions. 
Presenting choice options to patients or clients makes a doctor or advisor a choice 
architect, such as when they design enrollment forms (e.g., for the company healthcare or 
retirement plan). Choice architects become libertarian paternalists if they attempt to steer 
people's choices in welfare-promoting directions, without eliminating freedom of choice. 
They benefit greatly if they are equipped with a good understanding of bounded rationality 
and bounded self-control findings. 
A powerful steering device (or so-called nudge) is the default choice method. Default 
choices work because people prefer to remain in their current situation, due to their status 
quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1998), which leads to inertia and procrastination. 
Default choices also work because of an endorsement effect, in the sense that the default 
provides implicit advice about what is the wise decision. Johnson and Goldstein (2003) 
find strong evidence of the power of default options outside the financial domain: 
Enrollment in European organ donation programs was 97% for countries that made 
enrollment the default option but only 18% in other countries.  
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An interesting application using choice architecture, developed by Thaler and Benartzi 
(2004), is the Save More Tomorrow retirement plan. People hate to lose (i.e., do not want 
their paychecks to decrease), so the saving in this plan is financed by raises. Increases in 
saving rates (paid from future wage increases) are automatic, such that the plan uses 
people’s inertia to their own advantage. Because people also tend to discount future 
negative emotions, signing up for a plan that involves future, rather than immediate, 
payments mitigates self-control issues. Combining the plan with automatic enrollment has 
led to its great success, such that a majority of eligible people “decided” to join, and saving 
rates increased dramatically. Default options also might be effective in nonretirement 
saving and investment decisions. When opening an account, a sensible default might be 
that whenever the current account reaches a certain limit (e.g., twice the average monthly 
expenses), any surplus is automatically transferred to a savings account. Then when the 
savings account reaches a certain limit (e.g., six times the average monthly expenses), any 
surplus gets transferred to an investment account with a sensible asset allocation to low 
cost investment funds. At any time, these “choices” can be reversed, stopped, or altered, 
which ensures freedom of choice. However, one caveat cannot be overlooked: From a 
micro perspective, such a default product provides evident benefits, but from a macro 
perspective, it may introduce systemic risks in case it operates for large amounts of people 
at the same time. 
Choice architecture also could apply to the development of products. Designing sensible, 
simple, transparent, and low cost investment products with just a few choice options may 
help people overcome their hesitation about investing. A Dutch financial intermediary 
called “Brand New Day” offers a good example. It offers a simple Internet-based 
investment product that requires only two choices: the initial and/or periodical amount to 
be invested, and the relative allocation to fixed income investment (i.e., a low cost, triple 
A, Euro government inflation-linked bond fund), with the rest invested in a low cost, 
global equity index fund. The default investment horizon is 20 years, but it can be adapted 
if desired. Ten years before this horizon is reached, the product invests at least 55% in 
fixed income, then increases the fixed income allocation automatically by 5% each year. 
Although more optimal portfolios, strategies, and/or products may exist, for many private 
investors, such a product may be very beneficial, in that it helps them to mitigate inertia 
and procrastination by reducing choice complexity and choice overload.  
De Meza (2008) advocates sensible, easy-to-remember rules of thumb as good nudges. 
Simple slogans may shift norms and thus change behavior, as did the phrases “don’t drink 
and drive” or “safe sex” in other contexts. Warnings added to financial advertisements, 
like “borrowing is costly” or “past performance is no guarantee of future results,” may 
have similar benefits. Other sensible rules of thumb might “pop up” when investors 
execute an online trade. Whether such nudges really help is an empirical question that 
needs further inquiry, but the evidence of Drexler, et al. (2010) on rule-of-thumb financial 
CHAPTER 6 
154 
 
literacy training, provides preliminary support for the positive effect of easy-to-remember 
rules as nudges.  
6.2.3. Improving Financial Advice 
This thesis concludes that financial advice has the potential to improve investors’ 
decisions. In turn, there are benefits to be gained from improved training of advisors and 
changing their incentives. 
The current education of financial advisors typically aims at improving financial-
economic, social, and commercial skills. In describing the roles of financial advisors in 
Chapter 1, I introduced the “financial psychologist,” who can help investors assess their 
susceptibility to judgment and decision-making biases, as well as provide ways to mitigate 
them. Adding investor psychology to the education curricula of advisors may help them 
accomplish that role better.  
Debiasing is typically successful when people confront quick, unambiguous feedback. In 
financial decision making, feedback instead tends to be slow, such that it can take years to 
determine the outcome of a retirement portfolio decision, while outcomes also depend on 
factors outside the investor’s control. Shefrin (2007) therefore notes that mitigating biases 
is not easy; it requires an explicit procedure, discipline, and effort. Kahneman and Riepe 
(1998) provide some practical help to attain discipline: Ask yourself what may go wrong, 
keep track of all unsuccessful efforts, and list all reasons the proposed trade is not a 
random choice (see also Appendix 1.A, Chapter 1). 
A first step in a debiasing strategy may be for advisors to recognize their own biases, 
which requires them to overcome their bias against recognizing their own biases. 
Nofsinger (2011) states that recognizing one’s biases (and those of others) is an important 
step for avoiding them. Although financial advisors may already be aware of the existence 
of decision-making fallacies in financial matters, such awareness does not automatically 
eliminate their judgmental biases. A nice illustration comes from the well-known Müller-
Lyer optical illusion (Nofsinger, 2005, p.2). Even when a viewer knows that two 
horizontal lines are of the same length, one of the two still looks longer. Cognitive illusions 
are not easily eliminated, because the underlying psychological phenomena are deeply 
ingrained in human brains and result from automatic “system I” processes (Kahneman, 
2011). It thus is safe to assume that advisors are not free from biases in their judgment and 
decision making. For example, they may be just as overconfident as laypeople or are 
susceptible to framing and anchoring effects. Investor psychology training may help both 
clients and advisors realize their own limitations. Some success in debiasing financial 
advisors has come from having advisors attend lectures on investor psychology (Kaustia 
and Pettula, 2011). 
If they know more about investor psychology, advisors also may be better equipped to 
assess their clients’ risk attitudes. Before building a portfolio, the advisor’s main goal 
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should be to get a clear picture of the investor. It is standard practice to assess investment 
goals and horizons, investor knowledge, experience, and risk attitudes before any advisory 
relationship begins. Specific personality traits may be equally important. For example, in 
assessing how a client perceives risk, advisors should recognize that risk may be perceived 
as volatility or as downside risk, the risk of losing money, the amount of money that may 
be maximally lost, or the risk of not reaching a specified goal. In this respect, Kahneman 
(2009) notes the “the myth of risk attitudes” and the importance of a temporal perceptive. 
Financial advisors should help clients perceive their future emotions when they experience 
various outcomes, which may deviate considerably from their perceptions at the moment 
of the decision. Assessing their propensity for regret is a key aspect; others include the 
degree of overconfidence, optimism, loss aversion, or use of mental accounts. 
To improve financial advice, the current incentive structure of advisors also needs 
attention. Many academics believe that an important deterrent to unbiased financial advice 
is the way advisors are paid: They receive kickback fees from financial product suppliers 
or charge commissions on a trade. Although current legislation requires advisors to be 
transparent about the fees they receive, it may not help much. A recent survey by the 
Dutch Financial Markets Authority (AFM, 2012) indicated that 73% of advised customers 
had no clue about the costs of advising. More promising than transparency rules may be a 
change to the incentives of advisors. A proposed ban in the Netherlands on sales 
commission is promising, though it could come at some cost. Practitioners have suggested 
introducing hourly or fixed annual fees as two ways to adapt their remuneration model, 
though such cost transparency may limit the number of people who seek advice, such that 
they lean toward execution-only trades, which may cause more damage. Fixed annual fees 
also create an incentive for advisors to be inert, while hourly fees give them an incentive to 
pay too much attention to any single investor’s portfolio.  
6.3 Limitations and Further Research 
There are some important limitations of the empirical contributions of this thesis. First, 
using data about investors at only one bank in the Netherlands introduces a potential 
sample selection bias that limits the external validity of my findings. Specific investor 
characteristics may drive the choice to invest at this particular bank, and the specifics of 
the Dutch institutional environment or culture may influence the results. Second, advice is 
operationalized and limited to a dummy variable. Investors receive advice or they do not. 
Yet advice may take different forms, with varying frequency, by advisors with different 
characteristics and skills, and may or may not be followed. Third, the choice to receive 
advice creates a potential self-selection bias, as noted previously. Although the difference-
in-difference methodology in Chapter 3 and instrumental variable approach in Chapter 4 
both aim to address this issue, by using field data that was not collected for my own 
research purposes, it becomes difficult to satisfy the causality question fully. It should be 
complemented with more robust methods designed to control for self-selection. In the next 
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paragraphs, I suggest three complementary studies that address the concerns mentioned 
above. 
The gold standard for detecting treatment effects is a randomized (field) experiment 
(Antonakis et al., 2010). This ideal is often achieved in medical research, where the use of 
randomized, double-blind, and placebo-controlled trials is commonplace. Neither the 
subjects nor the doctors know who has been randomly assigned to the groups that receive 
the medicine or placebos. If executed properly, the health outcome differences after the 
experiment must be caused by the medicine. Such a research strategy could solve some of 
the limitations of my data set, though not all of them. In particular, when they receive a 
medication, patients have no discretion over the effects of the medicine, whereas recipients 
of financial advice have the option to ignore the advice, so an element of selection 
inherently remains. Hung and Yoong (2010) implement a randomized treatment laboratory 
study to the impact of financial advice, which may serve as a good starting point for an 
experimental study.  
Another promising research stream pertains to audit studies, which would provide in-depth 
analyses of what happens during advisory meetings. Such studies would require the 
recruitment of auditors who, after extensive training, take on roles as (potential) investor 
and visit banks for advisory meetings, without those financial advisors knowing that they 
are taking part in research. Such a research strategy is akin to mystery shopper techniques 
used in marketing. So far, to the best of my knowledge, only one such study has been 
executed (Mullainathan et al., 2012). 
Finally, in this thesis, the advisors themselves were not the subject of inquiry. It would be 
worthwhile to survey a group of financial advisors about what they believe their roles to 
be, their added value, and whether their advisory strategy is useful to their clients. This 
information also could be used to take advisor heterogeneity into consideration in various 
specifications.  
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
Dit proefschrift  heeft tot doel onze kennis over de waarde van beleggingsadviezen door 
beleggingsadviseurs voor particuliere beleggers te vergroten. Inzicht in die waarde is 
belangrijk. Veel huishoudens maken namelijk gebruik van de diensten van een adviseur bij 
het nemen van financiële beslissingen. Daarnaast is wereldwijd een tendens waar te nemen 
om de huishoudens zelf meer verantwoordelijk te maken voor hun financiële toekomst. Uit 
empirisch onderzoek naar het gedrag van huishoudens blijkt dat ze daarbij wel wat hulp 
kunnen gebruiken: veel huishoudens beschikken over een beperkte financiële kennis en 
nemen mede daardoor suboptimale financiële beslissingen. 
Het is niet op voorhand duidelijk of beleggingsadviezen van adviseurs waarde toevoegen 
of niet. Het is mogelijk dat adviseurs suboptimale beslissingen van particuliere beleggers 
weten te voorkomen omdat ze over meer financiële expertise beschikken. Het zou ook 
kunnen dat adviseurs minder goede beslissingen nemen of dat zij zelfs de suboptimale 
beslissingen van beleggers stimuleren. In dat geval speelt de potentiële 
belangentegenstelling tussen de beleggingsadviseur en zijn klant een rol: omdat adviseurs 
vaak over een informatievoorsprong beschikken kan een adviseur, zonder dat de cliënt dit 
direct opmerkt, zijn eigen belang (of het bankbelang) nastreven. Dit fenomeen staat 
bekend als moral hazard. Vooral bij de advisering tot aankoop van bepaalde financiële 
producten zoals beleggingsfondsen speelt dit een rol. Zo weet een adviseur vaak exact wat 
een product kost, terwijl de klant daar minder goed inzicht in heeft.  
Dit proefschrift beslaat zes hoofdstukken waarvan er drie empirisch van aard zijn. Deze 
empirische hoofdstukken beogen inzicht te geven in de waarde van beleggingsadviseurs 
inzake portefeuillesamenstelling, portefeuillerendement en handelsactiviteit.  Ook 
beleggers komen aan het woord: welke voor- en nadelen zien zij van een 
beleggingsadviseur ten opzichte van zelfstandig beleggen. Andere vragen die aan bod 
komen zijn: wie kiest er voor advies en wie niet, en corrigeert advies voor een gebrek aan 
financiële kennis en cognitieve vermogens, de twee oorzaken van minder goede financiële 
beslissingen. Hieronder vat ik elk van de zes hoofdstukken kort samen.  
Hoofdstuk 1 introduceert de economische en de behavioral benadering van de studie naar 
beleggersgedrag, de rollen die een beleggingsadviseur voor particuliere beleggers speelt, 
en de specifieke elementen van de institutionele omgeving waarbinnen beleggingsadvies 
zich afspeelt. De economische benadering biedt een normatief raamwerk waarbinnen 
concepten als rationaliteit, verwachte nutsmaximalisatie en de portefeuilletheorie centraal 
staan. De behavioral benadering, die meer beschrijvend van aard is, neemt beperkte 
rationaliteit als vertrekpunt.  Beperkt rationele actoren worden beïnvloed door de context 
  
178 
 
van de vraagstelling en heuristieken bij het beoordelen en beslissen. Mensen worden 
daarnaast beïnvloed door emoties, zelfdeceptie en sociale krachten. Een adviseur zou met 
beide benaderingen rekening moeten houden: hij of zij moet op de hoogte zijn van de 
normatieve uitgangspunten die de beleggingstheorie biedt, maar mag vanzelfsprekend niet 
blind zijn voor de empirische werkelijkheid waarin beleggers afwijken van normatieve 
gedragingen onder invloed van psychologische mechanismen.  Kahneman en Riepe (1998) 
vatten dit uitgangspunt goed samen als ze stellen dat: “advisors should maximize a client’s 
overall well-being (which includes emotional as well as financial health)”.  
Een adviseur kan diverse functies hebben die ik in dit proefschrift definieer als: financieel 
econoom, financieel psycholoog, persoonlijk adviseur, relatiebeheerder, verkoper en 
onderwijzer. In een adviesrelatie kan elke functie in meer of minder mate een rol spelen. 
De institutionele omgeving waarbinnen beleggingsadvies in Nederland zich afspeelt wordt 
beïnvloed door de Nederlandse Wet Financieel Toezicht (Wft) en de Europese Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). Deze onderscheiden beleggingsadvies en 
execution-only vooral in de mate van de zorgplicht die wordt vereist. Nieuwe 
ontwikkelingen binnen de Nederlandse institutionele context zijn de “Code Banken” die 
het klantenbelang als uitgangspunt neemt en het “Wijzigingsbesluit Financiële Markten 
2013”. Twee elementen daarin zijn voor dit onderzoek met name van belang: de brede 
invoering van een bankierseed voor iedereen die in de bankensector werkt, dus ook voor 
beleggingsadviseurs en, wellicht nog belangrijker: per 1 januari 2014 geldt een 
provisieverbod  bij het adviseren tot aankoop van complexe financiële producten. Na die 
datum mogen adviseurs geen provisie (zoals bestandsvergoeding, retourprovisies of 
plaatsingsvergoeding) meer ontvangen van een aanbieder van beleggingsproducten.  Zij 
moeten hun klanten rechtstreeks laten betalen voor het advies. Hiermee beoogt de 
wetgever perverse prikkels uit het systeem te halen en de kosten meer transparant te 
maken. 
In hoofdstuk 2 vat ik empirisch onderzoek naar het gedrag van particuliere beleggers van 
andere onderzoekers samen. Vanzelfsprekend is er veel heterogeniteit in dit 
beleggersgedrag waar te nemen, maar desalniettemin zijn er zijn enkele gestileerde 
gedragingen te observeren op het gebied van portefeuillesamenstelling, handelsgedrag en 
koop- en verkoopbeslissingen. Ten aanzien van portefeuillebeslissingen valt met name een 
onvoldoende mate van diversificatie op die mede wordt veroorzaakt door naïeve 
diversificatiestrategieën en de (psychologische) invloed van “nabijheid”. Men belegt dan 
relatief te veel in het bedrijf of in de industrie waarin men zelf werkzaam is of in een 
bedrijf dat in de buurt van de eigen woonplaats of in het eigen land gevestigd is. Als we 
kijken naar het handelsgedrag valt op dat sommige groepen excessief veel handelen, 
terwijl andere groepen bijna nooit muteren in hun portefeuille. Koop- en verkoopgedrag 
blijken te worden beïnvloed door diverse heuristieken, emoties, en framing-effecten. Bij 
bestudering van deze door psychologische mechanismen beïnvloede  gedragingen valt op 
dat meer professionaliteit en ervaring beleggingsbeslissingen verbeteren. Uit reeds 
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verschenen publicaties over de invloed van advies komt overigens een gemengd beeld naar 
voren.  
In hoofdstuk 3 presenteer ik empirische resultaten op basis van de bestudering van een 
grote database van een Nederlandse bank.  Bij deze bank hebben alle beleggers de keuze 
of ze gebruik willen maken van het advieskanaal of van execution-only. Bij het vergelijken 
van de twee soorten dienstverlening die beleggers kozen, valt een aantal zaken op: de 
groep beleggers die voor advies kiest bestaat uit meer vrouwen dan mannen en de 
gemiddelde leeftijd is iets hoger dan die van de execution-only groep. Verder is er een 
duidelijk verschil in de portefeuilleomvang; die is namelijk bij de geadviseerde groep 
gemiddeld meer dan vier keer zo groot als bij de execution-only groep. Ook zijn er grote 
verschillen waar te nemen in de portefeuillesamenstelling. Zo bevatten de geadviseerde 
portefeuilles significant meer vastrentende beleggingen, meer beleggingsfondsen en meer 
gestructureerde producten. Daarentegen bevatten de execution-only portefeuilles meer 
aandelen (en binnen die asset class relatief meer individuele aandelenposities) en meer 
derivaten. Al met al valt hieruit op te maken dat execution-only portefeuilles gemiddeld 
genomen meer risico inhouden. Een andere belangrijke bevinding volgt uit de bestudering 
van de rendementen van beide groepen. Hierbij worden drie soorten rendement 
bestudeerd. Zo worden de verschillen in de voor risico gecorrigeerde 
rendementstijdsreeksen van de gemiddelde geadviseerde belegger vergeleken met die van 
de gemiddelde execution-only belegger. Ook worden de rendementen onderzocht waarbij 
wordt gecorrigeerd voor cross-sectionele verschillen in beleggers- en 
portefeuillekarakteristieken. Ten slotte worden rendementstijdsreeksen met elkaar 
vergeleken waaruit timingvaardigheden zijn te destilleren. Al deze vergelijkingen leveren 
een identiek beeld op: tussen beide groepen beleggers wordt geen significant 
risicogecorrigeerd rendementsverschil waargenomen. 
Hoewel bovenstaande resultaten veel interessante inzichten hebben opgeleverd, valt 
daaruit niet op te maken of de beleggingsadviseur al dan niet waarde toevoegt. Om de 
invloed van advies goed te meten heb je namelijk een goede counterfactual nodig en het is 
maar de vraag of de execution-only belegger die goede counterfactual biedt. Idealiter zou 
je namelijk willen weten wat de geadviseerde groep gedaan zou hebben indien deze niet 
voor advies had gekozen, en wat de execution-only groep gedaan zou hebben indien deze 
wél geadviseerd was. Helaas is dat in de werkelijkheid niet te observeren. In hoofdstuk 
vier staat dit probleem centraal, in hoofdstuk drie gebruik ik een methode die toch inzicht 
geeft over de invloed van advies. Hierbij wordt onderzocht wat het effect is op het 
portefeuillegedrag indien een belegger besluit over te stappen van execution-only naar 
advies. Omdat we kunnen waarnemen op welk moment dat gebeurt, kan het gedrag vóór 
en na de adviesinterventie met elkaar worden vergeleken, gecontroleerd voor het gedrag 
dat een vergelijkbare groep in diezelfde periode vertoont.  Uit die analyse blijkt dat de 
adviseurs grote veranderingen in de portefeuille doorvoeren: er wordt meer geld belegd, de 
allocatie naar aandelenbeleggingen daalt en het aantal beleggingsfondsen in de portefeuille 
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stijgt fors (zodat de invloed van “nabijheid”, de home bias, daalt) en er wordt in meer asset 
classes belegd. Deze bevindingen ondersteunen het beeld dat adviseurs zorgen voor een 
betere diversificatie in de portefeuille van particuliere beleggers.  
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt specifiek ingegaan op het probleem dat de waarde van advies niet 
zonder meer kan worden bepaald door vergelijking van geadviseerde beleggers met 
execution-only beleggers. Omdat beleggers zelf de keuze maken welke dienstverlening ze 
kiezen en dus niet op basis van toeval in een van beide groepen terecht zijn gekomen, kan 
er sprake zijn van een z.g. zelfselectiebias. Een voorbeeld kan dit probleem wellicht 
verhelderen: veronderstel dat kundige beleggers er eerder voor kiezen om zelfstandig, dus 
zonder tussenkomst van een adviseur, te beleggen. Omdat zij kundig zijn presteren zij 
beter dan minder kundige beleggers indien die ook niet voor een adviseur zouden hebben 
gekozen. Zij kiezen er in dit voorbeeld juist wel voor om een adviseur te raadplegen. Bij 
vergelijking van de portefeuille-uitkomsten, zonder controle op het verschil in kundigheid, 
dat lastig is te meten, is er sprake van een zelfselectiebias.  Indien blijkt dat beide groepen 
vergelijkbaar presteren, is de minder kundige belegger blijkbaar door het advies op 
hetzelfde niveau geraakt als de kundige belegger. Feitelijk heeft de adviseur hier dus voor 
een performanceverbetering gezorgd hoewel dat niet blijkt uit de directe 
performancevergelijking. 
Omdat soortgelijke problemen veel voorkomen bij het evalueren van interventies die 
buiten een laboratorium plaatsvinden, zijn er diverse econometrische methoden ontwikkeld 
die een oplossing bieden. Zo kan er gebruik worden gemaakt van de panelstructuur van de 
data (er zijn dan van meerdere beleggers over verscheidene periodes observaties 
beschikbaar) of van zogenaamde instrumentele variabelen. Omdat de variabelen waarin we 
geïnteresseerd zijn geen tijdsvariatie kennen en we niet over externe instrumenten 
beschikken, wordt gebruik gemaakt van de Hausman-Taylor methode die specifiek voor 
die situatie is ontwikkeld. Indien de dataset een panelstructuur heeft, kunnen instrumenten 
worden gecreëerd uit transformaties van variabelen. Als aan bepaalde voorwaarden is 
voldaan kan zo de exogene variatie in de advieskeuze worden geïsoleerd en kan er worden 
gecorrigeerd voor zelfselectie. Daarmee wordt dan de causale relatie tussen de 
adviesinterventie en portefeuille-uitkomst duidelijk. De resultaten uit dit hoofdstuk 
bevestigen de resultaten uit hoofdstuk 3. Adviseurs zorgen ervoor dat portefeuilles minder 
idiosyncratisch risico bevatten en dus beter zijn gediversifieerd. Daarnaast wordt nu ook 
een (kleine) rendementsverbetering waargenomen en een lagere handelsactiviteit als 
gevolg van de beleggingsadviezen. Deze bevindingen ondersteunen het eerder genoemde 
voorbeeld dat juist de minder kundige beleggers kiezen voor advies. 
In hoofdstuk 5 presenteer ik de resultaten van een survey-onderzoek onder een groep van 
467 particuliere beleggers. Gegeven de in hoofdstuk twee genoemde bevinding dat met 
name de minder financieel geletterden en minder cognitief begaafden suboptimale 
financiële beslissingen nemen, is  het een relevante vraag of er een relatie bestaat tussen 
financiële geletterdheid, cognitieve vermogens en de keuze voor een adviseur. Een 
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adviseur zou het gebrek aan financiële kunde en cognitieve vermogens wellicht kunnen 
corrigeren. Er blijkt echter geen relatie te bestaan tussen de keuze voor advies of 
execution-only enerzijds en financiële geletterdheid en cognitieve vermogens anderzijds. 
Wel is er een verband tussen de eigen perceptie van de financiële geletterdheid en de keuze 
voor advies. Daaruit blijkt dat mensen die zichzelf als minder financieel kundig zien eerder 
voor een adviseur kiezen. De gepercipieerde financiële geletterdheid blijkt ook de 
meningen over beleggingsadvies en execution-only sterk te beïnvloeden. Zo schatten 
diegenen die zichzelf als minder geletterd zien de voordelen van advies groter in en de 
voordelen van execution-only als kleiner. De nadelen van advies waarderen zij kleiner, 
terwijl zij de nadelen van execution-only juist als groter beoordelen.   
Naast financiële geletterdheid en cognitieve vermogens geeft dit hoofdstuk inzicht in 
andere factoren die bepalen of men kiest voor advies of niet. Daarbij blijkt dat 
laagopgeleiden en mensen met een hogere risicotolerantie minder vaak kiezen voor 
beleggingsadvies. Diegenen met een grotere beleggingsportefeuille, ouderen  en ook 
andere beleggers met vertrouwen in adviseurs, kiezen juist wél voor advies. 
Ten slotte biedt dit hoofdstuk inzicht in de vraag waarom beleggers kiezen voor een 
bepaald dienstverleningskanaal. Dan blijkt dat beleggers met name voor advies kiezen 
omdat het de informatiekosten verlaagt. Zo stellen geadviseerde beleggers dat zij kiezen 
voor een adviseur omdat die meer beleggingskennis heeft,  de portefeuille in de gaten 
houdt, een betere portefeuille samenstelt, beter relevante informatie heeft en een 
tijdsbesparing oplevert. Consistent met die bevinding is dat geadviseerde beleggers veel 
minder dan zelfstandige beleggers financiële informatie verzamelen via andere kanalen 
(Tv-programma’s, kranten, websites, familie en vrienden). Diegene die kiezen voor 
execution-only geven aan zelfstandig te willen beleggen omdat zij de controle willen 
houden over beslissingen, omdat zij meer plezier beleven aan het zelf doen en omdat het 
goedkoper is.   
In het laatste, het zesde, hoofdstuk, bespreek ik de bovenstaande bevindingen in een 
bredere context. Mijn onderzoek toont aan dat advies waarde oplevert wat betreft beter 
gediversifieerde portefeuilles. Dat is een niet te onderschatten voordeel gezien de grote 
hoeveelheid empirische literatuur die erop wijst dat een gebrek aan goede diversificatie een 
van de grootste problemen is die uit de studie naar particulier beleggersgedrag naar voren 
gekomen is.  Mijn onderzoek toont daarnaast aan dat er tussen financiële geletterdheid en 
cognitieve vermogens enerzijds en de keuze voor advies anderzijds geen relatie bestaat. 
Diegenen die meer voordeel bij advies zouden kunnen hebben, kiezen daar dus niet per se 
voor. Daarnaast is uit onderzoek door anderen gebleken dat als er al voor advies wordt 
gekozen, dit advies lang niet altijd wordt opgevolgd. De conclusie lijkt dus 
gerechtvaardigd dat advies wel waardevol is, maar dat het geen afdoende mechanisme is 
om financiële beslissingen van huishoudens te verbeteren. Ik stel dan ook voor advies als 
een onderdeel te beschouwen van een breed scala aan mechanismen die tot doel hebben 
huishoudens betere financiële beslissingen te laten nemen. Hierbij zijn zowel financiële 
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educatie, keuzearchitectuur, regelgeving en het verbeteren van beleggingsadvisering van 
groot belang. 
Financiële educatie lijkt een voor de hand liggende oplossing. Hiermee worden 
huishoudens zelf in staat gesteld om, door een toename van financiële kennis, goede 
beslissingen te nemen. Helaas komt uit empirische studies naar het effect van financiële 
educatie een gemengd beeld naar voren. Ook hier speelt de eerder genoemde kwestie van 
zelfselectie: diegenen die kunnen profiteren van educatie kiezen daar nu juist niet voor 
wegens gebrek aan motivatie of cognitieve vermogens. Verder blijkt het lastig om een 
relatie waar te nemen tussen een financieel opleidingstraject en een gedragsverandering.  
Het probleem daarbij is dat veel financiële keuzes niet frequent worden gemaakt, denk 
bijvoorbeeld aan het kiezen van een hypotheek, een verzekering of een beleggingsproduct.  
Financiële training kan ook leiden tot zelfoverschatting waardoor het effect juist negatief 
kan worden. Inmiddels zijn er aanwijzingen voor het feit dat financiële training een 
positief effect heeft, mits die eenvoudig te begrijpen en eenvoudig te onthouden vuistregels 
bijbrengt (een z.g. rules-of-thumb training). 
Keuzearchitectuur is een begrip dat door Sunstein en Thaler (2003) is geïntroduceerd in 
combinatie met het begrip libertair paternalisme. Keuzearchitectuur is de context 
waarbinnen mensen keuzes maken. Libertair paternalisme is de poging om keuzes zodanig 
te structureren dat ze welvaartsverhogend zijn zonder dat het leidt tot een inperking van de 
keuzevrijheid.  Een van de meest krachtige stuurmechanismen (z.g. nudges) is de 
standaardkeuze (z.g. default) Vaak kiest men de standaardoptie omdat de default als een 
impliciet advies gezien wordt en ook omdat mensen niet van veranderingen houden, soms 
gewoon lui zijn of aan uitstelgedrag lijden. Een “slimme” standaardoptie leidt dan 
automatisch tot een goede beslissing. 
Een interessante applicatie van keuzearchitectuur is ontwikkeld door Thaler en Benartzi 
(2004). Zij ontwikkelden een pensioenspaarplan onder de naam Save More Tomorrow (of 
“SMarT”). Dit plan maakt slim gebruik van enkele psychologische mechanismen. Zo 
hebben de meeste mensen last van verliesaversie: het psychologisch fenomeen dat 
verliezen mentaal zwaarder wegen dan winsten van gelijke omvang. Daarnaast leiden veel 
mensen aan geldillusie: ze denken in nominale en niet in reële termen. Daarom financiert 
dit “SMarT” -plan de pensioenbijdrages uit salarisstijgingen zodat voor besteding 
beschikbare salarissen nominaal niet dalen. Elk jaar dat het salaris stijgt wordt de betaling 
aan het pensioenplan automatisch verhoogd totdat een vooraf vastgesteld maximum 
percentage van het salaris bereikt is. Het plan maakt daarmee handig gebruik van het feit 
dat veel mensen inert zijn en de eenmaal gemaakte keuzes liever niet meer veranderen. 
Daarnaast heeft men er vaak moeite mee om nu al een kostenpost te accepteren voor iets 
dat pas in de toekomst voordeel oplevert  (dit heeft te maken met een gebrek aan 
zelfcontrole en het daaraan gerelateerde hyperbolisch disconteren). Daarentegen heeft men 
vaak minder moeite met een toekomstige kostenpost. Daarom begint de eerste inleg pas 
een jaar nadat een deelnemer zich heeft aangemeld. In de VS is dit plan  bij diverse 
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bedrijven geïntroduceerd in combinatie met de opt-out optie. De default is participeren in 
het plan tenzij je aangeeft dat niet te willen. plan blijkt een groot succes: veel Amerikaanse 
werknemers doen mee en als gevolg daarvan zijn hun pensioenspaarsaldi fors gestegen.  
Keuzearchitectuur kan ook helpen bij het ontwikkelen van eenvoudig te begrijpen 
beleggingsproducten waarbij de keuzes beperkt en de kosten laag zijn. Deze kunnen de 
drempel om te gaan beleggen (die mede samenhangt met choice overload and choice 
complexity) verlagen en een goede keus mogelijk maken. Zo biedt bijvoorbeeld “Brand 
New Day” in Nederland een beleggingsproduct aan via het internet. Hierbij kiest een 
belegger voor een maandelijks en/of eenmalig te storten bedrag en er kan met een 
schuifbalkje worden aangegeven hoe dat bedrag moet worden verdeeld tussen enerzijds 
een wereldwijd gespreid indexfonds en anderzijds een triple-A obligatiefonds. De default  
is een looptijd van 20 jaar, waarbij zodra de einddatum in zich komt, de aandelenallocatie 
langzaam terug wordt gebracht ten gunste van het obligatiedeel. Hoewel dit product niet 
voor iedereen de optimale keuze zal zijn, is het waarschijnlijk superieur ten opzichte van 
veel alternatieve keuzes. 
Hoewel uit dit proefschrift blijkt dat beleggingsadvies waarde toevoegt, is verbetering 
mogelijk. Hierbij denk ik aan de aanpassingen van de incentives en aan de opleiding van 
de beleggingsadviseur. Aan de incentives van adviseurs is al druk gewerkt. In Nederland is 
de wet aangenomen die per 1 januari 2013 voor een aantal financiële producten de 
provisies verbiedt. Per 1 januari 2014 gaan deze regels ook voor beleggingsproducten 
gelden. Op dit moment worden de kosten van een adviseur nog betaald uit 
transactievergoedingen, plaatsingsvergoedingen en bestandsvergoedingen. Hoewel sinds 
enkele jaren deze kosten transparant moeten zijn, lijken veel cliënten zich toch niet bewust 
van de werkelijke kosten van financiële producten. De wetgever heeft daarom besloten dat 
cliënten van hun financiële intermediair rechtstreeks een factuur voor het advies moeten 
ontvangen. Recent zijn door diverse financiële dienstverleners bijvoorbeeld de tarieven 
voor een hypotheekadvies bekend gemaakt, deze tarieven liggen tussen de €2.000 en 
€3.000. Ook voor beleggingsadviezen zullen dergelijke vergoedingssystemen worden 
ingevoerd. Op het eerste gezicht lijkt dit plan een goed idee. Klanten worden bewust 
gemaakt van de kosten van advies en zo kunnen zij een meer afgewogen oordeel vellen 
over de waarde die het advies oplevert en de kosten daarvan. Het uitbannen van perverse 
prikkels en de grotere transparantie zijn noodzakelijk maar het nieuwe systeem heeft, net 
als het oude systeem, zijn nadelen. Zo is voor veel mensen de waarde van een advies niet 
goed waar te nemen en zeker niet op korte termijn. De financiële consument zal nu 
wellicht eerder kiezen voor execution-only, dus beslissen zonder advies, en het is maar de 
vraag of dat tot betere uitkomsten leidt ook al zijn de directe kosten bij die keuze lager. 
Indien men wél voor advies kiest, moet men zich realiseren dat wanneer de prikkel bij de 
adviseur om een product te adviseren dat de hoogste provisie oplevert weggenomen is, er 
andere financiële prikkels voor in de plaats kunnen komen. In een systeem waarbij een 
adviseur bestede uren in rekening gaat brengen, heeft de adviseur misschien de neiging om 
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het aantal te besteden uren te maximaliseren. Bij een vaste vergoeding, een vergoeding 
gebaseerd op assets-under-management of een doorlopende bestandsvergoeding op basis 
van een abonnement, ontstaat juist een prikkel om, nadat het advies eenmaal tot een 
beleggingsportefeuille heeft geleidt, daar niets meer aan te doen, omdat de inkomsten van 
de adviseur niet meer van enige verdere inspanning afhangen.  Hoewel het lastig is om een 
systeem te ontwikkelen dat al deze problemen ondervangt, is het goed om zich te 
realiseren dat elk systeem zowel voor- als nadelen kent. De wetgever had er overigens ook 
voor kunnen kiezen om een zekere intransparantie te laten bestaan maar wél de hoogte van 
de provisie aan banden te leggen. 
Ook over het opleidingstraject van adviseurs is het een en ander op te merken. In het 
bestaande curriculum van beleggings- en financiële adviseurs is er geen of slechts beperkte 
aandacht voor (beleggers)psychologie, terwijl juist psychologische mechanismen de 
beslissingen en evaluatie van uitkomsten in grote mate beïnvloeden. In hoofdstuk 1 heb ik 
daarom de rol van financieel psycholoog als een van de functies van een 
beleggingsadviseur geïntroduceerd. Inzicht in beleggerspsychologie maakt de adviseur 
bewust van de rol die psychologie speelt in de besluitvorming van cliënten en van de  rol 
die zij speelt bij de eigen besluitvorming. Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat, net als 
particuliere beleggers, ook adviseurs niet vrij zijn van biases in hun oordeels- en 
besluitvorming. Ter verduidelijking  geef ik een voorbeeld waaruit blijkt hoe het inzicht in 
beleggerspsychologie behulpzaam kan zijn in een adviesrelatie: voordat advies wordt 
gegeven, wordt een zogenaamd cliëntprofiel opgesteld, waarin zaken als beleggingsdoelen, 
kennis, ervaring en preferenties zijn opgenomen. Centraal hierbij staat het bepalen van de 
risicobereidheid van een belegger. Op dit moment worden risico’s veelal getoond als 
standaarddeviaties van historische rendementen behorende bij diverse asset-allocaties. Uit 
onderzoek blijkt echter dat de standaarddeviatie niet altijd aansluit bij de wijze waarop 
beleggers risico’s percipiëren. Soms zijn beleggers geïnteresseerd in de kans om geld te 
verliezen, soms in de maximale omvang van dat verlies, en in andere gevallen in de kans 
om het beoogde doel niet te bereiken. Ook heeft een belegger vaak simultaan verschillende 
niveaus van risicobereidheid, afhankelijk van onder andere de beleggingsdoelen en de 
herkomst van het geld. Daarbij komt dat veel mensen moeite hebben om al vooraf 
toekomstige emoties in te schatten, men realiseert zich vaak pas achteraf dat de eigen 
risicobereidheid toch anders is dan men meende te weten. Het presenteren van risico als 
standaarddeviatie leidt dus niet per se tot een correcte cliëntprofilering. 
Hoofdstuk zes wordt afgesloten met enkele suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek. Ik stel 
voor om de waarde van advies in een experimentele opzet te onderzoeken. Het probleem 
van zelfselectie kan dan in de onderzoeksopzet al worden aangepakt in tegenstelling tot de 
correctie achteraf die in het proefschrift is gebruikt. Ook stel ik voor de adviseur zelf een 
stem te geven en door onderzoek bij beleggingsadviseurs meer inzicht te verkrijgen in hun 
eigen mening over de toegevoegde waarde van hun advies. Ten slotte stel ik een 
onderzoek voor waarbij gebruik gemaakt wordt van onderzoekers die zich voordoen als 
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klant van een beleggingsadviseur. Zij laten zich adviseren zonder dat de adviseur weet van 
het onderzoek. Zo kan meer inzicht verkregen worden in datgene wat zich exact in het 
adviestraject voordoet. 
Al met al, laten de resultaten zien dat adviseurs een nuttige bijdrage kunnen leveren bij het 
nemen van financiële beslissingen door huishoudens. Advies alleen is echter niet 
voldoende. In combinatie met  financiële educatie, aangepaste regelgeving, en 
keuzearchitectuur, kan het leiden tot een gezondere financiële toekomst van particulieren. 
 
